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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Concepts and Terminology 
Using general terms such as globalisation, international liberalisation, deregulation 
or economic interdependence frequently leads to a debate over how one actually 
defines these concepts.  Once defined, they can be used to identify and explain 
change in the political and economic arenas of industries and contribute to the 
existing political science lexicon.  It is therefore important to address these issues 
at the outset of this paper and how they will be used, to minimise any ambiguity 
specific terminology can generate.  Liberalisation is frequently used interchangeably 
with de-regulation and many use the term globalisation to suggest that the 
independence of sovereign state decision-making ability has been eroded or 
transferred to some undisclosed power above or beyond the state.  For 
international air transport, this could not be further from the truth, despite 
suggestions to the contrary.   
In the context of this study, de-regulation is not synonymous with liberalisation.  
The difference between the two, in very simplistic terms, is that the former refers 
to a domestic arena while the latter denotes an international one.  The usage of de-
regulation in the air transport sector arose when the US government lifted the very 
restrictive terms of operations for the cargo sector in 1977 and the dismantling of 
the Civil Aviation Board (CAB) in 1978.1  However this only applied to the domestic 
operators and was intended to allow competitive market forces to determine the 
shape of the industry and to stimulate a competitive market place.2  The traditional 
market restrictions determining where, when, and how often an airline could fly 
between city pairs without applying to the government for permission meant the 
airlines could develop corporate strategies based solely on market criteria for the 
first time in the history of the industry.  Service requirements to specified 
destinations, usually small or remote communities, were either abandoned or 
relaxed making it no longer necessary for airlines to cross-subsidise operations due 
to these regulations.3  Other market restrictions such as self-determination of 
                                          
1 Paul Stephen Dempsey and Andrew Goetz, Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology, 
1992. 
2Daniel M. Kasper, Deregulation and Globalization:  Liberalising International Trade in Air Services, 
1998; and George Williams, The Airline Industry and the Impact of Deregulation, 1993. 
3 While this was the case in the US, in other countries such as Canada, regulations to serve 
remote regions remained in place.   
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frequencies between city pairs were also removed.  Nevertheless, these changes 
only applied to the country’s airlines and did not affect or change the terms and 
conditions of international air services agreements (ASAs). 
The term liberalisation refers to international trade rules that govern how tariff and 
non-tariff barriers will be reduced or removed between or among a group of states.  
International agreements determine inter alia, market access, national treatment, 
and levels of foreign ownership.  In short, it is the trade barriers that are affected 
when liberalisation occurs, not the national regulatory structures that govern the 
operational aspects of a given industry.  This is particularly true in the case of 
international trade in services, which includes the air transport sector.  
This services industry was, is, and will likely remain one of the most highly 
regulated industries in both domestic and international trade arenas.  Regulatory 
authorities exist at local, regional and national levels of government to ensure 
safety standards are not compromised.  In addition to the national authorities, the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a special body of the United 
Nations, issues recommended practices for technical and safety standards 
throughout the industry and the decisions are voted on by the Member States.  
Government regulators usually follow these standards, although unlike the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) there are no multilateral enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure standards and procedures are followed.  Liberalisation of international air 
transport in this context has been conducted primarily under traditional state 
bilateral negotiations and has been expressed through abolishing or relaxing 
restrictions in tariffs, capacity route allocation, and “doing business” matters.4   
The industry is global insofar as it exists throughout the world, however it is purely 
trans-national due to the conditions set out in the bilateral regime of state-to-state 
negotiations.  The strict limitation on foreign ownership and effective control of an 
airline in most countries prevents these companies from becoming multinational.  
Although international air transport is a global industry, it remains particularly 
resistant to liberalisation in both its traditional bilateral framework and in the 
multilateral system of progressive liberalisation under the WTO.  Airlines physically 
operate out of and back into their home territories although third and fourth 
country routes are allocated reciprocally under bilaterally negotiated agreements.  
Code-share5 agreements with other flag carriers expand the number of destinations 
                                          
4 “Doing business” matters refer to the sub-sector or infrastructure industries that support airline 
operations.  These will be discussed in greater detail throughout the study. 
5 Code-sharing is “…the use of the flight designator code of one air carrier on a service performed 
by a second air carrier, which service is usually also identified (and may be required to be 
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but do not alter the trans-national nature of an air carrier’s route structure and 
therefore reflect the structural limitations of the bilateral regime. 
The Thesis Framework 
The thematic framework of this thesis covers the first WTO Air Transport Review 
(the Review), which began in September 2000 and ended in October 2003.  
Although the Review ended after three years without any changes to the Air 
Transport Annex (the Annex6) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), it is a rich forum for analysing the disparate factors that impact multilateral 
discussions at the WTO and shows us why any undertaking is a long and drawn out 
process.  Moreover, it provides us with a counterpart perspective to observers who 
frequently cite any failed talks to be the prelude for the imminent demise of the 
WTO as an International Organization (IO).  This work is intended not only to shed 
light on the institutional processes, but also to highlight the numerous factors that 
influence negotiating positions of the WTO Members, thereby furthering our 
understanding about the role of the WTO vis-à-vis national government goals and 
objectives, and how these are translated into negotiating positions. 
Why study the impact of the WTO on air transport when this sector is mostly 
excluded from the scope of coverage by the GATS and appears to be singularly 
resistant to multilateral liberalisation?  The first reason is to highlight the tensions 
that continue to exist between the universal belief in territorially defined state 
sovereignty and the increasing economic interdependence among all states 
(globalisation).  Also it is to put to rest the notion that the WTO pushes its 
liberalising agenda on nation states by focusing on how negotiators, on behalf of 
their governments, advocate for or against liberalising a given sector or sub-sector. 
Second, international air transport plays a key role in national prosperity by 
maintaining and/or expanding economic linkages through the lowering of trade 
barriers.  It is of fundamental importance in promoting the economic well-being and 
growth of local, national, and regional economies in addition to the global economy.  
Thus, there is a strong link to the debate about the purpose and consequences of 
having a multilateral trading system.   
Third, analysing international air transport liberalisation and the WTO/GATS 
provides an insight into the economic and political forces that exist in this industry 
and that have an impact upon international trade negotiations.  Without air 
                                                                                                                         
identified) as a service of, and being performed by, the second air carrier”.  ICAO Manual on the 
Regulation of International Air Transport, Doc 9626, 1996, p 4.1.7. 
6 See Appendix 2 for the full text of the Annex on Air Transport. 
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transport linkages corporations would have difficulty moving goods domestically or 
for export and import, particularly corporations using the “just-in-time” method of 
supply chain management.  It would also increase the difficulty of movement for 
people conducting time sensitive business, tourism, and for some developing 
countries, acquiring hard currencies. 
Fourth, it is precisely because international air transport has been mostly excluded 
from the GATS coverage that examination of the industry and its infrastructure 
industries can assist us in attempting to identify where the political agency for 
change (i.e. catalyst) is located.  In other words, analysing the Review negotiations 
provides a rich forum for understanding why Member States will advocate 
liberalisation in some sectors and not in others, thus giving us a predictive tool 
when looking at other services negotiations such as those that began in 2000 under 
the mandate of Article XIX of the GATS.7   
Finally, the Review was chosen as the focus of analysis because it remains an 
anomaly within the GATS through its extensive exclusion of coverage and due to 
the importance of international air transport throughout the world economy.  
International air transport was the only specific industry exclusion granted under 
the GATS during the Uruguay Round (1986 – 1994).  Given the Review clause in 
the Annex, can we say definitively that the exclusion will last in perpetuity or do 
factors exist that can tell us how the regime might change?   
My interest in this research project also stems from the magnitude of the complex 
co-ordination (both operational and regulatory spheres) required for the air 
transport industry to function safely and smoothly and how this could evolve under 
the GATS.  Would any shift to the multilateral regime from the bilateral one impact 
safety or lead to flags of convenience?8  To ensure the safe departure and arrival of 
millions of passengers and tonnes of cargo every year from point of origin to the 
final destination requires at the outset, high levels of expertise, technology, and 
capital under a wide range of commercial restrictions.  It also requires countless 
safety regulations, and a highly skilled work force.  Although the industry is global 
in scope, it remains trans-national in structure, and relative to other sectors (e.g. 
telecommunications or finance) it remains relatively restrictive and hence less 
                                          
7 Article XΙX is the first of three articles in Part ΙV of the GATS entitled “Progressive Liberalization” 
that mandates “successive rounds of negotiations”, GATS:  The General Agreement on Trade in 
Services, and Related Instruments, April 1994. 
8 Flying a “flag of convenience” originates from the maritime sector whereby a ship owner can 
register their ship in any country of choice.  This has led to concerns primarily over safety 
standards.  Some countries are known to offer ship owners cheap registration fee, low or no 
taxation and no labour standards.  http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/flags/guide.htm. 
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competitive.  Any liberalisation that has occurred continues to be embedded in the 
bilateral regime that has governed the economic regulation of the industry for over 
fifty years.  Despite calls by some to liberalise this sector on a basis other than 
bilaterally, it remains singularly resistant to change. 
More specifically, this study provides a different perspective for deciding whether 
the WTO could have a direct impact on liberalising international air transport under 
a single set of multilateral rules rather than the traditional bilateral framework.  The 
analytical approach that will be undertaken examines the negotiations and 
negotiators juxtaposed against market forces and other factors that influence 
Member State positions.  This not only deepens our understanding of why Members 
have taken their respective positions on the topic of the multilateral liberalisation of 
international air transport but it also helps to expose the underlying factors that 
cause a state to take one position or another, oftentimes in contrast to opposite 
positions in other negotiating fora or trade sectors within the WTO.  Using such an 
approach also provides us with greater understanding of how and why regime 
change (or not) occurs in a global industry. 
Ultimately we are looking to see if what we uncover in the Review sessions can be 
generalised and used as a tool to understand and possibly provide some predictive 
elements in other industries or international political economy topics.  Some 
academics may query the value of using the Review as a reliable factor in the 
analysis due to the stalemate that ended the official sessions.  However, the 
analysis is less about whether the first Review can be considered to be successful, 
but rather about what the negotiating process and positions can tell us about: how 
different states view the liberalisation process; how they view the different types of 
negotiations and negotiating fora; and where they stand to gain the most from 
negotiating partners.  Thus, we will look at the market conditions prior to and 
during the Review to see whether we can expect to see movement from the rigidly 
bilateral regime to a multilateral one under the WTO in future Air Transport Reviews 
that are mandated to occur on a regular basis into the future.  
Since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade talks in 1994, and the 
beginning of the WTO as an official IO, there has been heightened attention given 
to the speed and effects of an increasingly interdependent economic and regulatory 
world.  Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), organised labour groups and civil 
society at large have raising their voices about the growing power of the WTO and 
the alleged loss of independent national sovereignty.  However, what is often 
overlooked is who or what might be behind these changes.  Much of the media 
coverage about trade issues (further liberalisation or disputes) speaks of the WTO 
  6 
as if it were based on the same principles as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
or the World Bank (WB), which have power somewhat distinct from the 
governments that provide operational funding.9  However, for the WTO this is not 
the case.  The institutional structure of this International Organisation (IO) is 
different because it is very much a Member driven organisation and the Members 
are official delegates of national governments.10  The Secretariat, while influential, 
does not direct any policy that is ultimately adopted by the Members.  This is 
certainly the case for the Review and any possible expansion of the GATS over air 
transport. 
International air transport is both a national and a global infrastructure industry 
that is critical to the economic prosperity of sovereign states and the world 
economy.  In combination with international finance, telecommunications (post and 
telecoms) and maritime, air transport is a key element of the interdependent world 
we live in today.  It is also one of the most political industries due to its historical 
links to the state, territorial sovereignty, and thus national security.  These linkages 
are expressed and embedded in a bilateral regime of economic regulations that has 
not evolved extensively from the original framework.   
Although the international economic regulatory regime for this sector remains 
restrictive, bilateral liberalisation has occurred and it would be remiss to discount or 
ignore efforts that have already been made by numerous states to push 
liberalisation forward at the domestic level (deregulation) and the international 
level (liberalisation).  This trend was led by the United States (US) deregulation in 
1977 (cargo airlines) and 1978 (passenger airlines), and followed upon by Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and others.  In the same vein, the European Union (EU)11 
and its Member States undertook extensive liberalisation among themselves, 
effectively shifting away from the traditional bilateral framework.12  It is therefore 
                                          
9 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are Bretton Woods institutions.  Although 
the World Trade Organisation is neither a Bretton Woods institution, nor the United Nations, it 
does maintain relations with both.   Richard Blackhurst, “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT):  Origins of the GATT”, forthcoming in Princeton Encyclopaedia of the World Economy, 
Princeton University Press, 2007. 
10 The definition of a Member of the WTO is:  they are States and any separate customs territory 
free to conduct its own external relations.  Guide to the Uruguay Round Agreements. p 12. 
11 Throughout this paper the name European Union (EU) will be used when referring to the 
political and economic entity outside of the WTO and European Communities (EC) will be used 
when speaking about it as a Member of the WTO.  This is because the former is the current official 
name whereas within the WTO the EU is officially called the European Communities (EC). 
12 Presently the economic regulations also include non-EU countries like Switzerland (CH) due to 
the full ratification of the first EU – CH bilateral (16 October 2000).  This Agreement consists of 
seven economic sectors including civil aviation.  For explanatory notes on civil aviation see:  
http://www.europa.admin.ch/ba/expl/factsheet/e/luftverkehr.htm. 
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valid to say that many developed countries (there are some notable exceptions) 
have demonstrated a desire and willingness to move definitively away from the 
extremely restrictive economic regulation of the original bilateral agreements that 
governed international air transport and all its sub-sector industries throughout the 
twentieth century.  The trend has continued to include developing countries; 
therefore the issue is not whether liberalisation should occur but how and in which 
forum. 
Given this background one would assume that the Review would have been an 
opportunity to begin further liberalisation and would see the European Communities 
(EC) and the US joining together to begin the process of expanding the scope of the 
Annex.  Assuming this to be the case, it is counter-intuitive to expect either of 
these powerful WTO Members to resist any expansion of GATS coverage.  Yet 
despite the progress made at the bilateral level and the stated desire of the US to 
drive liberalisation forward, it (and others) blocked all attempts to expand the 
coverage of the GATS over the air transport sector, including sub-sectors that can 
operate independently of traffic rights. 
The first Air Transport Review, in conformity with the Uruguay Round Mandate 
began in 2000.  The terms, as laid out in paragraph five of the Annex, states that 
“[t]he Council for Trade in Services shall review periodically, and at least every five 
years, developments in the air transport sector and the operation of this Annex with 
a view to considering the possible further application of the Agreement in this 
sector.”   Thus, the objective of the Review was two-fold.  One part was to address 
the economic and regulatory changes throughout the industry, while the other was 
to examine the operation of the Annex with an eye to expanding coverage of the 
GATS.  How the Review was to proceed would appear to be self-explanatory:  
examine the economic and regulatory changes throughout the entire industry to 
identify the sub-sectors that would benefit from a single set of multilateral rules, 
and expand coverage as appropriate.  Through this process, one would have 
expected to see incremental coverage begin to occur.  Given the continued efforts 
by inter alia, the EU and the US to liberalise bilaterally, the Review would be 
concluded easily and quickly, however, this was not the case.   
The Review was not only dragged out over three years, but there were deep 
divisions among Members regarding expanding coverage of the GATS to this sector, 
over the definition of “…every five years…”, and over which sub-sectors belonged 
within the definition of being directly related to traffic rights or so-called hard 
rights.  It was clear that there were two distinct camps; one side argued that the 
bilateral system had worked well to liberalise the sector, while the other side 
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believes that liberalisation limits have already been reached and therefore the 
multilateral system should now be used to advance the process further. 
The pro-bilateral group was very clear at the outset of the Review that every effort 
would be made to retain the economic regulatory status quo.  Although at one level 
this position seems counter-intuitive, it suggests that these Members believe they 
have more to gain by taking this stand and leads to the question:  what types of 
gains?  Do some in this group, by simultaneously pursuing liberalisation bilaterally 
and opposing it at the multilateral level provide an insight into whether 
international air transport is going to remain mired in perpetuity within a regulatory 
framework constructed in 1944, or can we expect to see some type of regime 
change over time?  And, if so, how might it proceed? 
Among the issues that are being examined here is the question of why the two 
largest and arguably the most powerful Members of the WTO stand in such stark 
contrast to one another.  In turn this leads to a myriad of further questions about 
the industry and national policies over air transport and about liberalisation of 
services industries in general.  First and foremost, for the purposes of this paper, 
can we learn anything from the Review that sheds light on the reasons why some 
Members would choose the multilateral arena to further the already established 
liberalising trend and others the traditional bilateral negotiating process?  Second, 
can we take the uncovered knowledge and use it to predict whether international 
air transport will remain essentially a bilaterally regulated sector, or can we identify 
anything that will suggest a different future, or even argue that eventually the 
GATS will be expanded to cover many if not all sub-sectors of the industry? 
Given the complexity of the industry as a whole, which includes inter alia:  the 
uneven liberalisation that has occurred under the bilateral system; the extensive 
regulatory oversight by ICAO on technical and safety regulations; the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA), and the number of sub-sector industries that must 
be taken into account, it has been necessary to work within a theoretical framework 
that can accommodate all aspects of the industry.   
After surveying the mainstream theoretical frameworks that are used in political 
science, it became apparent that most, if not all, would be unable to accommodate 
the complexities and the dynamic nature of change within international air 
transport.  Mostly, they do not explain why the two largest aviation markets, both 
of which have been deregulated internally and liberalised internationally, are so 
divided on multilateral liberalisation.  It became obvious that a middle road theory 
would be most appropriate for uncovering the fundamental reasons for the radically 
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different positions taken during the Review and to show how this can be 
generalised into a broader theoretical framework.  Can one truly understand change 
without accounting for all the infrastructure industries, the core airline sector, and 
the plethora of regulatory agencies without omitting valuable insights or taking into 
account the contextual setting of the industry and its component parts?  At the 
same time, do we lose sight of our focus by including so much in the analysis? 
The willingness of some to move from a bilateral framework to a multilateral one 
under the WTO is questionable when analysing the formal sessions of the Review 
and its results.  Although professing a strong desire to liberalise at the international 
level and openly acknowledging the benefits of further liberalisation, the pro-
bilateral group made it clear that multilateral liberalisation was not appropriate for 
the international air transport industry, raising questions about the reasoning 
behind this position.  In the case of the US, a strong advocate of trade liberalisation 
in general and this industry in particular, opposition to expanded coverage of the 
GATS over air transport is indeed puzzling.   
In contrast, others worked hard to convince everyone that expanding coverage of 
the GATS could in fact go a long way in rectifying some of the inherent problems 
they believe exist within the bilateral system. In doing so, the benefits of 
multilateral liberalisation would accrue to all participating States — increasing the 
pie rather than merely redistributing the available pieces.   
These differences, the questions they raised, and how to answer them became an 
intriguing puzzle that is the basis for this study.   
Hypothesis 
This thesis posits that a gradual and incremental expansion of GATS coverage over 
air transport sub-sector industries will take place despite the stalemate that 
occurred in the first Air Transport Review.  To support this position it will be argued 
that Member States are influenced by independent variables that are exogenous to 
negotiations in the WTO such as the level of existing liberal agreements in the 
sector, geographic location, economic size and level of development, and the 
strength of individual corporations in the world economy.  Changes in the market 
arena will eventually impact Members’ willingness to begin expanding GATS 
coverage of Air Transport in future Reviews and thus begin the gradual shift from a 
strictly bilateral regime to one that accepts multilateral trade rules to operate in 
tandem with bilateral rules.  In particular, it will be argued that the sub-sectors not 
bound by or subjected to foreign ownership restrictions and do not require traffic 
rights to operate internationally will be the first to be covered by the GATS. 
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It is common knowledge that economic nationalism or national market interests 
drive a State’s liberalising agenda.  States with industries that are competitive and 
expanding are likely to support multilateral liberalisation whereas those with 
industries that are less competitive or struggling financially will be less likely to 
support this avenue of liberalisation.  If the state believes it can gain more through 
bilateral liberalisation, regardless of the reasons, it will favour this route because 
economic size and political power can influence the outcome of negotiated 
agreements.  One obvious example is the US.  It retains strength in the bilateral 
arena due to its political and economic power, and the importance of access to its 
huge domestic market by foreign interests.  In the bilateral arena it can ensure 
liberalisation will occur in the manner and timing of its choosing while protecting 
the interests of its airlines in the domestic air transport market.   
In start contrast the EC has been a strong proponent of expanding the GATS to 
cover some of the sub-sectors.  Its interests in accomplishing this goal appear two-
fold:  to push its own agenda for increasing the Commission’s authority over this 
sector, thereby increasing its authority over air transport, and because the sub-
sector industries in question are global market leaders.  In pursuing this agenda the 
EC has gone further than the US in liberalising air transport by creating a common 
aviation area (CAA) among its Member States and other European countries.   
In the case of developed but small open economies, one would expect to find 
support for increased coverage of air transport by the GATS, based on their 
economically positive experiences with pursuing open market policies.  This would 
be particularly the case for geographically distant countries that lack a geostrategic 
position and a small domestic market.  One would therefore expect Members like 
Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Australia, or Chile to prefer moving toward a 
multilateral regime and not be satisfied with the bilateral status quo.   
At the other end of the developed country scale it would be valid to assume nations 
that are located in geographically strategic positions, or those with a large domestic 
market and a mature domestic air transport industry, will support the existing 
bilateral regime.  These states know that they are negotiating from a stronger 
position due to either required over-flight permission, or the importance of market 
access for the bilateral partner.  Thus the assumption is based on the obvious 
imbalance that exists between negotiating partners.   
For the developing world one could expect countries with a large or substantial 
tourism industry to support a multilateral regime, whereas the least developed 
countries would prefer the status quo in order to assure the viability of their flag 
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carriers (an important earning capacity of hard currencies) and would support 
bilateralism. 
The different types of negotiations must also be taken into account and whether 
they are conducted bilaterally or within a multilateral setting.  Depending in which 
setting the negotiations are conducted, the outcomes can vary substantially due to 
the ability or lack thereof to use other industrial sectors as bargaining chips.  In 
strictly bilateral settings, such as in air transport negotiations, economic size and 
political power can influence the outcome.  Thus, the processes and outcomes will 
affect how liberalisation of a given industry will evolve.   
The question is not whether the industry should liberalise, but under what economic 
regulatory jurisdiction.  Agreement on the need to liberalise is almost unanimous.  
This is because it is recognised that further liberalisation in this sector will be 
beneficial in terms of cost to the travelling public and for the transportation of 
goods around the world.  Moreover, the barriers to foreign investment and 
ownership have already been breached in some sub-sectors, like ground-handling 
or airport management services.  Resulting from the outsourcing trend of the major 
airlines in the 1990s, many of the sub-sectors that were traditionally departments 
within an airline have been sold off to independent companies.  Oftentimes these 
companies are not airlines and once sold to a non-airline corporation, foreign 
ownership restrictions cease to apply.   
Extrapolations from interviews, informal personal discussions, formal Member 
submissions and interventions during the Review, in combination with empirical 
evidence (statistical analysis using linear regression) suggest that coverage will 
begin with the sub-sectors that are the least connected to traffic rights (hard rights) 
and in sub-sectors where international consolidation has already occurred.13  Traffic 
rights will, in all likelihood, remain in the bilateral sphere far into the future due to 
the universal perception that they are intrinsically linked to national control over 
sovereign territory.  In short, it will be argued that despite the adamant positions of 
some WTO Members against expanding GATS coverage of the air transport sector, 
it is likely that changes exogenous to the WTO will be the catalyst for a slow but 
                                          
13 Although many informal discussions were held during the research phase of the Secretariat 
background papers and throughout the Review, names will be withheld unless specific permission 
was granted.  Given the sensitive political nature of the Review and that many discussions were 
off record and therefore not official government positions, it is not possible to cite all the sources 
for this study.  In some instances permission was not requested and therefore not given and in 
others the request to withhold the name was made.  Every attempt has been made to respect 
confidentiality requests while simultaneously ensuring accuracy of given perspectives and 
thoughts. 
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definitive move from a purely bilateral regime to one that includes some sub-
sectors being covered by the GATS. 
Research Strategy 
The primary research strategy that supports my argument is to look at all the 
relevant component parts of the industry prior to and during the Review period and 
evaluate the degree of influence they hold over national positions.  This will give an 
indication of the factors that are most influential over national positions within the 
multilateral Review Sessions.  The research is divided into three parts:  the first is 
descriptive, the second economic and regulatory, and the third empirical.  The 
information for the descriptive part of the work is drawn from the written 
submissions and oral interventions made by the delegates who participated 
throughout the Review.  Included here are discussions with industry experts who 
work in the policy and operational areas of the industry and some of the 
participating delegates.   
The industry information is based on the research and writing that was done for the 
secretariat background papers.  This included the regulatory and economic changes 
the industry went through between 1994 and 2000 and was updated to 2004 for 
this study.  The empirical section is based on the data research drawn from the 
actual market data available and the Review discussions.  From this the dependent 
variable became a Member’s position regarding GATS expansion, and the 
independent variables include the most discussed sub-sector topics and points 
raised that appeared to have significant value to the different Members arguing 
their position. 
Chapter Overview 
The structure of the chapters is set up to address, to the greatest extent possible, a 
systematic approach that begins with addressing the puzzle of why air transport 
continues to remain an anomaly within the GATS and to set out my arguments in 
an attempt to find an answer.  Chapter 2 sets the argument within the theoretical 
framework of economic negotiations, which is based on John Odell’s (2000, 2006) 
work in the area of negotiations theory.  Chapter 3 sets the context and history of 
the international air transport regime in order to clarify the background and 
liberalisation trends that have occurred within the bilateral economic regulatory 
framework.  Chapter 4 examines the international political economy of the WTO, 
how it developed from the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) into a 
Member driven IO with an integral role in making and enforcing world trade rules.  
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Chapter 5 has two parts.  Part I provides an overview of the discussions that took 
place during the Review and Part II presents the empirical work of the study.  
Together, the descriptive and empirical work set the context for the two subsequent 
case study chapters.  Chapters 6 and 7 present the cases by describing and 
analysing individual Members’ negotiating positions to demonstrate how various 
factors influence the stand taken by the national trade representatives.  Finally, 
Chapter 8 draws together all the strands, providing a conclusion to the original 
puzzle, questions, and argument that have been the foundation of the research.  
I have been privileged to have participated in the research and writing of the 
Secretariat background papers for the Review, which permitted me to attend all the 
formal Review Sessions, and have extensive access to capital city based experts 
attending the meetings.  The research and interaction with participants provided 
me with much of the information I used to conduct my research. 
  14 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Framework 
The question of economic regulatory regimes, and where the agency promoting 
change is located, begins with the assumption that the changing market is a 
primary factor influencing industry actors regardless of whether they are from the 
private or public sector.  These actors in turn actively try to influence policy makers 
and ultimately the positions adopted by national representatives in international 
negotiations irrespective of the type (bilateral or multilateral).  However, one could 
also argue that political factors in the domestic and international sphere that are 
exogenous to the industry are important when it comes to locating the catalyst for 
change in a given industry.   
Can one truly understand change without taking into account the infrastructure 
industries, the core airline sector, and the plethora of regulatory agencies without 
omitting valuable insights or taking into account the contextual setting of the 
industry and its component parts?  At the same time would we lose sight of our 
focus by including so much in our analysis?  Thus, the theoretical framework used 
for this study must expose the underlying factors that led to the radically different 
positions taken during the Air Transport Review (the Review) and show how this 
can be generalised to other fields of political inquiry.   
Finding a theoretical framework that is able to encompass the regulatory 
complexity and political sensitivities surrounding air transport has been a 
troublesome task due in part to the surprising lack of political analysis about this 
economically important industry.  Political scientists, when analysing air transport, 
have tended to focus on individual parts of the industry or looked at domestic 
changes rather than taking a macro approach and examining the global linkages in 
conjunction with the domestic environment.14  Most of all there is a paucity of 
analysis that takes into account how market conditions might impact national 
policies in this particular industrial sector, or how in some instances political choices 
are made that appear to contradict existing policy platforms.15   
                                          
14 Helen Milner, “The Interaction of Domestic and International Politics:  the Anglo-American Oil 
Negotiations and the International Civil Aviation Negotiation, 1943-1947 in Double-Edged 
Diplomacy:  International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, eds., Peter B Evans, Harold K. 
Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, 1993. pp 207-230.  Baldev Raj Nayar, “Regimes, Power, and 
International Aviation” in International Organization, Volume 49, Number 1, Winter 1995, pp 139-
170. 
15 This is in direct reference to the UK bilateral position vis-à-vis the US.  The UK has a fully 
deregulated domestic market, is a member of the Common EU aviation area and yet has not 
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After surveying the mainstream theoretical frameworks in political science, it 
became apparent that most, if not all, would be unable to accommodate the 
complexities and dynamic nature of change within international air transport.  Using 
these theories it is difficult to explain why the two largest aviation markets, both of 
which have been deregulated internally and liberalised internationally (to varying 
degrees), had such opposing views on whether aspects of the industry are suitable 
for multilateral liberalisation rather than through the existing bilateral regime.   
Without going into any depth, it is important to acknowledge briefly the main 
strand of political theory that has predominated how we perceive inter-state 
relations in modern times and the tools we use to understand how the international 
world operates.  The starting point would be to acknowledge the realist school of 
thought since this perspective has dominated the study of international relations for 
much of the twentieth century.  Realists take the position that we are presently 
living in an anarchic world of sovereign states and thus the level of analysis should 
be focused at interstate relations to find explanations for how international relations 
are conducted and where these tend to lead us into the future.   
Like any theory realism has numerous strands that have emerged over time, 
although adherents primarily believe that the state and its actions are at the core of 
inter-state relations.  As noted by Robert Jackson, “[t]he ethics of statecraft is at 
the heart of realist ethics” (p 211).  For our purposes this suggests that the unit of 
analysis would remain at the state level and therefore does not provide enough 
theoretical room to account for how policy and decisions are formulated and what 
input factors are significantly influential.  While realist theory can explain the 
historical construction of the international regime, it does not adequately identify 
changing relationships between states and what lies beneath the change, 
particularly when trying to account for the influence of non-state actors, be it 
directly or indirectly.  So long as the air transport industry remained in a pure 
bilateral framework operating in the closed arena of high level diplomacy, state 
analysis sufficed.  In such a setting it is logical to assume or perceive states as 
sovereign rational actors, operating on the assumption of power relations 
(economic and military).  However, developing an analytical framework to account 
for change outside of the state becomes problematic.  At the same time, being 
critical of the relevance of this theory in today’s globalisation does not suggest or 
                                                                                                                         
moved past its restrictive Bermuda II Agreement with the US.  Most observers tend to focus on 
the latter without setting the context in a broader political framework.  In doing this, one misses 
or omits the important role of the UK in the broader US-EU negotiations that seek to replace all 
the individual European country bilaterals with a single EU one.   
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imply that the state is not an important aspect in any study of international 
relations, it is just not the only one. 
Another useful lens to use for analysis relates to the distribution of power (both 
economic and military) and argues that “… if there is a hegemonic distribution of 
power there is likely to be an open regime for trade” (Krasner p 117).  Within this 
theory the US, as the post-war hegemon ensured the growth and development of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Bretton Woods 
institutions of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the initial attempts to include trade in services within the GATT.  Many theorists 
have convincingly argued that the economic growth throughout the western 
hemisphere was driven by the US agenda and its hegemonic position (Keohane, 
1984).  However, since the end of the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union, 
the US has lost much of its post-war (WWII) power and according to the theory is 
therefore less likely to support further economic liberalisation.   
The difficulty with these arguments is that they tend to remain at a relatively macro 
level and therefore have difficulty explaining some of the events that run counter to 
the theory.  For example, from a hegemonic stability theory perspective one would 
expect to find that the US pursued a liberalising agenda during the period it 
adhered to the extremely restrictive Bermuda II air services agreements.  It wasn’t 
until the 1970s, when its hegemony was already waning that it began actively to 
pursue liberal policies for this sector.  In fact, over time one can also point to a 
correlation between diminishing US hegemony and its increased efforts to pursue 
more liberal bilateral agreements and continued pushing to bring trade in services 
within the GATT framework. 
Approaches through the lens of liberalism and its neo-liberal counter-part likewise 
fall short of being able to fully account for the different aspects and political levels 
that continually act and interact within a sector over time.  The argument about the 
inevitability of international trade liberalisation is attributed to the enormous power 
held by transnational corporations is rather singular in its focus.  Here the focus is 
on the corporate institutional power that exists within the state framework.  Or, as 
Susan Strange noted, while US hegemony may have diminished, its structural 
power has not and that technology is a key factor driving change (Strange 1994).  
While this might have held true during the 1980s when computer technology 
started to used on a wide-spread basis (e.g. computer reservation systems).  
However, this does not explain how this is related to the push to liberalise bilateral 
agreements, nor does explain why some sub-sectors could be covered by the GATS 
and most others not. 
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It does suggest that the traditional notion of hegemony by individual states can be 
re-constituted, albeit in a different form within the multilateral negotiating 
framework.  This means that the structurally powerful will remain so, whereas the 
weak will gain strength through numbers in the institutional setting of consensus 
based decision-making.  Set in the context of the GATS negotiating forum, this 
would not account for the position of the EC as a single voice, which is arguably as 
powerful as the US.  It certainly does not take into account the different economic 
and political influences acting upon the negotiator, nor does it expose the 
underlying reasons for state preferences at both the macro and micro levels of 
analysis.  
Exclusion of this industry from GATS coverage, from a liberal perspective would be 
difficult to argue, and realists (neo or not) would have difficulty explaining the 
rationale for inclusion of the one sub-sector, maintenance repair and overhaul 
(MRO), which is critical to the operation of the airlines and therefore arguably 
related directly to the exercise of traffic rights.  Moreover set in a broader political 
inquiry, questions need to be raised about state sovereignty and independence, the 
levels of domestic and transnational interests, and how each impact the other over 
time.  It is therefore imperative to inquire where the linkages are located and seek 
out the true levels of dependence or interdependence.  The fact that the Air 
Transport Annex in the GATS specifically excludes traffic rights does not, in and of 
itself, explain the dialectic between the different levels of policy makers.  Nor does 
it explain the national sphere of a political economy or the numerous influential 
factors that drive international liberalisation under the aegis of a multilateral 
framework.   
Within the mainstream theoretical frameworks it is difficult to take into account the 
labyrinth of linkages that are the operational basis of both the existing regime 
(bilateralism) and the norm of reciprocity, and how change to a multilateral system 
based on Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment is achieved.  Traditional political 
analysis has explained the historical growth and the interstate relationships 
primarily through game theoretic or positivist analysis (Nayal, Zacher, et al).  Once 
the regulatory complexity and scope of the industry (i.e. all the air transport sub-
sectors) and its bilateral framework set against the multilateral trading arena, the 
single mainstream theories begin to fall short of encompassing all the relevant 
factors that drive change or ensure the status quo.  
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The Theoretical Framework 
Negotiation theory has been chosen as the theoretical framework for this 
dissertation because of the flexibility and scope it offers when trying to include 
disparate elements or influencing factors that are normally analysed in isolation 
(Odell, 2000, 2006).  These elements range from domestic political influences, 
economic aspects of the international political economy, existing regulatory 
structures and policy-makers, industrial lobby groups and labour, to the role and 
influence of the WTO as a negotiating forum promoting national economic interests.  
It also provides an avenue to analyse how or if the WTO as a multilateral body has 
the potential to alter the traditional bilateral negotiations framework in the air 
transport sector.  In short, looking at change in an economic regulatory regime 
from a negotiating perspective permits us to uncover otherwise overlooked nuances 
about how and why national agendas are developed.  From this vantage point we 
can examine the input factors of different positions, existing commonalities among 
Members, elements of disagreement preventing dramatic change within an existing 
regime structure, and the degree to which changing markets influence national 
policies. 
It is a theory based on bounded rationality, meaning that actors (negotiators) 
operate with less than full information and are individually affected by constraints 
placed upon them by national governments and changes in the domestic and/or 
international political arena.  Moreover, the continually changing markets make it 
difficult or impossible for negotiators to possess full information at any given time.  
Information is provided by the Secretariat or Members that have teams of 
specialists dedicated to the sector under negotiation, however the latter source 
would necessarily be biased and reflect specific national concerns and perspectives.  
Additionally, negotiators must remain cognisant of linkages and overlaps in the 
different negotiating fora such as the services negotiations that began in 2000.16  In 
this case there are sub-sectors that arguably could be considered to be within the 
domain of the GATS already (e.g. express couriers, or freight forwarding).   
At this point it is important to note how ‘negotiations’ are defined and used 
throughout this paper.  We begin with Odell’s definition that, “negotiation and 
bargaining refer to a sequence of actions in which two or more parties address 
                                          
16 Art. XΙX paragraph 3 of the GATS states that “…negotiating guidelines and procedures shall be 
established.”  Guided by this article the Members created what is referred to as the Services 2000 
roadmap, which laid out the essentially bilateral ‘request-offer’ negotiating guidelines.  See, 
“Guidelines and Procedures for the negotiations on Trade in Services” S/L/93, 29 March 2001.  
See also “Technical Aspects of Requests and Offers:  Summary of presentation by the Secretariat”.  
WTO Seminar on the GATS, 20 February, 2002. 
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demands and proposals to each other for the ostensible purposes of reaching an 
agreement and changing the behaviour of at least one actor” (Odell, 2000, p 4).  
For our purposes the definition has been expanded to include formal and informal 
negotiations and the differences between them.  For example, the Review meetings 
were formal sessions in the General Council and Council for Trade in Services (CTS) 
but were not considered to be ‘formal negotiations’ in the sense of requests and 
offers.  This is noted because a number of delegates went on record to state that 
they and their governments did not consider the Review to be a formal 
negotiation.17 
Nevertheless, this paper considers the Review to be a ‘negotiation’ in the sense that 
the full membership met seven times (four dedicated sessions) over a period of 
four years to evaluate the economic and regulatory changes in the global industry 
and to determine whether coverage of the sector should be expanded, and if so, 
which sub-sectors?  It is also a negotiation from the perspective that there was 
potential to make changes to the GATS within the Annex.  Expansion of coverage of 
air transport would then allow the designated sub-sectors to be part of the larger 
Services Negotiations.18  Given that some delegates wanted to expand the coverage 
of the GATS in this sector, and others did not, the discussions to achieve each 
side’s objectives are considered, for our purposes, to be a negotiation.  
Including the input values or factors from the marketplace in the negotiating arena 
we begin to understand that, as entrenched as the bilateral regime in air transport 
appears to be on the surface, change is in fact occurring at various levels 
throughout the industry.  The question to be answered from a theoretical 
perspective, however, is whether the emergence of the GATS as a legal framework 
Agreement, the Review, or the services negotiations 2000, are a direct catalyst to 
change or just a reflection of the international political economy or something more 
random.  Ultimately, we are seeking the catalyst for change and how this affects 
national positions.  We are also asking if the WTO has a direct influence and impact 
on a regime change in the international air transport sector and why the US, EU 
and others stand so far apart in their positions despite the fact that each side of the 
debate supports further liberalisation of the industry as a whole.  In essence the 
debate is not about whether aspects of the industry should be liberalised, but in 
what framework (bilateral or multilateral). 
                                          
17 Egypt, Japan, Senegal, Brazil, Korea, and Uruguay stated the Review was not a negotiation.  
The EC went on record to state that it believed the Review was a negotiation.  See Appendix 4. 
18 The Services negotiations also began in 2000, becoming part of the Doha Round when it was 
launched November 2001.  “Ministerial Declaration”, WTO, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1. 
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The Framework Elements 
The theoretical framework is designed to capture input values that feed into the 
negotiating positions of national trade representatives within the WTO using one of 
the most politically sensitive global infrastructure industries.  Due to the complexity 
of the industry it was necessary to reduce the absolute number of actors and sub-
sectors while keeping the overall industry linkages intact.  The choice of industry 
sub-sectors also reflects the oral and written submissions by the Member States in 
the Review.  These must then be situated within the theoretical framework to show 
the inputs that affect the national trade representatives’ negotiating position. 
The starting point of the analysis is to identify the issues, the parties, and the 
objectives.  Emanating from these factors are at least five key elements.  These are 
contributing factors toward any given negotiating position and include:  changing 
markets, domestic political constraints or support (domestic interests), the type of 
negotiations, the zone of agreement (ZOA), and the best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement (BATNA).  This list is not finite, although for the purposes of this paper 
they will be used to show why Members have taken opposing positions despite their 
unanimity to liberalise the entire sector.  In general terms the above factors are 
roughly grouped according to the three initial factors of analysis (issues, parties, 
and objectives).  Chart 1 is intended to show the directional flow of elements that 
influence how each Member might perceive and prepare their national position. 
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Chart 1:  Issues, Parties, and Objectives 
 
 
To augment these general aspects of the theory, statistical analysis using linear 
regression will be used to discover whether geographic location (distance from 
major markets), market position (of sub-sectors), the economic health of the flag 
carriers (industry sector) and the degree of liberalisation that has already occurred 
under the bilateral regime have any statistical significance and thereby influenced 
the negotiating positions during the Review.  They also provide an empirical base 
from which comparisons can be drawn with the written and oral submissions of the 
Members.  Outlining each element briefly lays the foundation for the structure of 
the analysis in the cases studies that will be used. 
The Issue(s) 
Multilateral versus Bilateral Jurisdiction 
The Review is the only forum within the WTO where a shift from the bilateral 
structure could begin to occur as it is not permitted to make commitments in the 
Member’s schedules of specific commitments unless the sub-sector is acknowledged 
to be covered by the GATS.19  Thus, the issue of how these two fundamentally 
                                          
19 This refers to air transport since it is the only sector explicitly carved out of the GATS. 
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different environments could impact on each other is one of the key issues facing 
negotiators.  It is important to note that in contrast to other economic or regulatory 
negotiations, the Review and all that will follow are mandated by the Annex.  
Normally a negotiation is initiated by one State in response to domestic requests or 
a changing international political economy.  For the Review, the issues under 
examination relate directly to the mandate written into the Annex, which states in 
paragraph five, “[t]he Council for Trade in Services shall review periodically, and at 
least every five years, developments in the air transport sector and the operation of 
this Annex with a view to considering the possible further application of the 
Agreement in this sector.”  In short, the issue pertains to which, if any, sub-sectors 
could or should be covered by the GATS and sets the dependent variable that is 
used for the statistical analysis in the empirical section of the study (chapter 5):  
does a Member support expansion of the GATS coverage over sub-sectors of air 
transport or not?  The independent variables that are used to try to explain the 
positions are drawn from the oral and written submissions of the Member States 
and were chosen on the basis of the importance the delegates attached to these 
variables in their presentations and interventions. 
Degree and Type of Liberalisation 
With one major exception (the EU Common aviation area) international air 
transport remains governed primarily by bilateral agreements.  The differences 
exist within the agreements and range from being very restrictive to quite liberal 
(Open Skies type).  Coding the degree of liberalisation based on the degree of 
liberalisation of ASAs that are signed by the Members is considered to be an 
important independent variable for evaluating whether a Member would be more 
likely to support the bilateral or further multilateral expansion over the sector.   
The Parties 
The parties in any interstate negotiation will normally be government 
representatives:  either government employees or contracted experts in the sector.  
At the WTO the parties are the official trade representatives and industry experts in 
the employment of their Government.  Only State representatives are permitted to 
attend meetings and not independent interested parties.  Nevertheless, trade 
representatives or their sector experts may choose to keep interested domestic 
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parties informed at all stages of a negotiation and thus also draw upon their 
counsel.20   
Types of Negotiations 
For simplification purposes we identify four types of negotiations that take place 
within the WTO.  These reflect the different aspects of how the WTO functions as an 
institution and the types of agreements that have been reached through the 
different negotiating fora.  First there are the high level negotiations called 
Ministerials that are institutionally mandated to occur every two years, whereby the 
participants are government Ministers and other high level officials from the 
Member States.  These meetings formalise the launching of new general trade 
Rounds (e.g. the Uruguay Round and Doha Round), review interim results and 
progress, and formally conclude the Rounds.  These types of meetings can be 
classified as conceptual negotiations to oversee or direct the other more specific 
negotiations that are taking place.  For the purposes of this study, only the relevant 
bodies within the WTO will be mentioned, therefore this level of negotiations will 
not be examined further. 
The second level or type of negotiation is found in the General Council meetings.  
This Council oversees the institutional functioning of the WTO including dispute 
settlement.  Discussions in this forum are always multilateral and decisions are 
normally made by consensus.21  The only exception to this practice is when the 
dispute settlement body uses reverse consensus to reach a decision.22 
The third type takes place in the Council for Trade in Services (CTS).  In this forum, 
framework negotiations related to the services sectors are conducted multilaterally.  
A secondary forum occurs in the Special Session (CTSS), which is made up of all 
                                          
20 This was the case for the US during the Uruguay Round of negotiations on air transport.  A 
lawyer from the national pilots union was on an open line with the capital based expert attending 
the meetings in Geneva.  It is likely that other negotiators were in constant contact with people in 
their home territory.  This was taken from discussions about the Uruguay Round negotiations with 
the US air transport expert who attended the Review. 
21 Decision-making within the WTO and its predecessor the GATT have traditionally been made by 
consensus and the trade delegates and Ambassadors make every effort to maintain this tradition.  
The possibility of voting does exist however it is normally avoided.  “Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization”, Art. IX, p. 11, The Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations:  the Legal Texts, 1995; and Guide to GATT Law and Practice:  
Analytical Index.  Volumes 1 and 2, 1995. 
22 A dispute settlement panel report is adopted unless there is a consensus not to adopt it.  The 
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO is an example of a formalised legal framework that also 
encompasses the non-legal preliminary steps of negotiation.  Negotiation over international 
disputes (most frequently bilateral ones) is one of the primary tools used between States.  Within 
the ‘negotiation’ framework, the interested Parties to a dispute can choose from a range of 
methods (depending on the terms of the agreement) from an exchange of diplomatic notes, to a 
more formalised procedure utilising competent authorities or experts.  From an interview with 
WTO Legal Division Counsellor. 
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the same Members as the CTS.  Normally meetings are conducted in “formal 
sessions” with comments and submissions being “on the record”.  Nevertheless, 
during these meetings a delegate can request to go into “informal” discussions.  A 
discussion following this interim change of status allows delegates to pursue 
politically sensitive questions and answers without fear that any comments would 
be recorded as a national position.  Although such a request was made a number of 
times during the Review it was reversed each time at the request and agreement of 
other Members. 
Despite the multilateral structure of the WTO, an important aspect of negotiations 
is in fact bilateral (the fourth type).  Beginning in 2000, the current Services 
negotiations are primarily bilateral and operate in the form of requests and offers.23  
Although Members can and do join together in their requests to one or more states 
the actual negotiating process takes place between Members. 
Changing Market Realities 
Examining the changing market realities is an input factor considered to be one of 
the determining elements influencing negotiators.  Both domestic and international 
markets change constantly, including ownership of corporations, growth or 
reduction of different sectors, international expansion, and profitability.  Constant 
change in these elements highlights the lack of complete information held by 
negotiators.  In particular, air transport and its numerous sub-sector industries24 
are subject to continual and often rapid shifts due to the cyclical nature of the 
industry and exogenous factors such as terrorism (11 September 2001), pandemic 
diseases (SARS) and political instability in different countries and regions of the 
world.   
Despite the constant change, it is possible to identify trends or patterns in the 
marketplace that give us indications about what kind of position negotiators will 
adopt within the multilateral negotiating arena and the incentives that underpin 
Members’ positions.  Looking at empirical evidence over a period of time (nine 
years for this study) one can discern industrial sectors that will likely be advocated 
by the Member States to be covered by the GATS.  Through actual market data we 
can discern whether a sector is economically robust, competitive and expanding 
outside national borders, or if it is in decline.  It is also possible to see which 
                                          
23 For an understanding of the procedures see: “Guidelines and Procedures for the Negotiations on 
Trade in Services” in S/C/W/93, 29 March 2001. 
24 A complete listing of the sub-sectors as agreed to by the Member States is found in Job No. 
2451.  See Appendix 1 for the complete text. 
  26 
countries’ corporations are gaining global market-share and which are losing out.  
Where the sector represents the former it is likely that the government will 
advocate multilateral liberalisation.  Where it is found that domestic industries are 
in decline and are losing a formerly held competitive position in the world 
marketplace, governments will tend to avoid or delay liberalisation.  Of course 
within the multilateral trade arena of the WTO, consideration will be given to other 
more competitive sectors and it is likely that trade-offs will occur in the negotiating 
process.   
Over the years one notices this pattern when looking at how the US initiated the 
inclusion of services into the GATT (Kennedy Round and beyond).  During this era 
the US was a market leader in the world of finance and telecommunications and its 
industries were demanding greater and easier access to the international 
marketplace.25  Set in this context, it is not surprising to find that it was the US 
promoting inclusion of trade in services within the GATT framework (Crystal, 2003 
et al). 
World Market Position 
This refers to whether the Member has corporations that are multinational or trans-
national and how much of the world market they control.  It can also include 
emerging international corporations that are seeking to expand operations across 
borders.  For corporations operating in numerous countries or those seeking to gain 
international market share, we tend to see the representative of the Member State 
advocating greater liberalisation for the sector.  It is recognised that a single set of 
transparent and multilaterally negotiated rules simplifies access to trade laws in the 
Member States.  Moreover, once a Member makes a services sector liberalisation 
commitment, it will not become more restrictive in the future.26 
Health of the Industry 
Referring to the ‘health of the industry’ relates primarily to corporations as national 
entities regardless of whether they operate internationally.  Is the industry (sector 
and sub-sectors) economically dynamic or in financial distress?  In the former, 
there is likely to be less labour strife due to an expanding and/or stable labour 
market while in the latter it is probable that the opposite is occurring.  Given that 
Member States are always looking to maximise economic growth in their homeland, 
                                          
25 Reshaping the World Trading System:  A History of the Uruguay Round, John Croome, 1999. 
26 Once a Member makes a liberalisation commitment in its schedule to a sector, it is not easy to 
retract that liberalisation.  Nevertheless, Article XXI allows a Member to retract a commitment 
under certain specified conditions and/or if the Member were to end its membership in the WTO.  
To date no Member has quit the WTO. 
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it is understandable that some degree of protectionism will be exhibited when other 
countries are becoming more competitive and gaining market share in the national 
and world economies. 
Domestic Political Interests 
Similar to the comments above regarding international competitiveness and global 
market-share, domestic support for liberalisation will be greater or lesser depending 
upon the perceived threat from foreign interests.  This support links directly to the 
perceived health of corporations in the sector.  Where the industry (sector) is 
growing and the workforce is expanding or at least stable, it is more likely that 
corporations will have greater political support than if the industry is perceived to 
be vulnerable to foreign competitive forces. 
The degree to which domestic interests can influence policy makers and national 
negotiating positions will depend on the level of interaction and political power held, 
or perceived to be held, by these groups.  The notion of perception is added 
because of the different structures and roles played by labour in each national 
territory and how they are interlinked with the state in addition to the degree of 
organisation.  It is not necessarily the case that inflexible labour standards (ability 
to hire and fire employees) within a given country translate into absolute rigidity or 
power.  In this instance reference is being made to the strength and amount of 
organised labour.  In fact one can identify countries with flexible labour standards 
that view organised labour as a political force and hence are cautious about 
advocating liberalisation in politically sensitive industries such as air transport.27  
National trade associations and the major labour groups are an integral part of the 
policy choices being made at the national level.  The trade associations will reflect 
their membership’s interests and thereby give us an understanding about the state 
of the industry.   
Given that international air transport has historically been linked directly or 
indirectly to territorial sovereignty and national security issues, it is not surprising 
that in some countries liberalisation is perceived as a potential threat to the 
security of the State.  In the EU this issue has largely been resolved through the 
liberalisation that occurred in order to bring all the Member States within one air 
transport jurisdiction (common aviation area).  Also, national security and air 
transport have largely been separated.  Although an internal EU aviation market 
has been created, a common foreign policy and defence arrangement remains close 
                                          
27 “The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation Area”, the Brattle Group, December 2002, pp 
8-1 – 8-18. 
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to non-existent.  In contrast, there are voices in the US Department of Defence that 
view any liberalisation outside the traditional bilateral framework as a potential 
security issue (Brattle Report, p 7-1).  Beginning with the terrorist attacks in the US 
on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent military actions in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the issue of national security and aviation remains an important issue for 
many US domestic interests. 
The Objectives 
The objectives of a trade negotiator can range from very specific national goals 
(e.g. specific export reductions) to goals situated in a larger bargaining context 
such as the Services or Agriculture Negotiations within the Doha Round.  The 
former is likely to be initiated by one country bilaterally in response to a perceived 
need or a national policy objective whereas the latter is set within an agenda that 
has a mandate to reduce trade barriers on an ongoing basis.   
In multilateral negotiations WTO Members are committed to reducing trade 
barriers, both tariff and non-tariff, through a consensus based decision-making 
process.28  Since there is virtually no area of international trade that is not covered 
by the WTO and Members seek to maximise their national objectives, all 
understand that trade-offs are part of the negotiation process.  In such a context it 
is difficult to generalise specific objectives.  This is particularly the case for trade in 
services under the GATS since a priori no sector is excluded from coverage and a 
mandate exists for ongoing negotiations to liberalise the service sectors.   
Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) 
One of the features of this theory is the central role and importance of the best 
alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA).  The theory holds that negotiators 
will make demands or pursue specific negotiating objectives depending on how 
alternatives to an agreement are perceived by each side, or all participants in the 
case of multilateral negotiations.  Each perspective or side will be driven by input 
factors originating from domestic sources or domestic interests that are participants 
in the international marketplace.  This can be applied to any type of negotiation, 
including bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral.  In some instances this would also 
include what might be termed as competitive negotiations, whereby neighbouring 
countries have concluded trade agreements with a specific state.  The countries 
                                          
28 Consensus decision-making is based on the historical tradition established during the GATT 
years and continues in the WTO.  Although the legal right to use majority voting exists, delegates 
make every effort not to use this tool.  Instead ad referendum will be used at times in order to 
move forward on a stalled negotiation. 
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that have not done so would feel that to regain potentially lost opportunities they 
must also negotiate a favourable agreement with that same country.29 
One sees this effect in some developing countries vis-à-vis the US and the EU in 
terms of preferential bilateral trade agreements.  The World Bank, in its 2005 
Global World Prospects has pointed to what it calls the spaghetti bowl effect of 
economic trade liberalisation agreements and notes that there is a first move 
advantage (pp 27-56).  However, once all the neighbouring countries have signed 
similar agreements, the positive effects could be minimised.  This is particularly so 
because in the rush to sign liberalisation agreements, developing countries believe 
that such agreements with large economic powers will be preferable to no 
agreement and therefore will be likely to accept terms that might not be to their 
best advantage.  Many of the developing countries may lack the resources 
necessary to ensure agreements truly benefit their economic growth and/or sign 
agreements that could cause trade diversion, which could have negative 
consequences on their economies.  While most of the research has been directed 
toward trade in goods, the same cautionary notes can also be applied to trade in 
services and are therefore relevant to this study. 
Trade in Services is a particularly sensitive area of negotiations since historically 
many services were supplied by governments and even those in the private sector 
were not thought of as part of international trade.  Unlike goods, services cannot be 
measured at the point where they cross a border and they require both the 
producer and the consumer to complete the transaction.  In many instances (not 
all) the service provider and the consumer are in the same location, which makes 
exports difficult to measure.30  Indeed, trade in services has become an important 
factor of international trade as oftentimes it underlies the ability to trade efficiently 
in goods.  Moreover it has enormous potential for promoting growth throughout the 
world economy.  This is particularly the case for developing nations (e.g. tourism 
and travel services). 
When considering BATNA, oftentimes it is presumed that all negotiations are 
finalised with an agreement, whereas it could also refer to a stalemate or a 
delaying tactic in negotiations.  The Review could be categorised as the latter 
                                          
29 “Regional Trade and Preferential Trading Agreements:  A Global Perspective” in Global Economic 
Prospects:  Trade, Regionalism, and Development 2005, The World Bank, pp 27-56. 
30 Measuring trade in services remains elusive because there is no agreed standard for accurate 
measurement.  The only internationally recognised services statistics are limited to Tourism trade 
by the Satellite accounts at the World Tourism Organisation (WTO/OMT). IOs such the World Bank 
are in the process of developing a broad services template, however it remains in the design stage 
of development.  http://www.world-tourism.org. 
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condition since the only agreement that was made (and with difficulty) was to 
finalise the process and set up a tentative start date for the next Review.31  
Moreover, all the Member States know that under the terms of the Annex on air 
transport, future reviews will occur.   
For our purposes however, BATNA is viewed in terms of incentives.  Here we ask 
why some states prefer liberalisation through the bilateral regime and others in a 
multilateral forum and what goes into the formulation of these perspectives.  The 
question or dependent variable is why some Members supported expansion of the 
GATS and other vehemently supported the bilateral status quo.  By doing this we 
broaden the scope of analysis to include the interested parties (state and non-state 
actors) that feed into the final negotiating positions of the members.  Although it is 
alluring to look only at the specific proposals (written and oral) within the Review, 
this would not give us sufficient information about the background players that 
contribute either implicitly or explicitly to the final outcome or position.  Adding 
empirical data broadens our knowledge base and by grouping the interested parties 
schematically (Chart 2 below) we can see the different interest groups and thereby 
identify where their incentives are located, giving us an understanding about the 
collective input of information that leads to a negotiating position.  
Zone of Agreement (ZOA) 
The zone of agreement (ZOA) is roughly “the value of the worst deal a party or 
parties will accept” (Odell, 2000, p 26).  In this study the ZOA is inextricably linked 
to BATNA.  Where a country perceives its BATNA to be greater outside the 
multilateral forum, the incentive to achieve further liberalisation is reduced.  
Although applicable to any type of negotiation, the principles underlying the ZOA 
between or among parties may be somewhat misleading when it is applied to the 
Review.  The Review, as a negotiation, occurred due to the mandate given to 
Members in the Air Transport Annex.  This mandate ensures the first Review as the 
beginning of an ongoing evaluation of the sector by Members.  The mandate does 
not provide explicit instructions to Members on what must be reviewed or whether 
expansion of coverage must be reached at any specific point in time, but does allow 
for the status quo to be maintained.  Thus, in the context of Odell’s treatment of 
reaching a ZOA, the Review process differs slightly. 
                                          
31 Although the formal start date of the next Review was not agreed upon, preliminary meetings to 
set a date should take place late 2005.  The start date of the 2nd Review was finally scheduled to 
begin 13 December 2006. 
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The Members (parties to the negotiations), were/are required to discuss the 
economic and regulatory changes in the air transport sector and sub-sectors (the 
issues).  The objective of some Members was to decide whether any of the sub-
sectors could be covered by the Annex; for others it was to ensure this did not 
occur.  At the outset of the Review it was clear that the objective was the real issue 
under negotiation to the point where three years later, a stalemate was the final 
outcome.  Nevertheless, it would be difficult to claim that the process was a 
complete failure due to the requirement to repeat the process into the future.  
Instead it should be viewed as the first round of a number of negotiations.  
Members that pushed hard to expand the GATS coverage might claim the Review to 
be a failure, however they will have the opportunity to come back to the topic on a 
regular basis in the future.  In the meantime, they retain the power to pursue a 
liberal agenda unilaterally or negotiate commitments on some of the ancillary sub-
sectors in the Services negotiations (e.g. warehousing and storage or fuelling). 
It is difficult to attribute the classic ZOA analysis to the first Review because it is 
difficult to identify a single resistance point.32  Although Odell uses the conceptual 
notion of negotiators reaching a ZOA between two or more sides, this does not 
further our understanding to any significant level about the Review due to the 
structure of the negotiation and the lack of experience in working with this 
particular industry.  Nevertheless, within the broader institutional framework of the 
WTO it is relevant to note that reaching a ZOA between Members or states wishing 
to accede is an important factor and due to the degree of existing differences, 
agreement can take years to accomplish (e.g. China or Russia).   
Geography 
It is not only the economic principles and policies of a trading nation that are 
important, but also the distances.  Regardless of cost, transporting goods and 
people long distances impacts on the competitive position of transportation 
companies around the globe.  Knowing that regulatory barriers increase the cost of 
doing business, it is not surprising to find that countries that are geographically 
distant from major markets tend to advocate liberalisation.  This is even more 
pronounced when the countries are not major markets and rely on international 
trade for economic growth and stability.  Thus, the geostrategic location (distance 
from major markets), particularly in the air transport sector, will likely be a factor 
that helps to determine a member’s position.   
                                          
32 The resistance point (or reservation value) is the value of the worst deal the party will accept.  
John S. Odell, Negotiating the World Economy, 2000, pp 24-26. 
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In this study it is assumed for the purpose of simplification that there are two major 
markets: the EU and the US.  This choice was based on the size of the general 
markets (both import and export), the comparable level of development, and the 
history of liberalisation that both have undertaken.  Notably, India and China, two 
of the fastest growing markets, are excluded from this study.  India did not actively 
participate until the discussion turned to ending the Review and China had not yet 
acceded to the WTO.  It will be interesting to analyse their positions and level of 
participation after the second Review, which is to commence late 2006. 
Linkages Between and Among Interested Parties 
Due to the complexity of the industry and the corresponding economic regulatory 
and safety structures it is useful to describe the linkages visually:  below are a set 
of charts (2-7) designed to depict the major aspects of the entire industry, 
highlighting the non-linear flow of factors that feed into a national policy position 
for international air transport.  Rather than identifying each of the infrastructure 
industries specifically, the charts are intended to be applicable to the component 
parts required for the operational side of the whole industry.  The charts depict the 
linkages between the interested groups that are of importance for our analysis, 
showing the directional lines of communication and potential influences that 
combine to impact upon the formal positions taken by members in a negotiation.   
Chart 2 on the following page is designed as a general outline of the numerous 
interested parties that have specific incentives to influence the outcome of the 
multilateral negotiations.  It is intended to show, in a non-hierarchical manner, that 
different groups will represent the interests of their larger constituents.  The only 
grouping or institution that would be considered as industry specific to this chart is 
ICAO.  However, this same chart would be appropriate to use for other industries 
whereby the ICAO box would be replaced by the appropriate technical body 
representing the industry being examined (e.g. the International 
Telecommunication Union, ITU). 
Although the natural tendency would be to assume that a specific hierarchy exists, 
the representation is to highlight the types of interested groups and provide a 
general indication as to whether or not they represent domestic or international 
interests.  There are no values given to any particular box since we are depicting 
the variety of interests and their linkages to others rather than the value or specific 
incentives for each group.  The different areas are presented separately below to 
show in greater detail how the information and influence tends to flow into the final 
negotiation outcome.  In all cases the boxes are intended to show linkages for the 
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sector of air transport in addition to any other sector.  The representation of the 
charts should be understood as a general outline of potential interactions between 
interested parties that can be used in a broader context, or for an industry specific 
analysis. 
Other Negotiating Fora within the WTO 
This box is included to indicate the larger institutional structure of the WTO.  
Although the various WTO bodies are legally separate entities and conduct their 
business independently from each other, all fall within the same institutional 
framework.  Depending on the Member, national government or territorial 
representatives will either have specialists for the different areas or a small number 
of generalists, all under the direction of one Ambassador.33   
Multilateral Negotiations 
This box includes all the negotiating fora that exist in the WTO regardless of 
whether all Members participate, in order to include the plurilateral bodies (e.g. 
aircraft manufacturing) and any bilateral negotiations that might take place (e.g. 
the request/offer negotiations in Services).  At the Ministerial level this box would 
represent the multilateral agenda-setting process that is operationalised in the 
General Council or the individual Divisions.  All decision-making is normally finalised 
by consensus rather than majority voting. 
The WTO Secretariat 
The WTO Secretariat is relatively small in comparison to other IOs and is located 
only in Geneva, Switzerland.34  Unlike other IOs, which have different institutional 
mandates and structures, the WTO is truly a Member driven institution and as such 
the professionals who work for the secretariat do not have any decision-making 
powers.  The secretariat professionals provide technical and expert support for the 
different bodies in the form of research, background papers, and provide advice to 
delegates upon request.  For example, it is the professionals who write the minutes  
                                          
33 When referring to Members in the WTO it is important to note that not all Members are nation 
states.  One example would be the EC, which represents all the EU Member States (countries). 
34 The total number of people employed at the WTO is approximately 630, which includes 
administrative staff, and translation services.  http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/intro_e.htm. 
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Chart 2:  Linkages among Interested Parties 
 
Note*:  Since academic and independent consulting is widely used by all other groups, their 
participation is assumed to be linked to each of the other boxes in the schematic.  Adding directional 
arrows to this group would unnecessarily complicate the chart. 
for meetings and must be available to answer any technical or sector specific 
questions on topics under discussion.  Other functions are to research and write up 
the annual Trade Policy Reviews or give legal assistance in dispute settlement 
cases.  People who work for the WTO secretariat are drawn from almost seventy 
different Member States and are expected to remain neutral in any political issues 
that involve national interests.  The two-way directional arrows running between 
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the Secretariat to the multilateral negotiations and trade representatives reflect the 
support given in both of these areas and the instructions to be implemented at the 
request of the Members.  However, despite the frequent communication between 
the Secretariat and the delegates, in many instances the Secretariat does not 
initiate contact due to the need for impartiality in their work. 
Trade Representatives 
Trade Representatives or delegates work directly for their governments under the 
Geneva Mission Ambassador.  Depending on the country, trade representatives 
negotiate in numerous areas as generalists (usually these are from developing 
countries) or they are specialists in one sector only.  The make-up and structure for 
the Member’s missions are determined in the home state. 
Capital Based Experts 
These are sector specialists who live and work in the capital cities who provide 
background information, policy papers or statements for the trade representatives.  
They attend sectoral meetings in a support capacity and/or provide oral 
presentations and answer sector specific questions from other delegates.  When in 
Geneva they work directly with the Mission staff (trade representatives and 
Ambassadors). 
ICAO (and other International Organisations) 
Although the United Nations ICAO is represented in the Chart, it is specified 
because of the topic.  ICAO does not have official observer status and therefore 
must be specifically invited to attend meetings, however it actively cooperates with 
the Secretariat by providing research for background papers.  ICAO was invited and 
attended all the Review sessions and gave presentations in all four of the dedicated 
Review meetings. 
Corporations and Associations (International, National, Consumer and 
Labour) 
Commercial interests are the natural counterpart to the policy maker groups 
discussed above and represent the end user of policy decisions, liberalisation and 
regime changes that occur.  They can be roughly divided into three interest groups:  
corporate, labour and consumer.  All three require each other to exist and survive.  
In principle, the entire regulatory framework serves to ensure these three groups 
operate within a regulatory structure. 
Trade associations represent corporations at the national and international levels 
and exist for the purpose of defending their membership’s interests.  However, 
there can be a dichotomy between the national and international levels during 
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times of changing regulatory structures.  Both levels act as organised lobby groups 
to defend and promote the interests of their members.  A lot of time and effort is 
spent monitoring policy change and informing their members.  They act as an 
information clearing house whereby they ensure that the association speaks with 
one voice even if a consensus is lacking within the membership. 
Roughly speaking organised labour acts in a similar capacity as the trade 
associations.  They monitor policy change at the national and international levels 
and depending on the country, have a great deal of influence on national policy 
positions.35  Although this assessment of organised labour would hold for most 
sectors, it is particularly strong throughout air transport as most employees in this 
industry are members of organised labour unions. 
To a lesser degree, consumer associations and consumers also participate in 
lobbying policy makers.  A good example is the efforts made by consumer groups 
to have regulations for passenger rights enacted in the US and the EU.  Although 
the former did not formally enact legislation, the government made it clear that this 
would happen if the corporations did not adhere to good practices.  In the EU 
legislation was enacted.  Throughout the entire process IATA, in conjunction with 
national airline associations, lobbied governments relentlessly to prevent such 
legislation from becoming law.36   
Academic and Independent Consultants 
This group has been added separately and without arrows depicting linkages due to 
the plethora of people hired or consulted in this capacity in all areas of the chart.  
Using this form of expertise has become commonplace throughout all levels of a 
political economy regardless of the level one is examining.  However, they are not 
normally included in any of the negotiations directly but are consulted in advance of 
any type of negotiation or discussion for background analysis or opinions.  It would 
be beyond the scope of this research to do more than acknowledge their existence. 
Chart 3 is designed to show the reader the flow of input on technical and safety 
issues.  It should be noted that while the actors for the most part remain the same 
                                          
35 The US stands out as a good example.  Not only is labour cited as a reason for pursuing 
bilateral liberalisation rather than multilateral, but labour was consulted directly during the 
Uruguay Round when the Air Transport Annex was being finalised.  “The Economic Impact of an 
EU–US Open Aviation Area”, 2002 and personal interviews that were conducted. 
36 I participated in the research and development of a reference manual for IATA in 2001 on 
passenger rights that was used by member airlines as an aid to their lobbying efforts.  
“Comparison of Relevant Rules and Recommended Practices and Airline Service Commitments”, 
IATA, May 2001. 
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as in Chart 2, the trade experts and negotiators are not included.  In this depiction 
of linkages ICAO is the ultimate location for international policy decisions.   
ICAO is one of the oldest UN special agencies and has always been the international 
body that coordinated the safety and technical standards and it is through this 
organisation that the Chicago Convention provides the framework for the bilateral 
system between states.  Although it is often implied that ICAO, through the 
Convention, actively oversees the economic regulatory structures of air transport 
the Convention is “silent on progressive liberalization as an objective” 
(MTN.GNS/W/36, p 9).  Changes to the bilateral system would nevertheless involve 
ICAO and so it has a vested interest in being actively involved in any transition of 
the economic regulatory regime.   
Chart 3:  Safety Technical and Economic Regulatory Linkages 
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to its observer status.  Whether this status will change in the future is likely linked 
directly to the amount of coverage the GATS will have in the sector in the future.  
Since the sector is mostly excluded from GATS coverage the linkages that are 
relevant to our study are between the groups that are directly involved in the 
advance preparations for and actual discussions that take place in the WTO. 
Chart 4:  WTO Secretariat Linkages 
 
Chart 5 is designed to depict the major actors in what is generally referred to as the 
‘market’.  Here one can see the linkages between the actors that operate under the 
regulatory policies that come from governments be it via State legislation or WTO 
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Chart 5:  Linkages between Trade Associations and Corporations 
 
Chart 6 depicts the general linkages between a national government and domestic 
interests and is intended to show that there are numerous domestic factors that 
have some level of influence into the policy making process that ultimately creates 
foreign trade policy.  The depiction is intended to be general and not specific, 
because differences would likely appear, depending on the political structure of a 
state. 
Chart 6:  Domestic Influences on National Foreign Trade Policy 
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perspectives and approaches to the table.  Having the opportunity to analyse a 
multilateral negotiation in its entirety is unusual due to the normal diplomatic veil 
that enshrouds the process and therefore provides us with a unique perspective.  
For example, it allows us to set the talks in a much broader context than is 
normally available to political scientists, while at the same time allowing us to look 
at the minutiae of the different positions taken by Members throughout the Review.   
Moreover, it informs us as to whether regime change will likely occur by taking into 
account important factors that are exogenous and endogenous to a national 
industry when put in the context of national policy objectives expressed in the 
multilateral forum.  Domestic policy platforms, existing regulatory structures and 
institutions (national and international), the geostrategic position of a country 
(distance from major markets), and the share of the world market an industry 
possesses all influence negotiating positions in a multilateral forum in different 
ways from a single industry bilateral setting.  Additionally, spill-over or linkages to 
other sectoral goals affect multilateral negotiations in ways that do not exist in a 
single sector bilateral forum. 
It is also possible and useful to use these same analytical inputs in other political 
studies.  The important contribution that negotiations theory makes to political 
science is its scope, adaptability and real world relevance.  One is not limited to 
restrictive assumptions throughout the analysis, while at the same time data can be 
drawn from existing market conditions, thereby informing the overall process.  It is 
also important to note that outcomes are not defined in terms of winning or losing.  
Rather it is important for gaining a deeper understanding of what each of the 
parties has achieved relative to their original stated objectives and provides 
suggestions for the next steps that will likely be taken in the future.  Compiling the 
information in descriptive and empirical form gives us the opportunity to suggest 
that market forces play a larger role in the formation of a negotiating position for 
some while domestic objectives outside the actual sector are important for others. 
Summary:  Analysing Economic Negotiations 
John S. Odell, in Negotiating the World Economy, has proposed analysing change 
through a theoretical framework that takes into account the market and political 
influences affecting international economic negotiations and negotiators.  The 
influential factors are found at the local, national and international levels, and 
include numerous types of interests ranging from corporations to labour groups and 
their representative lobby groups, plus in some instances military and national 
security interests.   
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Using such an approach gives the analyst a flexible set of input factors, permitting 
inclusion of data that otherwise might have little or no analytical value.  Analysing 
the air transport sector and its component parts using this approach permits us to 
systematically address, unravel and examine the complexity of a global industry.  
This is particularly valuable for answering our primary question about the 
incentives, or BATNA, each Member State has for expanding coverage of the GATS 
over the air transport sector and the degree of influence the Review has in 
promoting a regime shift from the traditional bilateral framework toward a 
multilateral one under the WTO and the GATS.  It also allows us to understand why 
some states prefer to liberalise parts of the industry multilaterally and others 
bilaterally.  Through this lens we can better understand the reasons for negotiated 
agreements if we take into account international political power (in the realist sense 
of the term), market forces that impact domestic policy makers and known 
alternatives to the terms of an agreement.   
The starting point emanates from the notion of bounded rationality and incomplete 
information rather than the realist perspective that assumes choices are based on 
full or complete information.  The theory itself is partially subjective, which has 
raised debate in the rational choice camp of theorists.  Nevertheless, it is a 
theoretical framework that is grounded in empirical reality.  Can a theory that 
attempts to assess influences and interactions among people have any degree of 
credibility in the arena of international relations or international political economy?  
I believe that an unequivocal yes can be delivered.   
It is, however, important to draw from knowledge of domestic political systems and 
the ever-changing environment of the marketplace in the field of inquiry.  Taking 
elements from these academic arenas and using them in the real world enriches the 
theoretical possibilities of increasing our understanding of the rarefied world of 
international economic negotiations.  Critics are likely to say that it is not possible 
to create a new paradigm or political theory by simply drawing aspects from 
accepted frameworks.  However, in a rapidly changing world the mainstream 
theories have, in many instances, become outdated and therefore have been under 
increasing challenge by academics in sister fields.  In our case we utilise aspects or 
elements of the different theories, such as the importance of using contemporary 
empirical data, domestic political aspects to show how they impact national policy 
makers and regulators.  It is also important to utilise economic trade theory to lay 
an analytical foundation, thereby ensuring that a solid link with the political theory 
is maintained. 
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The combination of these factors, as highlighted by Odell, gives us tools of analysis 
that take into account the likelihood that negotiators from Member States at the 
WTO do not have full information and some have more information than others yet 
still must negotiate the best possible deal for their national governments.  In 
actuality, not only do many national delegates (representatives) have less than 
complete information, many of the developing world representatives lack in depth 
knowledge of many sectors.  Air transport in particular is a complex services sector 
that includes sixteen economically important sub-sectors.  It would be difficult for 
an aviation expert to stay abreast of all the sub-sectors of this industry, and 
virtually impossible for an economic trade negotiator who is not an expert.  Based 
on this information, it would be incorrect to assume that all trade negotiators enter 
multilateral discussions with the same amount of information, or in specific sectors, 
expert knowledge of the industry in question.  They are therefore dependant on the 
input from multiple domestic and market factors that exist throughout the expert 
air transport community (e.g. ICAO, IATA, and domestic corporations).37 
Augmenting negotiating theory we have drawn from different theoretical 
perspectives permitting the analysis to be generalised thereby encompassing 
historical, contemporary, and future directions of the international political 
economy.  This also provides insights into the formulation of state policies in the 
different negotiating arenas and how the state acts as a filtering process for 
domestic interests, both industry specific and in general. 
In short, different perspectives can improve the understanding of what is occurring 
throughout the global political economy.  Drawing the different theoretical strands 
together actually allows us to pull together the relevant factors of international air 
transport to show how national positions will coalesce at some point in the future 
and be expressed through compromises given to reach a consensus within the 
multilateral framework.  The process will then become embedded within the 
international legal framework and ultimately reflected in the specific commitments 
made by individual states.  This is because the state represents a much larger set 
of actors working to advance specific objectives rather than only one industry.   
                                          
37 Although there appears to be an industry-wide consensus that international air transport should 
be liberalised, there is no consensus about whether this is best achieved through the bilateral 
process or a multilateral one.  Therefore the experts throughout this industry are not considered 
to be an epistemic community.  “Introduction:  Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination”.  Peter M. Haas, International Organization, Volume 46, Issue 1, Winter, 1992, 1-
35;  “Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the convergence of Competition Policies”, Frans Van 
Waarden and Micheala Drahos in Journal of European Public Policy,  9:6 December 2002: 913-934. 
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Since numerous groups within civil society have raised concern over the broadening 
and deepening scope of the WTO throughout the international political economy, it 
is relevant to question whether the structural power (economic and political) of 
particular states is being transferred into the multilateral setting.  Just raising the 
question will inevitably spark debates over loss of state sovereignty and whether 
increased multilateral authority automatically corresponds to this perceived loss.  
This suggests that international trade liberalisation and globalisation of political and 
corporate power is working in concert to undermine forty plus years of Keynesian 
Welfare ideology. 
Analysing the changing international political economy through the lens of 
international air transport, an industry that is critical to the smooth functioning of 
the world economy and an important national symbol, we can identify how state 
sovereignty remains a foundation from which international relations emanate.  
Moreover, this complex and highly regulated industry is a useful sector for 
highlighting important linkages between and among state and non-state actors 
alike.  This thesis suggests that despite the growing power and authority of the 
WTO as a multilateral institution, state sovereignty remains both important and a 
driving force behind decision-making within the WTO and how market forces play a 
strong role in the negotiating positions of different Member States.  
  44 
 45 
Chapter 3 
The Evolution of Bilateral Air Services Agreements in 
International Air Transport38 
International air transport is governed by a bilateral regime based on reciprocity 
that determines the economic regulatory framework for airline operations 
internationally.  Each ‘bilateral’, or air services agreement (ASA) determines the 
terms and conditions of market access that include inter alia:  the number of 
airlines permitted to operate, the frequency of operations, the tariff structure, the 
level of foreign ownership permitted, and city pairs available to the operating 
airlines.  Despite recent liberalisation trends that have begun to establish in 
different parts of the world, this global industry remains mired in an historical 
framework that was created toward the end of the Second World War.  Reflecting 
the events at the time it was constructed and designed on the basis of territorial 
sovereignty and the independence of the nation-state.   
“In 1944 the United States hosted an international civil aviation conference in 
Chicago attended by delegates from fifty-two countries and lasted five weeks”.39  
While still concerned about national security, delegates were now aware of the 
economic consequences of aviation development and included in their deliberations 
the question of who owns the right to exploit international air transportation 
commercially and on what basis?40  The meetings at the convention are significant 
because the same debate ensued during these meetings that are currently being 
discussed:  should the industry be governed solely by bilateral agreements or 
should it have a more multilateral foundation?  Unlike today, the US advocated the 
more liberal multilateral route and the Europeans, particularly the British, 
demanded the more restrictive bilateral structure. 
Americans sought a regime in which government participation was 
limited to “ensuring that private airlines [were] able to operate and 
compete freely with each other without disturbing the market 
function”; the British preferred a regime that allowed for greater levels 
of government intervention (Golich, p 160). 
                                          
38 The information in this chapter is based on standard or model agreements used by the US and 
not on actual bilaterals unless otherwise specified.  “Air Service Rights in U.S. International Air 
Transport Agreements:  A Compilation of Scheduled and Charter Service Rights” contained in U.S. 
Bilateral Aviation Agreements”, International Affairs Department, The Air Transport Association of 
America, 15 June 2000. 
39 Memorandum on ICAO:  The Story of the International Civil Aviation Organization.  15th ed., 
ICAO, Montreal, 1994. 
40 Vicki Golich, “Liberalizing International Air Transport Services”, in Dennis J. Gayle and 
Johnathon N. Goodrich eds., Privatization and Deregulation in global Perspective, 1990, p. 160. 
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The outcome of the Chicago Convention was the creation of a system of economic 
regulations that are bilaterally negotiated between states, and where the technical 
and safety issues are coordinated multilaterally through the issuing of 
recommended practices by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).  
Below is a very simple depiction of the roles between ICAO and the national 
regulatory bodies.  Notable is that while ICAO establishes guidelines and makes 
recommendations, it does not have a rule making role or sanctioning authority.  It 
is a body that provides technical advice and provides important research and data 
analysis for its members. 
Chart 1:  Hierarchy of Technical, Safety, and Economic Regulations 
 
States, through their national regulatory authorities formulate and implement the 
final policies and standards.  The territorial division of air space was established and 
state control ensured.41  International airlines were identified by their flag and there 
was an “…indomitable desire to maintain a “prestige” airline as a positive and 
legitimate expression of their nationhood – to make others cognizant of their 
independent existence”.42  Even privately owned international airlines were 
obligated to work with their governments to acquire landing rights into and beyond 
desired destinations.  “The international legal structure of air transport has made it 
anything but ‘free as the open sky’, and instead has hemmed it with the constraints 
of competing national sovereignties”.43   
                                          
41 Stephen Wheatcroft, Aviation and Tourism Policies:  A World Tourism Organization Publication, 
1994, p 17. 
42 K.G.J. Pillai, The Air Net:  The Case Against the World Aviation Cartel, 1969, p 16. 
43 Yvan Du Johchay, The Handbook of World Transport, 1978, p 68. 
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Although ICAO does not directly influence or participate in bilateral negotiations, it 
is the repository for the ASAs that are concluded between states.  Currently there 
are some 3,000 bilateral agreements worldwide, however only about 1,500 are 
officially registered since there are no legal requirements, nor any enforcement 
abilities held by ICAO.44  Most bilaterals fall into roughly three types of agreements 
that can be demarcated in time.   
The first is commonly referred to as Bermuda I signed in Bermuda, 11 February 
1946 that laid the foundation for the economic regulations of the global industry; it 
is the most restrictive type of bilateral.45  The second is called Bermuda II and by 
today’s standards is very restrictive, however it marks the first step toward 
liberalisation.46  Like Bermuda I, Bermuda II was signed by the US and the UK in 
Bermuda in 1977.  The third is referred to as an Open Skies type agreement and 
was a bilateral signed between the US and the Netherlands in 1992.  The only 
significant variation that appeared since the onset of Open Skies type agreements 
is the first plurilateral agreement named “Multilateral Agreement on the 
Liberalisation of International Air Transportation” signed on 1 May 2001.47  Despite 
the name and that there were only five signatory States, the agreement does not 
substantially deviate from the bilateral framework.48   
The only type of agreement beyond the bilateral framework is classified as a 
common aviation area (CAA).  This is considered to be the most liberal type of 
economic regulation because all the key elements of the bilaterals, such as foreign 
ownership restrictions, designation, and cabotage49 have been removed.  In short, a 
                                          
44 The number of signed bilaterals people mention range from 3,000 to 3,500.  Since many are 
never registered with ICAO the precise figure is unknown.  From discussions with the ICAO staff 
member while conducting research for the WTO Secretariat Background Papers in 2000.  For 
registered Agreements see:  “Agreements registered with ICAO including ground-handling 
provisions” as of 31 December 1999.  ICAO database. 
45 “Bermuda I Air Transport Agreement of February 11, 1946”. 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/64765.htm. 
46 Bermuda II actually occurred because the UK denounced Bermuda I in 1976, so a new 
agreement was required.  This agreement was amended in April 1978, December 1980, and 
November 1982.  “Air Service Rights in U.S. International Air Transport Agreements:  A 
Compilation of Scheduled and Charter Service Rights Contained in U.S. Bilateral Aviation 
Agreements”, the Air Transport Association of America, 15 June 2000. 
47 The full text can be accessed at:  http://www.state.gov/e/rls/othr/2573pf.htm. 
48 Christopher Findlay, “Plurilateral Agreements on Trade in Air Transport Services:  the US 
Model”.  Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management:  The Australian National University.  
November 2002. 
49 “The terms cabotage and cabotage traffic in air transport usage:  are derived, respectively, from 
maritime terms for the prohibition of coast wise carriage of traffic by foreign carriers and from the 
traffic thus prohibited which could be equated with domestic traffic, i.e. traffic moving on a single 
transportation document (ticket or waybill) involving no origination, stopover or termination 
outside the territory or State”,  ICAO Manual on the Regulation of International Air Transport, Doc 
9626, 1996, p 4.1-9. 
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common aviation area is an internal market where the ‘Freedoms of the Air’ are no 
longer determining factors that are negotiated and prescribed by two states. 
Freedoms of the Air 
Chart 2 (next page) depicts how traffic rights operate and what is meant when 
using the term ‘Freedom’ in the context of economic regulatory rights in the 
industry. The first category includes the First and Second Freedoms.  The First 
Freedom is defined as "the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international 
air services, granted by one State to another State or States to fly across its 
territory without landing".50  The Second Freedom is defined as "the right or 
privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, granted by one State to 
another State or States to land in its territory for non-traffic purposes".51  Both are 
considered to be ‘operational’ freedoms rather than traffic rights since no 
commercial traffic is involved and are normally not specified as ‘rights’ in bilateral 
agreements.  These rights are included in the International Air Services Transit 
Agreement (IASTA), which has been ratified by one hundred and twenty-three 
States.52 
The second category of Freedoms defined by ICAO is the ‘so-called Freedoms’.  
They are considered to be traffic rights and the key to market access between two 
states.  Bilaterals will normally specify the types of traffic rights permitted in any 
agreement.  The most common that are found are the Third to Fifth Freedoms and 
whilst there may be Sixth Freedoms in some bilaterals, ICAO does not collect data 
for this type of Freedom.53  The granting of Seventh and Eighth Freedoms is a 
recent occurrence for all-cargo operations and according to sources at ICAO, rare.   
  
                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 IASTA was one of the Agreements that came into existence during the Chicago Convention in 1944.  
The text of the Agreement with signatories is located at:  
http://www.mcgill.ca/files/iasl/chicago1944b.pdf. 
53 It is known that some countries such as Germany, the US, the UK and Japan collect this type of 
information, however it is kept confidential and sold only on request. 
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Chart 2:  Freedom Rights in International Air Transport  
 
Source:  Association of European Airlines/European Commission/OECD. 
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Typology of Air Services Agreements 
Bermuda I Type 
The Bermuda I type of bilateral agreement is the most restrictive and although it 
dates back to 1946, many states still have existing agreements of this type.  
Instead of negotiating a new agreement, which takes time, diplomatic notes are 
normally exchanged to modify articles or increase the number of designated 
carriers.  The traditional structure normally allowed for the designation of one 
airline from each state, specified capacity through frequency and type of aircraft 
permitted, the city pairs served by the carriers, the frequency of the operations, 
and a double approval of fares and tariffs that could be charged.  Any derogation 
from these limitations could trigger the rights to be withdrawn by the receiving 
state.   
Although all of the above mentioned points make these agreements restrictive, it is 
the foreign ownership and designation articles that set the baseline for the current 
market access limitations.  This is also a defining factor that differentiates bilateral 
type agreements from the common aviation area.  These restrictions are found in 
the criteria set out stating “substantial ownership and effective control” must be 
held by ‘nationals’ of the country designating the airline.  This works in two ways.  
The designating country can be sure that foreign control of a carrier is limited and it 
also prevents or restricts the bilateral partner from lifting its own agreed upon 
limits.54  Although each bilateral would be unique they follow standard patterns and 
contain similar content.  The following are examples of foreign ownership and 
control provisions found in the bilateral agreements. 
1. Each contracting party shall have the right to designate in writing to 
the other contracting party one or more airlines for the purpose of 
operating the agreed services on the specified routes and to 
withdraw or alter such designation; 
2. on receipt of such a designation the other contracting party shall 
without delay grant to the airline or airlines designated the 
appropriate operating permission; 
3. however, each contracting party reserves the right to withhold, 
revoke or suspend, or impose such conditions as it may deem 
necessary with respect to the operating permission of the 
designating airline, in any case where it is not satisfied that 
                                          
54 When a merger was proposed between KLM and BA it was reported the US warned that if “…BA 
takes over KLM, it will strip the Dutch airline of its unrestricted traffic rights to the US, and of its 
anti-trust immunity for an alliance with US carrier Northwest Airlines, unless London signs up to an 
'open skies' accord by year's end.”  My Business, “Access to US Air Cargo Market Hangs on 
BA/KLM Merger”, http://www.mybusiness.co.uk. 
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substantial ownership and effective control of that airline are vested 
in nationals of the other contracting party.55 
It is generally accepted that these criteria stem from the post-war era and the 
perceived need by governments to ensure the integrity of their territorial air space 
and because of national security concerns.  Although these limitations, with few 
exceptions,56 continue to exist, they are being questioned by many. 
Bermuda II Type  
Beyond modifications to Bermuda I type agreements there was no substantially 
new bilateral until Bermuda II was signed between the governments of the US and 
the UK in 1977.57  The primary difference between this and the previous type rest 
on capacity limitations and combinations of routes over the North Atlantic.  An 
Annex pertaining to cargo would be phased out by 1983.  For others negotiating 
new bilaterals in the post 1977 period the basic criteria of Bermuda II was adopted.  
The new type of bilaterals also reflected the technology change and the common 
usage of jet aircraft that flew longer distances. 
The standard elements of this type of agreement often still contained double tariff 
approval (this has mostly changed to double disapproval) and country of origin, 
specified city pairs, limited designation of carriers, and the standard foreign 
ownership criteria.  In short, Bermuda II type agreements remain very restrictive.  
They are also the most common type of bilateral that continues to govern market 
access throughout the global industry. 
Open Skies 
Arguably, signing the first Open Skies agreement in 1992 between the US and the 
Netherlands marks the first significant step toward liberalising the bilaterals since 
1944.  Open Skies agreements, while strictly bilateral, have done away with any 
capacity controls or limitations on frequencies, freedom and flexibility on fares and 
tariffs, and the freedom to choose gateway cities.  The charter and all-cargo 
arrangements have also been liberalised.  Included in this type of agreement is the 
commitment to permit airlines to conduct their own ground-handling operations 
(self-handling) and the guarantee that airlines have no restrictions on currency 
exchange and remittance to the home country.  There are also terms governing 
                                          
55 Peter van Fenema, “Ownership and Control”, Report of the Ownership and Control Think Tank 
World Aviation Regulatory Monitor, held at Geneva, 7 September 2000, p. 11. 
56 “Agreements registered with ICAO including ground-handling provisions” (as of 31 December 
1999), ICAO database.  
57 Bermuda II was signed, 23 July 1977, U.S. Department of State, 28 UST 5367; TIAS 861, 
Amendments:  25 April 1978; TIAS 8641. 
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access to computer reservation systems (CRSs), and the non-discrimination of 
treatment within a system.  This type of agreement also permits what the US call 
“open code-sharing opportunities”.  Here airlines are expressly allowed to pursue 
code-sharing opportunities with other carriers whereby the ticket is issued by one 
carrier but the flight is operated by another, or others.58 
What have not changed from the Bermuda type agreement are the strict foreign 
ownership conditions, designation of carriers, and cabotage rights.  Normally there 
are no restrictions on the number of carriers that can be designated but the 
conditions behind the designation remain restrictive.  This is because the clause 
“substantial ownership and effective control” remain intact in the same form as in 
the Bermuda type agreement.   
The final element that changed the substance of this type of agreement, at least as 
it relates to the US, was the removal of the article on multilateral agreements.  In 
the Bermuda II Article 16 stated:  “If a multilateral agreement, accepted by both 
Parties, concerning any matter covered by this Agreement enters into force, this 
Agreement shall be amended so as to conform with the provisions of the 
multilateral agreement” (US Standard “Post 1977” Agreement).  Notably this article 
was removed at a time that the Uruguay Round was being negotiated and it was 
clear that a priori no services sector would be excluded.   
After the first agreement was signed, the US actively pursued negotiating further 
agreements of this type and by the time of the first Air Transport Review (the 
Review) over 70 new agreements had been concluded.  It noted during the Review 
that judging by the number of Open Skies agreements that had been signed, it was 
clear Members considered this to be the most appropriate avenue to pursue 
liberalisation of the sector (see Chapters 6 and 7 for further discussions).  It also 
noted that other states have begun to negotiate Open Skies type agreements.  
Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalisation of International Air 
Transportation (MALIAT)59 
Despite being heralded as a breakthrough in liberalising international air transport, 
and given the optimistic name “Multilateral”, the agreement does not depart 
substantially from a traditional bilateral other than it has more than two 
signatories.  Moreover, it is difficult to accept the name since only there were only 
                                          
58 “Fact Sheet on Open Skies”, 8 May 1997.  http://www.usembassy.or.cr/openskye.html. 
59 The full text of the agreement, conditions and legal information can be found at:  
http://www.maliat.govt.nz/agreement/index.html.  Throughout the paper the MALIAT is also 
referred to as a five state plurilateral. 
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five states that signed the agreement.  While the agreement is unlike standard 
bilaterals, as it allows for accession members, it does not seem to provide any key 
elements that are attractive enough to make joining the agreement a priority for 
other states (Findlay, 2002, p 18).  In fact, only three small countries have joined 
(Cook Islands, Samoa, and Tonga) and one of the original signatories has already 
withdrawn (Peru).60  In an analysis of the agreement (signed in May 2001), and its 
potential to break the restrictive bilateral framework, it was found that the 
agreement while more liberal in some aspects, falls short of creating anything that 
is substantially new.61   
All of the same standard bilateral clauses that exist in the Open Skies agreements 
are included, although the granting of traffic rights is more extensive and pricing 
does not require even double disapproval.  The ‘rights’ are a key liberal element 
that includes the ability to pick-up and drop-off passengers and cargo in territories 
“behind”, intermediate, and “beyond” a signatory’s territory or that of the other 
Parties to the agreement.  Capacity limitations and type of aircraft are no longer 
specified, nor are the frequencies.  Designated carriers can operate city pairs of 
their choosing. 
Another key liberalising element found in this agreement is the article on ownership 
and control, and designation of carriers.  The traditional ‘substantial ownership and 
effective control’ has been changed.  Article 3(a) requires that “effective control for 
that airline is vested in the designating Party, its nationals, or both”; and in 3(b) 
“the airline is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in the territory 
of the Party designating the airline” (MALIAT, p 4).  This means that among the 
Parties to the agreement, the nationals of one Party can take a larger share of an 
airline where the principal place of business is located in the territory of another 
Member.  This expands the access to larger capital markets, which for smaller 
states has always been difficult due to the strict limitations on foreign capital 
investment. 
The only exception to this rests with the US as it was uncomfortable with the new 
clause and issued in November of the same year an Order to Show Cause 
pertaining to the ownership of carriers by US nationals.   
                                          
60 Samoa acceded on 4 July 2002, Tonga on 19 September 2003 and the Cook Islands on 8 March 
2006 New Zealand Ministry of Transport and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.  
http://www.maliat.govt.nz/country/index.shtml. 
61 Christopher Findlay, “Plurilateral Agreements on Trade in Air Transport Services:  the US 
Model”, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management, the Australian National University, 
2002, p 19. 
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Maintaining that the Department of Transport has no means in place to 
ascertain changes in control or degree of US ownership of any of the 
airlines designated by the four countries concerned, it concludes that 
the public interest requires that these airlines submit that information 
to the Department.  Specifically, we propose that these carriers file a 
report with the Director, Office of International Aviation, at least 30 
days prior to any proposed change of ownership in excess of five 
percent of their voting stock (van Fenema, p 22). 
Although this reporting clause was challenged by the airlines, it remains in effect 
and part of the agreement.  Other liberalising features are the possibility of 
accession by other states and the subsequent amendment to permit accession on a 
cargo-only basis (Article 15bis). 
Common Aviation Areas (CAA) 
There are two agreements that qualify as common aviation areas.  The first initially 
included all the EU Member States plus Norway, Iceland and eventually 
Switzerland, and the second is between Australia and New Zealand.  The European 
Common Aviation Area (CAA) is a direct result of the political and economic 
integration process of the EU and has effectively created a single aviation market 
that continues to expand its membership.62  The Single Aviation Market (SAM) 
between Australia and New Zealand is also an agreement that effectively drops the 
traditional bilateral restrictions.  Although it is currently only the two States that are 
signatories, it is not considered a bilateral since it creates a common market area.  
Both will be discussed below. 
The EU Liberalisation Packages 
The First Package is comprised of four elements:  1) it links the applicability of 
Articles 85 and 86 in the Single European Act (SEA) to civil aviation in general; 2) it 
gives block exemptions to airline cooperation agreements, CRSs, and ground-
handling; 3) it addresses fare regulation; and 4) it sets out capacity and market 
access rules.63  These incremental changes reflect both the compromises and trade-
offs that were made between the Member States and the Commission.  “Rather 
than introducing sweeping changes in terms of deregulation, it changes and 
legalises the framework in which the same activities are carried out”.64 
                                          
62 The EU has signed agreements in June 2006 with the South-Eastern European countries.  Once 
implemented, the CAA will include thirty-five countries, 
www.ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/international/pillars/common_aviation_area/ecaa_en.htm. 
63 Official Journal of the European Communities (L364) 1-25, 1987. 
64 Benoit M.J. Swinnen, “An Opportunity for Trans-Atlantic Civil Aviation:  From Open Skies to 
Open Markets?” Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 63. August-September 1997, p 260. 
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The Second Package came into force on 1 November 1990, although most of the 
terms related to minor amendments of the First Package.  The most significant 
changes that were introduced related to the freedoms of flight, route access, entry 
and exit within the European marketplace.  Third and Fourth Freedoms were 
granted between all airports in Europe.  This meant that a carrier from State A no 
longer required landing rights enshrined in a bilateral agreement in advance of 
starting operations into State B.  The carrier from State A was also able to pick up 
passengers and cargo originating in State B and carry them to State A.  Fifth 
Freedom rights (e.g. State A - to State B - to State C and back) were limited to fifty 
per cent capacity (up from thirty in the First Package).  In other words, a carrier 
could exercise these rights without prior authority as long as their operation did not 
exceed fifty per cent of the other Member States’ airlines’ capacity.  Recognition 
was also given to peripheral regions and smaller communities.  Airlines were not 
permitted to discontinue service for the sole reason that it was not economically 
viable.  Included in this package were public service obligations and certain 
protections for new regional routes.65 
The Third Package addresses the final steps for undertaking the complete 
liberalisation of internal European air transport market.  It came into force on 1 
January 1993 and effectively completed the creation of a single common European 
air transport industry over four years.  Compliance with the Third Package had to 
be completed by 1 April 1997.  The introduction and enactment of the provisions 
underpins the political will of the Commission to assume authority over all aspects 
of air transport.   
                                          
65 Kenneth Button, Kingsley Haynes, and Roger Stough, Flying into the Future:  Air Transport 
Policy in the European Union, 1998, p 43. 
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Chart 3:  The Three Liberalisation Packages 
Date from: 01.01.1988 01.11.1990 01.01.1993 
Fare approval 
Automatic 
approval of 
discount fares 
 Free pricing on all fares 
 
Double 
approval of full 
fares 
Double 
disapproval 
applied to full 
fares 
Member States and/or EC 
can intervene against 
excessive economy fares and 
fare dumping 
Market 
access 
Multiple 
designation on 
country to 
country routes 
 
Full access to all routes 
between all EU countries.  
Cabotage (operation of 
domestic route in another 
country) completely free 
from April 1997.  Up to 50% 
capacity allowed if domestic 
sector is combined with route 
to home country, 1993-7. 
 
Multiple 
designation 
permitted on 
higher volume 
city-city routes 
 
More developed public 
service obligations and some 
protection for new regional 
routes 
 5th freedom 5th freedom  
  
Protection for 
routes 
designated as 
public service 
obligations and 
certain new 
routes 
 
Licensing of 
Carriers 
Not provided 
for 
 
Full freedom to start an 
airline:  
1. if EU ownership;  
2. if financially sound and; 
3. if safety requirements are 
   met. 
Sources: Graham, 1995; AEA (1993) 
Provisions were also made regarding radical fare reductions that might lead to price 
wars and destructive competition.  Individual states or the Commission could 
intervene if airlines began reducing ticket prices excessively.  However, the airlines 
 57 
would be encouraged to begin a “sustained downward development of fares” 
(Button, p 43).  Designation by state authorities over traffic rights between all 
Member States was also abolished.  The incremental and restricted re-regulation 
was intended to prevent destructive competition between the European carriers.   
The implementation of the Third Package substantially altered the structural 
framework of the European air transport for four reasons: 1) cabotage rights create 
a single domestic marketplace with no restrictions on routes, capacity, or fares; 2) 
licensing of air carriers is no longer under state control; 3) ownership of airlines is 
no longer restricted, or forbidden between or among Member States; and 4) 
membership is open to like-minded states.   
The liberalisation in its entirety has created a common aviation area; an 
unprecedented break from the notion of territorial sovereignty over air space and 
the bilateral framework of economic regulation.  All countries acceding to the EU 
will become part of this single market.  In short the EC has created the largest 
single aviation market in the world.  Externally, the EU explored the concept and 
proposed a similar common transatlantic aviation area with the US, however there 
was little support for discussions on the American side.66 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) Rulings 
On 5 November 2002 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) handed down landmark 
decisions67 pertaining to the legality of eight “Open Skies” agreements signed 
between the US and the Member States of the European Union (EU).68  The 
decisions are significant because they draw into question not only the integrity of 
existing agreements, but also how future air services agreements will be negotiated 
between EU Member States and third countries due to the ruling that certain 
aspects (articles) in the Open Skies agreements do not conform to Community law.  
Moreover, depending on how the Commission and the Member States agree to 
proceed and the position adopted by the US negotiators, these decisions have the 
potential to alter substantively the existing bilateral regime of air services 
agreements.   
                                          
66 “Towards a Transatlantic Common Aviation Area:  AEA Policy Statement”, September 1999. 
67 Although totalling eight in number, the essence and substance and decisions for each are 
substantively similar and will therefore be treated throughout as a single decision except when 
specific decisions are being noted.  For the text of all the Court decisions see:  “Judgement of the 
Court (5 November 2002), C-466/98, C-467/98, C-468/98, C-469/98, C-471/98, C-472/98, C-
475/98, and C-476/98.  http://www.curia.cu .int/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl.  See also “Open sky 
agreements:  Commission welcomes European Court of justice ruling” (5 November 2002) 
Brussels, IP/02/1609, and “Press Release No 89/02, Press and Information Division. 
68 The eight Member States include: the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, Luxembourg, the UK and 
Northern Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. 
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Although the decisions in these cases have not given the Commission exclusive 
authority to negotiate air services agreements with third countries, the rulings have 
ensured that Member States must bring all their bilaterals into conformity with the 
ECJ rulings.  Henceforth all the bilaterals must recognise European airlines as 
‘Community’ carriers.  This is an important aspect to consider due to the relatively 
standardised nature of the traditional air transport bilateral agreements regardless 
of whether they are liberalised Open Skies agreements or the more restrictive 
Bermuda II agreements.  In short, the court rulings have created an environment 
whereby the Member States and the Commission must work with each other for the 
first time when negotiating the final terms of any international air services 
agreement.   
The Court ruled in favour of the Commission on four distinct areas of air transport.  
It is arguably the decision over ownership and control of an EU airline that could 
affect the internal and external dynamics of the whole industry.  This is because 
every bilateral agreement whether it is a liberal Open Skies, or a restrictive 
Bermuda I or II, contains articles specifying that ownership and effective control 
must be held by the designated airlines of each signatory.  The implications of 
changing every bilateral agreement signed between the EU Member States and 
third countries are therefore far reaching.  In particular, the relationship between 
the EU and the US must be carefully assessed before any action is undertaken.  
Ultimately the ECJ rulings set the stage for changes in the traditional bilateral 
regime governing regulations in international air transport and could have 
significant ramifications reaching far beyond the EU.  Traditionally bilateral 
agreements throughout the world were negotiated by individual sovereign states 
based on the norm of reciprocity.  However, the continuing political and economic 
integration of the EU has altered the air transport market within the EU through the 
three ‘Liberalisation Packages’ that created a common aviation area.   
The Single Aviation Market (SAM):  Australia – New Zealand 
The SAM Agreement signed in September 1996 is significant, even though it is only 
between two states, because of the terms that remove many of the traditional 
market access barriers in the Bermuda or Open Skies types of agreements.69  These 
barriers, such as capacity, frequency, tariffs and cabotage, have been removed 
completely and articles on competition policy and mutual recognition of aviation 
related certification inserted.  Carriers are able to determine where, when, how 
                                          
69 The full text can be found at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/sam.pdf. 
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often, and what they will charge.  Additionally, carriers from each of the states are 
permitted to operate on a cabotage basis and are allowed to set up domestic 
carriers in the other state.   
The provisions on foreign ownership do not go as far as the European single 
market, but do raise the limitations to fifty per cent for non-Australian and New 
Zealand capital investment.  The agreement specifies that at least two-thirds of the 
Chairperson and Members of the Board are nationals of one or both states.  It also 
uses principal place of business as one of the ownership criteria.  Articles ensuring 
the protection of national interest are included and in combination with the foreign 
ownership restrictions ensure effective control.  Nevertheless, due to the openness 
created between the two states, SAM is categorised for the purposes of this study 
as a common aviation area. 
The Role of ICAO 
The ICAO, a special organisation of the United Nations has been empowered to 
oversee the technical and safety standards of air transport and air navigation.  It 
has the largest number of member states (183) and is therefore truly a multilateral 
body.  Until the GATS came into existence, ICAO was the only Intergovernmental 
Organisation (IO) with any degree of influence over the industry.  It is therefore 
considered by many of the WTO members to be the only IO that should have any 
jurisdiction over air transport.  This comes primarily from developing states, but the 
jurisdiction issue has also been brought forth by some developed states (i.e. the US 
and Japan) wishing to limit the GATS coverage at its current level.  
The economic regulations determining how and where airlines can conduct their 
business internationally are prescribed, as discussed above, in the ASAs, not 
through predetermined rules laid out by ICAO.   
In summary, the rôle of international air transport in the overall 
development strategy of States and the extent to which this can be 
achieved through a liberal or a protective approach is a matter for 
States individually under the Chicago Convention. It is the framework 
which is established by the Convention rather than the Convention 
itself which provides the means for the progressive liberalization of 
international air-transport services and, in recent years, a marked 
degree of liberalization has taken place within this framework 
(MTN.GNS/W/36, 16 May 1988, p 10). 
Historically, ICAO has not had a significant amount of influence over the 
commercial aspects of the industry beyond recently suggesting that technical and 
safety standards cannot be separated from economic issues.  ICAO did not begin to 
actively develop a predominant economic regulatory role until the Uruguay Round 
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was underway in the mid-1980s.  It normally provided research and analysis for 
regulatory standards that are directly related to safety issues.  There is no 
embedded history of recommended commercial practices.  It is nevertheless 
possible to find “recommended practices” based on ICAO research that are adopted 
and adhered to by its Member States.  That some industry participants and national 
policy makers view the WTO as a threat to ICAO is really overstating the role of the 
GATS vis-à-vis its Member States.  ICAO has a critical role to maintain in the safety 
aspects and this role should never be diminished in any manner.  Given that the 
same states belong to both IOs the likelihood of ICAO’s role being diminished 
because the GATS is expanded to cover some sub-sectors is extremely remote.   
The movement from an economic regulatory system that is based on bilateral air 
services agreements, to a multilateral framework in air transport remains in a 
conceptual stage of development and is not supported by all industry participants, 
including ICAO.  The majority of states throughout the world remain committed to 
the operational framework developed over the past fifty years that is primarily 
bilateral, but there is a growing number that would like to move away from the 
restrictiveness of these agreements without losing control over territorial 
sovereignty or reducing technical and safety standards.  The liberalisation of 
international air transport industry that has occurred was conducted within this 
framework.  However, the development of multilateral trade liberalisation through 
the creation of the WTO and the GATS suggests that there is a tension developing 
between the traditional bilateral framework and the multilateral forum of the 
WTO/GATS.   
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Chapter 4 
The GATT, the WTO, and the GATS 
In order to set the context for the scope of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreements, the 2000 services negotiations and the Air Transport Review (the 
Review), it is relevant to cast back to the informal negotiations prior to the launch 
of the Uruguay Round to see how the present institutional framework developed, 
when new proposals were submitted, and whether they gained immediate support 
by other Members.  In short, history helps us identify a number of relevant factors 
for understanding institutional change at the multilateral level.  Moreover, this 
exercise provides a deeper understanding of the commitment by sovereign states 
to participate and achieve national economic gains from the increasing 
interdependence of the global economy and any corresponding sovereignty based 
trade-offs.  This pertains equally to all Member States.70  It also highlights the 
importance of the value placed upon compromise and consensus decision-making in 
order to achieve sovereign economic and political goals.   
Examining the informal discussions and negotiations that eventually led to the 
official launching of the Uruguay Round deepens our knowledge and understanding 
of the mechanisms and procedures of consensus decision-making.  Understanding 
the informal setting lends support to the argument that while the process may be 
time intensive and cumbersome, it remains the most appropriate and democratic 
method for multilateral trade agreements.  The process is likely to be slower than 
majority voting, however, despite the time and effort necessary to reach a 
consensus on contentious issues, the outcome tends to produce rules and 
documents that represent broader interests, whereby all participants achieve at 
least some of their original objectives. 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has been evolving and 
expanding in both membership and scope since its inception in 194771, however the 
                                          
70 As noted previously, the Members of the WTO are not always sovereign states, with the EC 
being the most obvious example.  However, throughout this chapter reference will be made to the 
state or states in addition to Members and Member States.  This is being done for ease of usage 
and is not intended to suggest all Members are in fact sovereign states.  
71 The GATT negotiations first began in 1947 as an ad hoc institution after the failure of 
establishing the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1944, and it was not recognized under 
international law.  It included only 23 states.  GATT Agreements and membership grew until 1995 
when the WTO became the official international organization.  The GATT Secretariat was likewise 
an informal institution until the WTO was created.  Richard Blackhurst, “General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT):  Origins of the GATT”, forthcoming in Princeton Encyclopedia of the 
World Economy.   
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terms of accession were different prior to the formation of the WTO.  During the 
early years a country, specifically former colonies, only had to apply for 
membership to be accepted; there were no accession negotiations and thus no 
requirement to change domestic regulations prior to joining.  Nevertheless, every 
time a country joined the GATT, trade barriers were reduced and there was a 
corresponding and positive economic impact experienced by those states, which in 
turn affected the growth of the world economy.  Today, countries wishing to accede 
must go through lengthy (years) bilateral negotiations (accession talks) with other 
Members prior to being accepted into the Organisation.  These institutional changes 
occurred over the years gradually without much public attention or scrutiny.  That 
is until the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) of negotiations and the inclusion for the 
first time of trade in services. 
Prior to the creation of the GATS it was widely believed that provision of many 
services could not be traded across borders and that in many instances it was a 
governmental responsibility to provide services to the people.  It was the perceived 
encroachment on the latter that drew wide-spread and negative attention to the 
WTO and in particular the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  Large 
and increasingly violent anti-globalisation demonstrations began to occur and 
culminated with globally broadcast riots in Seattle (1999) and Genoa (2001).  While 
much of the media attention was garnered on the basis of protests against 
economic globalisation, history provides concrete evidence that national economic 
gains have been made through the lowering of tariffs or quota restrictions and 
increasing interdependence between states. 
The growth and expansion of this multilateral institution is the antithesis of 
international air transport.  During roughly the same time period that the GATT 
expanded on the basis of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment, air transport 
developed on the basis of bilateral agreements and reciprocity.  While the GATT 
principles were based on transparency and consensus, bilateral reciprocity through 
historically non-transparent negotiations between unequal partners defined the 
market access rules of international air transport.   
The end of the Uruguay Round established the WTO as an Intergovernmental 
(International) Organisation (IO) and produced inter alia the GATS.  The original 
intent of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration and the launch of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations in 1986, was to include a priori all forms of services without 
exclusion.  However, as the negotiating groups were established, certain service 
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sectors that were considered to need ‘special treatment’ were treated individually in 
sector specific working groups.  These sectors72, which included air transport, were 
negotiated individually and resulted in the creation of six sectoral Annexes73 
attached to the main text of the GATS.  Only the Air Transport Annex contained 
provisions that specifically exclude parts of the sector from the GATS, while the 
others were mandated for further negotiations (i.e. telecoms maritime and financial 
services).  The immediate exclusion of the air transport sub-sectors was not 
unequivocal since aircraft repair and maintenance services (MRO), selling and 
marketing of air transport services, and computer reservation system (CRS) 
services were specifically identified for coverage by the GATS.  Moreover, the text 
of the Air transport Annex was framed ambiguously.  While clearly defining the 
exclusion of traffic rights, it is less clear about the meaning of the ‘services directly 
related to the exercise of traffic rights’ (GATS, 1994).  Considering that air 
transport is oftentimes the transportation medium connecting trading partners, any 
exclusion is striking.  The effect is that market access barriers in air transportation 
services contribute toward higher than necessary consumer costs in the supply 
chain. 
Pre-Uruguay Round Negotiations 
In an excellent analysis by John B. Richardson74 about the discussions leading up to 
the launching of the Uruguay Round we are given insights into the institutional 
structure and decision-making processes within the WTO.  As a participant prior to 
and during the Uruguay Round, Richardson’s observations and analysis highlight 
work that is required by delegates and is not usually available to academic 
researchers.  From this perspective he analyses the informal negotiations that took 
place prior to the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration and the launching of the 
Uruguay Round.  These discussions are considered to be critical in the sense that 
without compromises reached during this phase of negotiations, it is likely that the 
Uruguay Round would not have been launched.  Analysing the outcome of these 
discussions raises two important factors in multilateral negotiations:  the 
importance of informal meetings and discussions that occur among the Members, 
                                          
72 The other sectors that can be found in the Annexes of the GATS include:  telecommunications, 
maritime, and financial services.  GATS:  The General Agreement on Trade in Services and Related 
Instruments, 1994. 
73 The Annexes cover:  Article II Exemptions, Movement of natural Persons Supplying Services 
under the Agreement, Air Transport, Financial Services, a second Annex on Financial Services, 
Telecommunications, and Basic Telecommunications.  Ibid., pp 25-48. 
74 See “What Really Happened at Punta del Este:  Understanding the Framework of the Uruguay 
Round” in International Economics and Development.  Rittle, 1988.  John Richardson was a 
participant during the period under discussion as a delegate with the European Communities. 
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and the influence of economically powerful states when major controversies arise in 
the multilateral setting. 
First, it is important to note that the US and the EC played pivotal roles in the 
GATT, particularly when contentious issues were involved.  When either or both of 
these two powers choose to oppose an issue unequivocally, it is unlikely that any 
further progress will be made in that issue area in the short-term.  Nevertheless, 
both of these influential Members are cognizant of their economic power within the 
world economy and are therefore less likely to overtly oppose discussions or 
negotiations that would lead to a convergence of ideas.75  Unlike developing 
countries, the largest two economic powers will continue participation despite 
opposition to a particular topic or issue under discussion.  This in turn enhances the 
possibility of reaching compromises and can facilitate the convergence of 
negotiating positions and/or consensus.  To achieve the desired outcome of the 
powerful states, rewording the text under discussion will accommodate, to some 
extent, that state’s demands in the event that others challenge it.   
The inclusion of services in the Uruguay Round provides a good example of the 
willingness of states to participate in a multilateral forum and suggests that despite 
the varying speeds of trade liberalisation, the trend is well established.  The US was 
the initiator of including services into the GATT, although was later supported by 
the EC.76  In the initial stages prior to the Round a number of countries (primarily 
developing countries) strongly objected to the proposal.  However, rather than 
abandoning the concept, both the EC and the US worked to ensure informal 
discussions were initiated, bringing ‘on board’ the reluctant Members.  Thus, 
initiatives emanating from either of these two Members have, in most cases, the 
ability to push an agenda forward despite opposition from smaller states, 
particularly if those states do not form into groups that promote their interests.  
Following from this, it is unlikely that unless an issue is supported (actively or 
tacitly) or at least not opposed by one or both of these two Members it will probably 
remain under discussion and can lead eventually to a consensus.   
The second point is about how consensus can be reached through compromise 
without actually conceding a state’s primary objectives, and therefore can be 
                                          
75 See Croome, page 6 regarding his observation that despite their reluctance to initiate further 
negotiations “the Community took seriously its responsibilities as a leading power and pillar of 
GATT, and was prepared to join fully in discussions and decisions on GATT’s future.”  John 
Croome, “Reshaping the World Trade System:  A History of the Uruguay Round”, 1999. 
76 More accurately “American financial services providers were perhaps the prime movers for 
putting services on the agenda of the round.”  Bernard Hoekman, “Market Access: through 
Multilateral Agreement”, in The World Economy, Vol. 15 No., 6, pp 707-727, 1992. 
 65 
differentiated from a majority voting system.  In this instance achieving an optimal 
outcome remains an important negotiator objective.  When striving for an 
agreement there cannot be one or two who adamantly oppose an outcome, 
regardless of economic or political strength, unlike in the case of majority voting.  
At the same time, the absolute numbers of states participating in the multilateral 
negotiations environment make it impossible for every individual state to articulate 
specific positions.  Thus, states tend to form interest or tactical alliances in order to 
move the negotiations forward (Richardson, p 205) or at a minimum to keep the 
item under active discussion.   
Examples of this type of co-operation today are the alliance between the US and 
Japan over wanting to keep air transport excluded from GATS coverage, or the 
Dominican Republic in concert with other developing Members77 to ensure their 
proposed Tourism Annex is not swept aside in its entirety.  Another example is the 
creation of the Cairns Group78 during the Uruguay Round to ensure agricultural 
issues and concerns remained under discussion.  In the case of air transport there 
were no definitive groups and the US and the EC remained at odds over what sub-
sectors might be covered.  The US agreed to the creation of an Annex and 
consented to accept coverage in three of the sub-sectors; of the three, they took an 
MFN exemption on two (marketing and sales, and CRS).  Looking closer at why only 
one of these sub-sectors (MRO) was accepted by the US can be found in their 
domestic legislation.  The MRO industry had already successfully lobbied the 
government to make legislative changes so that maintenance bases could be 
located outside the country and airlines could take advantage of the more 
competitive international market in aircraft repair.79  This allowed the US to agree 
to a compromise in order to achieve the needed consensus to the overall Round.  
Noting this is significant due to the negotiations over the ground-handling sector 
that the EC et al wanted included in the exceptions and the US did not.  Conceding 
MRO was an important negotiating point.  Had there been a majority vote on these 
negotiations, the outcome might have been substantially different. 
Although the potential for developing a majority voting system existed and has 
been used prior to the Uruguay Round (1986), the trade delegates remain strongly 
committed to the consensus process.  This adherence to the notion of deciding by 
                                          
77 The supporting Members were:  Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru, and Venezuela. 
78 Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System:  
From GATT to WTO, 1995. 
79 Interview with US based government representative that participated in negotiations of air 
transport during the Uruguay Round. 
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consensus exists despite the built in provisions of the “Marrakech Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization”, Article ΙX, that allows for majority 
voting.80  “The GATT contracting parties could, by simple majority “decide to 
conduct, sponsor or support multilateral negotiations”, although they could not 
oblige individual countries to accept new substantive obligations as a result of such 
negotiations” (Croome, 1999).  This would likely have the effect of injecting 
structural weakness into the system whereby it could create disadvantaged splinter 
groups that might decide to ignore final decisions.  A slow system would then also 
become fractured.  A precedent would be set for decision-making that could have 
the potential to entrench the North-South division and existing tensions even 
further.  Indeed, while some states remained opposed to beginning the Uruguay 
Round, they did not demand the use of majority voting, and remained within the 
consensus based protocol (Croome, 1999). 
For advocates of majority voting rights, the adherence to consensus can be rather 
perplexing since most democratic states operate on the basis of the former rather 
than the latter.  Consensus is often criticised for being inefficient (too much time) 
and producing agreements that may appear at the surface to be ambiguous and too 
broad.  Moreover, the initial proposals and objectives may be set in general terms 
whereby differing perspectives or proposals may have areas in common with others 
despite appearing, in the first instance, to be vastly different.  In this sense (as was 
the case for including services in the Uruguay Round) general proposals are broad 
enough to permit compromises through negotiations without losing the core intent 
of the original proposal.  This is because there can be issues where states may be 
unclear of their specific objectives and is reflected in the wording of a proposal or 
submission.  The negotiations leading up to the launching of the Uruguay Round 
exemplify this type of negotiating proposal and the results reflect the flexibility of 
the negotiating and decision-making process.  In fact, it could be argued that 
despite the apparent inefficiencies that are built into consensus decision-making the 
process provides for a greater likelihood of reaching some level of agreement for 
Members regardless of economic and political power.  Nevertheless, there is also 
potential for a stalemate or talks collapsing altogether. 
The strongest opponents of the proposal to include services in the GATT were the 
G1081 developing countries led by India and Brazil.  In between were the EC leading 
                                          
80 The Results of the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations:  the Legal Texts.  
Geneva:  World Trade Organization, 1994, p 11. 
81 The Group of ten includes: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania, 
Vietnam and Yugoslavia. 
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a mix of OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) and 
developing countries and a group of developing countries referred to as the G20 
group.82  While each state could be said to hold particular objectives, the positions 
were broadly categorised into four groups (US, EU, G10, G20).  At one end of the 
spectrum stood the US and at the other end were those who were adamant that 
any services negotiations had to be completely separate from negotiations over 
goods (G10).  Noteworthy for the G10 position is that the concern was primarily a 
structural issue rather than a complete refusal to consider services at all.   
Structural issues tend to relate to how new areas of interest such as how inclusion 
of services will be incorporated operationally and whether operational divisions will 
be separated.  In this instance, it was important for some states to ensure that the 
new area of services would be kept distinct from the framework (structure) of the 
GATT, whereas others were content to merely incorporate services directly into the 
GATT rules.  The general divisions and groups of states that formed in response to 
the US proposal to include services into the GATT represented core differences 
among the contracting states (Croome, Richardson, et al).   
At one end of the spectrum stood those who did not want services negotiations 
included in the GATT and were represented mostly by the developing states (all 
levels).  Others wanted special recognition for difficulties facing the developing 
states.  This was based on the institutional framework whereby a distinct North-
South divide already existed.  The US, supported by some OECD countries wanted 
to adhere to its original proposal submitted in 1982, whereby services would be 
liberalised through GATT negotiations (Richardson, Croome, Nayal).  Using 
Richardson’s graphic depiction (Charts 1-4) it can be seen how the informal 
negotiations permitted compromise among the four groups, allowing for 
incremental movement away from the initial positions and toward a consensus. 
Chart 1 below represents the initial perception of negotiating positions and appears 
to suggest that it would be difficult to find compromises to bridge the gap in 
perspectives.  In a majority vote it is likely that the developing countries would 
have carried the vote to oppose the US proposal. 
                                          
82 The list of Members that are included in this group were not identified other than to note that 
they were “developing countries”.  John B. Richardson, “What Really Happened at Punta del Este:  
Understanding the Framework of the Uruguay Round” in International Economy and Development, 
1998, p 206. 
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Chart 1:  Enthusiasm for US Proposal to Liberalise Trade in Services83 
Source: John B. Richardson “What Really Happened at Punta del Este”.  
At this stage it is still individual Members that are grouped according to declared 
opinions regarding the US proposal, although they can be viewed as distinct 
clusters.  Through the informal discussions it became clear that the groups took 
general positions in order to support others in the same group despite some 
differences in objectives and political positions.  In this manner, negotiators were 
able to establish a basis for continuing the talks.  The table below indicates that 
while the groups are shifting their overall positions, they remain distinct in their 
differences, and the same perspectives no longer appear to be completely 
immutable. 
Chart 2:  General Shift from Original Negotiation Positions 
 
Source: John B. Richardson “What Really Happened at Punta del Este. 
                                          
83 Richardson appears to make no distinction between least developing or less developed and 
developing Members.  It has therefore been assumed that these Members are from the full 
spectrum of developing countries.  Radical refers to those who were most adamantly opposed to 
including services in the Round.  
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Chart 3:  Overlap due to Indefinite or General Negotiating Statements 
 
Source: John B. Richardson “What Really Happened at Punta del Este”. 
 
Charts 2 and 3 raise another aspect of multilateral negotiations; compromise on 
individual issues allowing the group as a whole to move from initial positions.  While 
the possibility of a deadlock exists, the negotiators still retain the ability to move in 
the direction of consensus.  This despite remaining apart on many issues as 
indicated in the difference between the positions noted in these two Charts.  
Notably, the US needed to make one major concession, to accept a separate 
negotiating forum for services. 
The next Chart (4) is a depiction of the progression or evolution of negotiations and 
lobbying that was brought to bear by those Members supporting the US proposal 
(notably the EU and the US).  It highlights the convergence by the resistant 
Members (G10, G20) and those that could agree to the conceptual inclusion of 
services balanced by the desire to continue the traditional trade expansion of 
goods.  
This depicts the difference, in the case of the G10, G20, and the EU, between the 
desire to continue the multilateral work on lowering international trade barriers in 
goods and retaining traditional sovereign state monopoly power over the services 
sector.  Through informal discussions and compromise by many delegates, the final 
text of the Ministerial Declaration reached, at least to some extent, a workable 
solution.   
Enthusiasm for GATT negotiations 
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Chart 4:  Convergence  
Source: John B. Richardson “What Really Happened at Punta del Este”. 
In the final analysis, the US really did not concede much, relative to their initial 
proposal other than agreeing that services could be negotiated separately from the 
GATT.  However, the developing countries were able to establish their primary 
objectives which were:  a) keeping the services agenda and negotiations completely 
separate from the goods arena; and b) ensuring that special considerations would 
be extended to the developing and least developed countries in the framework 
agreement.  These primary objectives are set out in the preamble of the GATS.  
Thus, the Declaration itself is a construction of compromises that address the major 
concerns and aspirations of all Members.   
Despite the broad objectives that were attained through the negotiations, it is also 
important to look at the more substantive issue of what liberalising trade in services 
actually meant.  According to Richardson, “[t]he first key element that caused 
individual positions to be modified emerged as soon as the original US proposal was 
subjected to analysis” (p 206).  Questions regarding the meaning of liberalisation 
arose since “[m]any service sectors are regulated, some extremely heavily, by 
governments” (p 206).  In other words, was liberalisation considered to equivalent 
to regulation?  Were the two synonymous?  The opinion arrived at by all the states, 
as related by Richardson, was that they were to be considered to be distinctly 
different. 
All countries, in fact, came to the view that some regulation of 
services would and should continue to exist and that liberalization of 
trade, if it were agree, could therefore be equated neither with 
general deregulation nor with free trade in services (Richardson, p 
206). 
Enthusiasm for 
trade expansion 
Enthusiasm for GATT negotiations 
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In fact, in some instances liberalisation is accompanied by increased regulatory 
oversight. 
Uruguay Round Negotiations 
This section will focus on the negotiations that took place during the Uruguay 
Round (1986 – 1994) in order to provide a context for analysing the final text of 
the Air Transport Annex in the GATS.  Understanding how the negotiations 
proceeded provides a contextual basis for understanding how air transport came to 
be the only services sector that was excluded in its entirety from GATS coverage 
(notwithstanding the three specified exceptions).  The importance of understanding 
how the negotiations evolved exposes the political forces that drive the multilateral 
liberalisation process and highlights the value of creating a single body of rules for 
governing international trade.   
The launching of the Uruguay Round set in motion the broadest and longest 
multilateral trade negotiations since the GATT agreements began in 1947.  For the 
first time trade negotiators, who previously had only negotiated tariff reductions for 
goods, designed and created a framework document for multilateral rules relating 
directly to international trade in services.   
The negotiating mandate directed participating trade representative to begin talks 
on a broad range of issues based on general objectives that would shape the final 
agreements.  The Group Negotiating Services (GNS) discussions reflected national 
concerns over how to create a framework agreement for trade in services that 
would fulfill the Ministerial mandate of transparency, progressive liberalisation, and 
ensure all Members would be able to benefit economically from any agreement.  
Since this was the first time services were considered in a multilateral forum and 
comprehensive services statistical data was virtually non-existent, negotiators were 
careful to cover everything conceivable that would or could be affected by their 
negotiations and decisions.   
The initial phase of the negotiations consisted of creating six general elements to be 
discussed by delegates:  1) general negotiating guidelines and objectives; 2) 
definitional and statistical issues; 3) broad concepts on which principles and rules 
for trade in services, including possible disciplines for individual sectors, might be 
based; 4) coverage of the multilateral framework for trade in services; 5) existing 
international disciplines and arrangements; and 6) measures and practices 
contributing to or limiting the expansion of trade in services, specifically including 
any barriers perceived by individual participants, to which the conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalization might be applicable. 
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A number of states had distinctive objectives including and beyond services that 
they hoped to have integrated in the final texts at the end of the Round.  The US 
was committed to concluding an agreement on services while a group of 
traditionally non-aligned states formed the Cairns Group84, and a proposal by the 
Swiss and Colombian Members sought to place broader interests (including the 
developing world) on the discussion table.  The formation of traditionally non-
aligned states was significant since this was the first time in post war history that 
traditional economic blocs were transcended.85  Although a new Round would likely 
never be launched without the US and other G7 states, the growth in membership 
of developing countries, the formation of interest blocs, and the adherence to 
consensus decision-making meant that issues important to the developing world 
were to be seriously considered. This helped to shape the final GATS framework 
document and ensured negotiations over all the new sectors (natural resource-
based products, textiles and clothing, agriculture, intellectual property rights, 
investment measures, and services) for both the developed and developing worlds 
were taken into account.  
The Uruguay Round was officially launched 14 September 1986 at Punta del Este, 
Uruguay by adopting the Ministerial Declaration that set out the scope, structure, 
and length of the negotiations.  Work was divided among the different working 
groups in order to focus on what would become known as sectoral issues.  In 
keeping with demands made by many of the developing states negotiating on 
services, the working groups were to be distinct and separate from the GATT 
negotiations on goods.  The formal structure established that the Trade 
Negotiations Committee (TNC) directed the Round as a whole.  Under this 
committee were inter alia, the Group Negotiating Goods (GNG) and the Group of 
Negotiations on Services (GNS).  In total there were fifteen negotiating groups.  
The distinctions between these groups and the work of each, were maintained 
throughout the entire Round (Croome, p 25), reflecting the mandate of the Punta 
del Este Ministerial Declaration.  Although the focus of the study is directed toward 
the GATS and air transport specifically, it needs to be remembered that they still 
operated within the context of the overall Round. 
                                          
84 Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, and Uruguay. 
85 Raymond J. Krommenacker, “Services Negotiations:  From Interest-lateralism to Multilateralism 
in the Context of the Servicization of the Economy”, Paper for the Symposium on the New GATT 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations:  Legal and Economic Problems, 12 June 1987. 
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The mandate given to negotiators remained one of the widely misunderstood 
aspects of the Uruguay Round and the subsequent creation of both the WTO and 
trade in services.  This Round, despite how some media and anti-globalisation 
groups presented the issues, was not about liberalisation at all costs regardless of 
the consequences.  The objectives of the Declaration were “…to halt and reverse 
protectionism, remove distortions to trade, preserve GATT’s principles and forward 
its objectives, and develop a more open, viable and durable multilateral trading 
system” (Croome, p 26).  The difference between the work conducted under the 
direction of the negotiating mandate and the perception of external observers is 
significant and worth examining further in light of the services negotiations. 
The internal work was conducted on the basis of the negotiating mandate and 
directed the new sectors to develop a framework agreement to create the legal 
foundation within which actual negotiations and national commitments could be 
made.  In direct contrast to the growing anti-WTO voices over states losing their 
sovereignty, the institutional reality of the GATT (and subsequently the WTO) is a 
structure comprised of states and their representatives.  It is the states that 
represent state interests and by extension corporate interests.  Then and now lobby 
groups or individuals work through the state to achieve specific agendas.  
The external perception by some observers suggests that there is a body of policy 
makers located outside the realm and jurisdiction of sovereign states, whose 
agenda is driven by trans-national or multinational corporate interests that are 
seeking greater economic control beyond the home state.86  The implications 
attributed to this perspective are not merely distorted but are simplistic when 
related to the processes and operational structures that drive the multilateral trade 
liberalisation agenda of the WTO.  This is particularly evident when examining the 
air transport sector where flag carriers have in many cases been closely linked to 
national governments and airline executives have a high degree of access to policy 
makers.  This means corporate lobbyists focus on influencing national governments, 
which in turn promote these interests through the foreign affairs departments of 
national governments.   
While it is arguable that large trans-national interests have a disproportionate 
amount of influence upon national policy makers and thereby influence the ongoing 
drive toward an economically interdependent global economy, it is equally incorrect 
to suggest that corporations have a direct impact or influence on the multilateral 
                                          
86 Scott Sinclair, GATS:  How the World Trade Organization’s New “Services” Negotiations 
Threaten Democracy, 2000, p 9. 
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negotiations or the secretariat.  Unknown to many, the WTO bureaucracy is small 
with approximately 580 employees when compared to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF)87, which employs more than 2,600 and the World Bank (WB) over 
10,00088 (the Bretton Woods institutions).  Included in the numbers for the WTO, 
only about half are professional secretariat personnel.  These professionals interact 
with national governments and bureaucracies and have limited, if any, contact with 
corporate lobbyists.  In addition, the secretariat is under constant scrutiny by 
Members to provide non-partisan information and is frequently reminded that the 
WTO is a “Member driven Organisation”.89 
Completion of the Uruguay Round 
The Uruguay Round officially concluded on 15 April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco, 
with the Ministerial Declaration “representing the 124 Governments and the 
European Communities”.90  On this date the “Final Agreement” opened for signature 
to end the longest running (1986 – 1994) and most comprehensive Round ever 
conducted during the history of the GATT.  For the first time, Members agreed to 
include international trade in services and the first time there was agreement to 
create one body of multilaterally agreed rules that included a built in mandate for 
progressive liberalisation.   
The outcome of the Round, as it related to the services sector of the world 
economy, meant that national governments intended to use multilateral rules as 
the basis for progressive liberalisation of internationally traded services.  The 
objective was to enhance economic growth (nationally and internationally) and to 
assist developing and least developed nations to improve their trading position vis-
à-vis the developed world.  To achieve these lofty goals, it was believed that having 
the most favoured nation (MFN) principle of non-discrimination as the cornerstone, 
augmented by transparency rules, and backed by a dispute settlement body, would 
be the most rational method of achieving economic benefits for all Member States.  
That the membership now includes more than 75% (149 out of 189) of all 
sovereign states indicates there is a general political consensus that benefits 
accrued through economic interdependence far outweigh concerns over losing some 
degree of political sovereignty.   
                                          
87 As of May 2002, http://www.imf.org.  
88 As of May 2002, http://www.worldbank.org. 
89 This comment is not infrequently heard in committee and council meetings by country 
delegates. 
90 See:  The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations:  The Legal Texts, 
GATT Secretariat, The Marrakesh Declaration, 15 April 1994.  
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Traditionally, many services sectors were provided universally under government 
authority (e.g. education, communication, and transportation) and thus were 
considered as primarily domestic policy concerns and non-tradable.  The creation of 
the GATS reflects the broad political shift in many countries from treating trade in 
services as a purely domestic concern to understanding that trade in services can 
and do cross borders.  Part of the reason that services were not traded 
internationally emanates from the lack of technology to support rapid and reliable 
infrastructure systems (e.g. telecommunications).  The high level of technological 
development was not widely available until the GATS came into existence (1980s).  
However, the GATS framework rules are not what drive liberalisation in substance.  
Rather, it is a combination of the framework and the Members’ schedules of specific 
commitments that determines the depth and scope of liberalisation.   
The GATS: Obligations and Commitments 
The GATS became an international legal document in 1994, at the same time the 
WTO became legally recognised as an international organisation (IO).  Like other 
IOs, this defines the relationship between governments and not the private sector; 
corporate interests and communications that involve an IO must be addressed 
through the home state.  Only official state representatives are permitted to attend 
and participate in the formal meetings, and decision-making process.  While 
observers are permitted, they must be invited and approval by consensus needs to 
be given for official observer status of other IOs or non-governmental organisations 
(NGO’s).  These rules include not only the GATS but also the entire institutional 
structure of the WTO. 
In design and substance, the GATS is a framework agreement that recognises an 
important and growing aspect of the world economy:  services industries.  It is a 
legal text that lays out the principles and ground rules for states to undertake 
progressive liberalisation of all services for the purpose of encouraging economic 
growth nationally and globally.  The Agreement itself does not, however, dictate the 
how or when specific liberalisation must occur within each Member country.  The 
actual liberalisation occurs only when states are prepared and willing to liberalise a 
sector or sub-sector and only to the level defined by the state itself.  In other 
words, while the GATS contains universal principles and obligations that must be 
adhered to by WTO Members, the agreement is given life and meaning through the 
individual liberalisation commitments defined by each of the Members.  What is 
provided for in the Agreement is the mandate to negotiate progressive liberalisation 
into the future (Article XΙX). 
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The Agreement is both flexible and complex, the latter being a result of the 
Members desiring maximum flexibility.  For example, the GATS covers a priori all 
services (a negative list) but has specified exceptions and a positive listing made by 
the Members in their schedules of specific commitments.  The former ensures the 
Agreement is comprehensive while the latter gives individual Members maximum 
flexibility over the timing and scope of liberalisation commitments.  The 
combination of general obligations laid out in the Agreement to which all Members 
are bound and the legal implications of specified commitments makes it complex 
and difficult for the average person to understand.  
The GATS is divided into six parts plus a section on related instruments and 
appendixes.  Part I provides the scope and definition of the Agreement followed by:  
Part II, General Obligations and Disciplines; Part III, specific commitments; Part IV, 
progressive liberalization; Part V, institutional provisions; Part VI final provisions; 
and at the back, the Annexes.  A further and integral part of the GATS is the 
Members’ schedule of specific commitments.  The schedules are divided into two 
parts, which include the horizontal section (Part I) and the specific commitments 
(Part II).  While each of these parts is an integral element to the agreement, it is 
beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to examine them in detail.  It is 
however relevant to highlight the basic principles and  general obligations of MFN91, 
transparency92, and national treatment93, in order to understand why some of the 
arguments that Members used in the Review indicate a basic lack of understanding 
on the part of the air transport community.  It is also useful to outline briefly the 
basic principles of market access94 and dispute settlement95 in the WTO, which work 
in conjunction with the general obligations. 
                                          
91 Article ΙΙ paragraph 1 states, “With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each 
Member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any 
other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service 
suppliers of any other country.” The GATS:  the General Agreement on Trade in Services and 
Related Instruments, April 1994. 
92 Article ΙΙΙ paragraph 1 states, “Each Member shall publish promptly and, except in emergency 
situations, at the latest by the time of their entry into force, all relevant measures of general 
application which pertain to or affect the operation of this Agreement.  International agreements 
pertaining to or affecting trade in services to which a Member is a signatory shall also be 
published.” The GATS:  the General Agreement on Trade in Services and Related Instruments, 
April 1994. 
93 Article XVΙΙ paragraph 1 states, “In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any 
conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, 
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.”  
The GATS:  the General Agreement on Trade in Services and Related Instruments, April 1994. 
94 Market access under the GATS is a clearly circumscribed obligation that is assumed by inscribing 
a particular sector in a Member's schedule of commitments.  In the absence of qualifying 
limitations, the concept of market access, as defined in Article XVI, guarantees that there are no 
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There is also a formalised method for members to make commitments depending 
on the type of service and how it is normally delivered.  To encompass all types of 
services and the manner in which they are normally supplied, four types or modes 
of service delivery are specified (see description below).  States were also able to 
take MFN exemptions that would be reviewed by the whole membership after five 
years, with the goal that they be removed after ten years.   
Purpose, Obligations and Principles 
Preamble 
The preamble of the GATS recognises that international trade in services are 
becoming an important sector for the “growth and development of the world 
economy” (preamble, the GATS) and that Members intend to develop a multilateral 
framework that can provide a basis for further international liberalisation of services 
constructed upon the principle of transparency.  The process to achieve this goal is 
based on progressive (incremental) liberalisation over time and conducted through 
negotiation under conditions set out in successive trade rounds.  The text 
specifically mentions that progressive liberalisation must proceed with the purpose 
of promoting economic growth for all members and recognises the need for 
member states to be able to advance national policy objectives, regulatory 
standards, and public goods services.  There are no exceptions in this area that 
indicate or imply that states must liberalise at all costs and/or that the process and 
speed must be determined by the GATS.   
Additionally, the preamble sets out the desire “to facilitate the increasing 
participation of developing countries in trade in services and the expansion of their 
service exports including, inter alia, through the strengthening of their domestic 
services capacity and its efficiency and competitiveness”.  Finally, it takes into 
account the potential difficulties that face the least-developed states.  It is 
therefore recognised that all states cannot liberalise at speeds equal to others, that 
the least developed states have greater economic difficulties and therefore this 
must be taken into account by developing and developed states alike.  It seems 
clear that the intent of creating a multilateral framework for services liberalisation 
                                                                                                                         
restrictions pertaining to: a) the number of service suppliers; b) the value of service transactions 
or assets; c) the number of operations or quantity of output; d) the number of natural persons 
supplying a service; e) the type of legal entity or joint venture; f) the participation of foreign 
capital.  Members wishing to maintain any of these six types of restrictions in a committed sector 
would need to specify the relevant measures in their schedules. 
95 The Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is found in Annex 2 as the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization. 
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is for the purpose of including all members (least developed to developed states) in 
the potential economic benefits of a liberal trading system.   
Notably, there does not exist either implicitly or explicitly, anything to suggest that 
Members must sacrifice national safety standards, social public policies, 
environmental standards, or national security issues.  Instead, the preamble lays 
out objectives and goals that relate to the maintenance of sovereign aspirations 
and objectives.  This is not to suggest or imply in any way that through progressive 
liberalisation of trade in services nations do not remain completely independent.  
Lowering barriers to international trade does increase the economic 
interdependence among states, but this differs vastly from a complete loss of 
sovereignty or democracy.  In short, the preamble appears to embed services 
liberalisation within the realm of the sovereign state thereby ensuring that 
participation increases economic benefits for all Members through progressive 
liberalisation. 
Definition of Services 
The first section of the GATS sets out in one article, both the scope and the 
definition of trade in services.  The scope is limited only through the “… measures 
by Members affecting trade in services” whereby measures are defined as the “… 
central, regional, or local governments and authorities: and non-governmental 
bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional, or local 
governments” (GATS paragraphs 3(a)(i) and 3(a)(ii)).  In other words, authority 
rests within sovereign states regardless of the political structure or level of 
economic development. 
The exercise of autonomous authority is further entrenched through the clarification 
in Article 1(3)(b) and 1(3)(c) that ensures governments retain control over sectors 
(industries) that are not commercially offered or are considered important to 
national policy objectives: 
(b) “services” includes any service in any sector except services 
supplied in the exercise of governmental authority: 
(c) “a service supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority” means any service which is supplied neither on a 
commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more 
service suppliers. 
These two sub-articles ensure that although members of the WTO have legal 
obligations to the Agreements (all WTO agreements), in the case of services the 
liberalisation process is circumscribed by individual states through sector specific 
commitments, and in the multilateral forum of negotiations and ministerial 
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decisions (again state driven).  The sub-articles (1(3)(b) and (c)) clarify that the 
power to liberalise further is not shifted away from the state.  An emphasis is 
therefore placed on the sovereign right of states to determine individually the speed 
of liberalisation, control over sectors deemed to be inappropriate for multilateral 
liberalisation, or even privatisation.  This also places the secretariat and 
multinational corporations as recipients of state policy and not the other way 
around, as suggested by some anti-globalisation advocates.  By forming the WTO 
and in particular creating the GATS, Members have retained authority over national 
policy agendas, the scope of GATS, and the speed and timing of further 
liberalisation in the services sector. 
The definition of services and government measures are also clarified in Article 1 
since the delivery and consumption of services is more varied than for goods.  
While the latter can be visually determined at point of entry into a foreign territory, 
services oftentimes need the consumer and supplier to be located in the same 
physical space.  In other instances it is the service that moves across borders.  To 
accommodate these complexities, the negotiators defined services in reference to 
how they are delivered (provided) and have thus been categorised into four types 
(modes) of service delivery. 
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any 
other Member; 
(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any 
other Member; 
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial 
presence in the territory of any other Member; 
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through the presence of 
natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other 
Member. 
In combination these four modes96 of service delivery define international trade in 
services.  The first is referred to as either “mode 1” or “cross-border supply”.  Here 
it is the service that travels across international borders (e.g. facsimiles, telexes, e-
commerce).  The supplier and the consumer are not located in the same physical 
place.  “Mode 2” (consumption abroad) is when the service is delivered in country 
and consumed by a foreigner in the same country (e.g. a foreign tourist staying in a 
hotel).  “Mode 3” (commercial presence) is when a company from country a opens 
a business (e.g. subsidiaries, branch offices) in country b.  Mode 4 (temporary 
                                          
96 Modes of supply are found in the Members’s schedules of specific commitments.  In schedule 
templates they are found at the top along with the brief description of each type.  Under the 
national treatment and market access columns only the numbers are used to denote the mode of 
service to which commitments are being made and are only listed when a commitment is entered. 
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movement of natural persons) is the actual movement of people from one country 
to provide services in another country for a short and determinate amount of time 
(e.g. expert consultants). 
The final definition provided in Article 1 states that “a service supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority” means any service which is supplied neither on 
a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service suppliers” (Article 
1(3)(c).  Such a service is not covered by the GATS.  Including this definition 
appears to emphasise the importance national governments place upon retaining 
control over sectors considered to be of national importance and therefore are 
beyond the scope of the GATS and the WTO.  Moreover, there are no restrictions or 
positive listings that circumscribe the scope of government authority insofar as 
specific sectors or industries are concerned.  This effectively excludes some services 
despite the a priori inclusion of all services in the GATS.  However, any such Article 
1 exclusion is limited to specific national conditions. 
General Obligations and Disciplines:  Part II 
The general obligations and disciplines of the GATS contain the greatest number of 
articles and set the rules for the framework of the Agreement.  Totalling fourteen 
articles, this section is a top down approach to the rules that must be followed by 
the Members.  It encompasses obligations and disciplines that are universally 
binding on all, thereby establishing a set of rules covering all services and reflecting 
the desire by Members to have consistency guiding progressive liberalisation.  
Included in the framework are also a number of exceptions for the purposes of 
maintaining the ability of a Member to protect national policy making powers, inter 
alia, over areas of national security, protection of Balance of Payments (BOP), and 
domestic concerns relating to issues of public morals, health and safety standards, 
and the ability to enforce laws and regulations.   
Probably the two most fundamental principles of the multilateral trade regime of 
the WTO (all agreements), embodied in this section of the GATS are:  “trade 
without discrimination”, through MFN and transparency.  While National treatment 
is a fundamental obligation within the WTO, in the GATS it is treated differently 
than the GATT agreement.   Another, and equally important principle, is the 
recognition of special difficulties facing developing and least developed countries.  
The GATS was therefore written to acknowledge unique problems and potential 
difficulties of the different economic conditions of Members.  In addition, there are 
also a number of articles that create a mandate for Members to continue 
negotiations on sectors needing finalisation at the end of the Uruguay Round.   
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MFN: Article II 
The MFN principle has been one of the fundamental building blocks for multilateral 
trade since the inception of the GATT in 1947.  It is a principle of non-discrimination 
among the Members to the agreement and has been carried over into the GATS 
(Article II).  MFN means that “…each Member shall accord immediately and 
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no 
less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any 
other country” (Article II paragraph 1).  In other words, there is to be no arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination either among Members or preferences given to non-
Members. 
Additionally, MFN remains a fundamental principle regardless of commitments by 
Members in their national schedules.  However, despite the importance attributed 
to MFN, negotiators of the GATS agreed to recognise that in some instances MFN 
exemptions would be necessary to advance the liberalisation process.  For those 
instances where states believed MFN would have a detrimental affect on a given 
sector or sub-sector the GATS provides states with the ability to take temporary 
exemptions.  The exemptions taken had to be reviewed after five years (2000) and 
should be removed after a maximum of ten years. 
Having a principle like MFN is an important aspect of the international trade 
liberalisation process because it ensures that preferential trade agreements cannot 
be constructed so that trading partners give preferential treatment to some states 
over others.  MFN also separates trading rules from political tensions that may arise 
from time to time between states.  Moreover, this principle does not state either 
implicitly or explicitly how or when states should begin to liberalise.  What it does 
require is non-discriminatory treatment of others in sectors already liberalised, and 
when liberalising in the future treatment must be on an MFN basis in national 
schedules. 
Article 3:  Transparency 
After the principle of non-discrimination through MFN treatment, transparency can 
be considered as the vehicle for ensuring discrimination does not exist within the 
domestic realm of national regulations.  Transparency, as it is written into the 
GATS, provides the basis for constructing a set of rules for the timely publication of 
national measures that could affect international trade in services.  Paragraph 1 
clearly states that adherence to the rules on transparency can not affect 
“emergency situations”, and only apply to measures “which pertain to or affect 
trade in services” and or the “operation of [the] Agreement.”  In addition to these 
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ground rules, consideration is also given (again) to the special needs of developing 
countries (paragraph 4).   
Article 3bis: Disclosure of Confidential Information 
Despite the provisions in Article 3 that specify measures affecting trade in services 
must be published or otherwise available in the public domain, this sub-article 
explicitly clarifies the ultimate authority resides with the Member.   
Nothing in this Agreement shall require any Member to provide 
confidential information, the disclosure of which would impede law 
enforcement, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or 
which would prejudice legitimate commercial interests of particular 
enterprises, public or private (GATS: Article 3bis). 
Although the article is not lengthy, the scope is broad and augments the principle 
that the Members are not required to undertake any liberalisation that would affect 
sovereign rights over privacy laws or would in anyway affect the public interest.  
The sectors that were mandated for negotiation at a future date included: 
Emergency Safeguard Measures (Article X), Government Procurement (Article XIII), 
Subsidies (Article XV), and Domestic Regulation (Article VI).  In addition, Part II of 
the GATS recognises that there are situations, existing and potential, whereby 
national governments need to act in ways that could run counter to general 
obligations.  To address the possibilities there are also articles that cover the 
potentiality and include:  protection of confidential information (Article IIIbis); 
recognition of regional agreements (Article V); labour market integration 
agreements (Article Vbis) general exceptions (Article XIV); and national security 
(Article XIVbis).  Through these articles, the negotiators have attempted to blend 
the desire for creating an agreement capable of promoting liberalisation of trade in 
services while recognising the need for states to retain important policy tools at the 
national level of governance. 
Market Access 
Market access sets the conditions under which a company from one Member can 
provide services to a consumer of another Member.  Article XVΙ specifies six market 
access limitations (restrictions) that can be listed in the market access column of a 
schedule. 
a) The number of service suppliers; 
b) the value of service transactions or assets; 
c) the number of operations or quantity of output; 
d) the number of natural persons supplying a service; 
e) the type of legal entity or joint venture; and 
f) the participation of foreign capital. 
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These six points are the only type of market access limitations that can be specified 
in a schedule.  They are called limitations because once entered the Member can no 
longer increase the restrictive levels, unless for reasons of national security, 
balance of payments problems or issues affecting the stability of a country.  A 
Member can unilaterally determine the amount of liberalisation it will inscribe or it 
could negotiate bilaterally or multilaterally with other Member States. 
National Treatment 
National treatment is considered to be one of the fundamental principles of the 
WTO and is included in the GATT, TRIPS (Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights), and the GATS.  However, it is important to note that in the GATS 
national treatment is not a general principle and it is only applied when a specific 
commitment has been made in a Member’s schedule.  The key to understanding 
National Treatment is that foreign service suppliers are given equal opportunity to 
compete with domestic firms.  This does not however mean that domestic and 
foreign firms must be treated in an identical manner.   
Article XVΙΙ covers National Treatment and unlike market access there is no specific 
list.  It is the Members who are responsible for ensuring that all potentially relevant 
measures (regulations) are listed.  Here one may find limitations for discriminatory 
tax measures or residency requirements.  It is up to each Member to decide what 
kind and how restrictive their limitations will be in the schedule. 
Dispute Settlement  
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding97 is a comprehensive international 
dispute settlement framework that would enhance the existing dispute settlement 
systems in the bilateral agreements.  This is due to its transparency, defined time 
frames, neutrality, 3rd Party participation, consideration for least developed and 
developing countries, and sanctioning power.  Each of these issues works toward an 
efficient and stable environment when conducting international business.   
Unlike air transport, where disputes are normally settled under the veil of 
diplomatic notes, the dispute settlement at the WTO is transparent.  Parties that 
might be indirectly affected are informed of the proceedings within three days of 
the dispute being launched by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).98  Most 
important however is the sanctioning ability that is built into the system.  
                                          
97 Op cit. 
98 The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is comprised of all the WTO Members.  For a description of 
the dispute settlement procedures see: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis.e/tif_e/dispt_e.html. 
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Agreements are not cancelled or withdrawn in the event of a large dispute and at 
the end there is sanctioning mechanism that can be enacted.   
Summary 
A comprehensive multilateral trading system based on one set of rules sets a 
standard of predictability and reliability.  Transparency ensures that preferential 
treatment by some states over others can no longer be covered by national policy 
under any guise, and that downward spiralling trade wars between, or among 
states will be substantially reduced.  Yes, one can argue that sovereignty is being 
reduced, however, to argue from that perspective also implies that this erosion is 
open-ended.  Considering the actual text of the GATS, and all the qualifications 
regarding sovereign decision-making powers over the liberalisation process, the 
argument loses a significant amount of value.  Moreover, when considering the 
states which have not yet joined the multilateral economic world (e.g. North Korea, 
Russia), and those who have, but have not liberalised trade in services significantly 
show dramatically lower economic growth than open trading states, regardless of 
size.  Set against the bilateral framework that lacks transparency and is based 
solely on reciprocity, the multilateral system has much to offer.  In particular this 
would be the case for smaller and/or economically weak states and would reduce 
the power politics that are inherent in air transport bilateral negotiations.   
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Chapter 5 
Descriptive and Empirical Evidence  
There are two parts to this chapter: the first is qualitative (descriptive) and the 
second gives a brief overview of the quantitative (statistical) analysis that was 
undertaken to place the work on an empirical foundation.  In combination the two 
parts set the context for the following two case study chapters.  Part Ι focuses on 
the actual Air Transport Review sessions (the Review) and the meetings about the 
Review prior to its actual commencement in September 2000.  The purpose is to 
provide a synopsis of the written and oral submissions made throughout the Review 
sessions to give the reader a sense of participants’ positions and the issues at 
stake.  It should be kept in mind that because such a review had never before been 
held, many of the participants either did not actively contribute, or asked questions 
rather than taking a definitive position.  Some Members did not prepare for 
meetings to the same level as others, taking a ‘wait-and-see attitude’.  The 
questions posed by many delegates were primarily directed toward establishing the 
procedural framework for the Review.  Other Members were forthright in their 
positions about whether the GATS should be expanded to cover any part of this 
industry.   
It is worth mentioning that multilateral meetings do not necessarily follow the pre-
set agenda and this is particularly so when a topic is as complex and politically 
sensitive as air transport.  Although Job No. 2451 (see Appendix 1) sets out a 
specific list of sub-sectors and topics to be covered, not all that is covered in the list 
conform to operational categories or national regulatory definitions.  For example, 
fuelling is listed independently, although in reality it is often considered to fit into 
the classification of ground-handling or airport management services.  Other 
services such as fire fighting (auxiliary services) may be provided by the local 
government or are in fact local community fire-fighting units that serve the airport 
as part of their district.  Thus, despite the set agendas given out for each meeting, 
Members raised the same issues in different sessions often disregarding agenda 
items under discussion.  Every attempt has been made to insert the relevant 
comments made throughout the Review under the appropriate agenda item, and in 
some instances arbitrary structure has been given in order to provide continuity for 
the reader.   
After attending all the meetings, reviewing the submissions, and oral presentations, 
tentative conclusions are drawn about why Members took the positions they did and 
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what factors influenced a given policy position.  It was clear that placing this 
information and collected data into an empirical study would help to verify or 
discount initial conclusions.  Thus, Part ΙΙ of this chapter is empirical; it sets out the 
data research and provides an overview of the statistical analysis undertaken.  The 
outcome of this work indicates that most, but not all the independent variables that 
were used correlated to the conclusions arrived at through the oral and textual 
evaluations.  In some instances it was found that for a few of the independent 
variables there were significant correlations and in others virtually none.  The 
findings suggest that certain constant variables can be linked to a negotiating 
position, while others, such as some of the market variables, are not statistically 
significant but nevertheless appear to be important factors influencing a Member’s 
position. 
Part Ι:  The Air Transport Review (2000-2003)99 
Pre-Review Meetings:  Council for Trade in Services (CTS) 
The preparatory discussions in the CTS meeting regarding the Review provide an 
insight into preliminary national positions over how and if air transport should be 
liberalised under the GATS.  These discussions give us the Member’s position, which 
reflects the policy platform of the national government.  In the case of the EC, its 
position reflects the Community as a whole, and any differences among the 
Member States were worked out in advance of statements made during the 
meetings.  While it is not possible to discern from these preliminary talks the actual 
negotiating position that would be taken in the official Review, it was possible to 
identify the positions Members would likely take in the Review itself. 
The discussions preceding the mandated Review among WTO Members in the CTS 
were in three meetings (informal and formal)100 over two years prior to the 
commencement of the official Review Sessions that began on 28 September 2000.  
During these preliminary meetings Members discussed:  a) proposals for the 
scheduling of the Review; b) the substantive issues of the mandate that is written 
into the Annex (paragraph 5); and c) the scope of topics to be discussed.  The 
discussions included agreeing to the list of industry topics (Job No. 2451101) 
compiled by the secretariat that would be covered throughout the Review and two 
                                          
99 For a complete list of reference codes to the Review documents and background papers see 
Appendix 3. 
100 The meetings were held on the following dates as part of the Council for Trade in Services 
(CTS) meetings:  24 November 1998, September 1999, and 14 April 2000. 
101 See Appendix 1 for the full document list. 
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preliminary background papers (S/C/W/59, S/C/W/129102).  In addition, there were 
delegate submissions by New Zealand together with Chile and Singapore 
(S/C/W/113), Japan (S/C/W/134), Poland (Job No. 1430), an individual paper by 
New Zealand (Job No. 753), and ICAO (Job No. 6541).103  In its written submission, 
ICAO outlined its position regarding jurisdictional and institutional issues vis-à-vis 
the WTO.  The oral submission that was given at this time indicated the importance 
ICAO attaches to its historic role over the economic regulatory activity in 
international air transport.104  
Due to the preliminary nature of the three meetings, and the fact that they were 
not officially part of the Review, the discussions did not focus in depth on the 
substantive issues contained in the written submissions.  However, the papers and 
delegate interventions provide initial indicators about the areas (sub-sectors) 
Members regarded as important topics to be discussed in the up-coming Review. 
Written Submissions, Secretariat Background Papers, and Delegate 
Interventions 
ICAO Presentation105 
The written submissions and oral presentation by ICAO106 during this time 
highlighted its work regarding economic regulations throughout the industry and 
the importance it placed on its role as the multilateral body governing air transport.  
In each paper it stressed its position as the guardian of safety, in the commercial 
development of air transport, and in particular, the importance of articles 5, 7, 17, 
and 83107 from the Chicago Convention.  In essence these articles highlight the 
                                          
102 S/C/W/129, dated 15 October 1999, is the updated version of S/C/W/59, dated 5 November 
1998. 
103 Papers submitted informally obtain Job numbers while formal papers received S/C/W/** 
documentation numbers. 
104 “Communications from the International Civil Aviation Organisation” Job No. 679, 22 November 
1999 and 8 February 2000.  “Informational Exchange Meeting 24 November 1998” Statement by 
Representative of the International Civil Aviation Organization, 24 November 1998” Job No. 6541, 
24 November 1998.  “Communication from the International Civil Aviation Organization” 
S/C/W/63, 23 October 1998. 
105 The ICAO has ad hoc observer status at the WTO.  This means that it can only attend meetings 
when it receives an explicit invitation.  ICAO has submitted requests to attain official observer 
status, which would mean it could attend meetings without an invitation.  This status request has, 
to date, been denied. 
106 Job No. 679, 8 February 2000. 
107 The following excerpts are from the ICAO statement (Job No. 6541), which appears to highlight 
the relevance and importance of ICAO’s role in liberalizing international air transport.  “1) Article 5 
which provides for the overflight and non commercial landing for aircraft not engaged in scheduled 
international air services (non-scheduled, “charter” flights) with any commercial traffic in 
passengers cargo or mail subject to the conditions imposed by the State in which landing takes 
place.  This explains why non-scheduled services tend to be regulated at the national, rather than 
the bilateral and regional level.  However there are about 30 bilateral arrangements that have 
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degree to which the Agreement governs economic aspects of international air 
transport.  Notably however, the main aspects of economic regulatory governance 
are substantially different to national commitments within the WTO framework and 
there are no transparency requirements.108  Moreover, the entire structure is based 
on reciprocity and, under ICAO economic regulation, exists in the form of 
recommended policies and practices.  As noted in the ICAO submission to the WTO 
meeting on 24 November 1998, “…the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(Chicago, 1944, 185 Parties) does not accord commercial rights for air transport…” 
(oral statement by the ICAO Representative, with written text:  Job No. 769).  
Specific regulations are found in the individual bilateral or plurilateral agreements 
between the negotiating states.  
The first two Secretariat background papers (S/C/W/59, 1998 and S/C/W/129, 
1999) are a preliminary attempt to document “developments in the sector” and are 
lacking in both substance and detail.  Moreover, they do not reflect all aspects of 
the industry for the period being reviewed.  However, they provide a substantive 
outline for the subsequent background papers and lay the foundation for the 
approach used by the Secretariat, which examined in depth the economic and 
regulatory standards and changes that occurred between 1993 and 1999.  These 
preliminary documents also correspond with Job No. 2451, which is a detailed and 
comprehensive outline of all the air transport sub-sectors and the identification of 
commercial operations that exist within the “traffic rights” definition provided in the 
Annex on Air Transport Services.109 
                                                                                                                         
provisions dealing with non-scheduled services.  2. Article 7 State shall not seek or obtain 
cabotage – the right of a foreign airline to carry domestic traffic – on an exclusive basis.  The term 
“on an exclusive basis” has not been defined by ICAO, but the airlines of States of the European 
Union exercise this right as part of the single European market for air services.  3. Article 15 
Airport Access and User Charges:  (a) Access An [sic] airport open for public use by its national 
aircraft shall be open under uniform conditions to the aircraft of all other Contracting States.  This 
represents an MFN type of approach, which is triggered by national use.  (b) Charges for the use 
of airports and air navigation facilities shall not be higher that [sic] that charged national aircraft 
engaged in similar operations or similar international scheduled air services.  ICAO policy and 
guidance on such charges is based on the principle of cost recovery; these chares to the user 
should not exceed the cost of providing the service.  4. Article 83 requires that States register 
their aeronautical agreements with ICAO which provides transparency in this sector.”  
Informational Exchange Meeting 24 November 1998.  “Statement by the Representative of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization”, WTO Job No. 6541, 24 November 1998. 
108 There are approximately 3,000 bilateral agreements in existence and despite a requirement to 
register signed agreements with ICAO, only about 1,500 are registered. 
109 Paragraph 6. (d) of the Annex on Air Transport Services provides the definition of traffic rights.  
“Traffic rights” mean the right for scheduled and non-scheduled services to operate and/or carry 
passengers, cargo and mail for remuneration or hire from, to, within, or over territory of a 
Member, including points to be served, routes to be operated, types of traffic to be carried, 
capacity to be provided, tariffs to be charged and their conditions, and criteria for designation of 
airlines, including such criteria as number, ownership, and control.” GATS: The General Agreement 
on Trade in Services and Related Instruments, April 1994. 
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Delegate interventions 
The interventions during the CTS meetings prior to the commencement of the 
Review focused primarily on procedural issues in order to establish a work 
programme for the actual Review.  The interventions supported the proposal by 
New Zealand,110 which requested the Secretariat to prepare a background paper for 
Members to facilitate discussions during the Review.  It was suggested by a number 
of Members that the background paper should follow the detailed list of sub-sectors 
(Job No. 2451) and provide an economic and regulatory overview of the 
developments throughout the sector between 1993 and 1999.  Additionally, 
Ecuador, citing Article 4 of the GATS, backed by Morocco, specifically requested 
that developing country issues be addressed both in the Secretariat paper and 
during the Review discussions.111 
The proposals addressing the structure and format included two approaches.  The 
first proposed that the Members undertake an examination of “the development in 
the sector” and “operation of the Annex” (New Zealand, the EC, Turkey, 
Australia112, and Hong Kong, China) while the second wanted a blending of both 
elements (Switzerland and Hungary).  Hong Kong, China responded to the Swiss 
proposal to blend the discussions by firmly disagreeing with the notion that 
developments in the sector and operation of the Annex could be blended; instead 
they should be defined and separate.  It also believed that the Review meetings 
should be confined to the specifications in the Annex and nothing more.  Japan and 
others, noted that only paragraph 5 should be examined but did not specify 
whether this should be separated into two distinct categories or dealt with as one 
                                          
110 New Zealand submitted two papers in advance of the Air Transport Review.  See:  Job No. 
1059, 23 November 1998 and Job No. 753, 10 February 2000.  New Zealand, together with Chile 
and Singapore submitted a joint paper, S/C/W/113, 15 July 1999. 
111 The following is Article IV of the GATS reproduced in its entirety.  “Increasing Participation of 
Developing Countries”.  1. The increasing participation of developing country Members in world 
trade shall be facilitated through negotiated specific commitments, by different Members pursuant 
to Parts III and IV of this Agreement, relating to:  (a) the strengthening of their domestic services 
capacity and its efficiency and competitiveness, inter alia through access to technology on a 
commercial basis; (b) the improvement of their access to distribution channels and information 
networks; and (c) the liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export 
interest to them.  2.  Developed country Members, and to the extent possible other Members, 
shall establish contact points within two years from the date of entry into force of the WTO 
Agreement to facilitate the access of developing Members’ service suppliers to information, related 
to their respective markets, concerning:  (a) commercial and technical aspects of the supply of 
services; (b) registration, recognition and obtaining of professional qualifications; and (c) the 
availability of services technology.  3.  Special priority shall be given to the least-developed 
country Members in the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2.  Particular account shall be taken 
of the serious difficulty of the least developed countries in accepting negotiated specific 
commitments in view of their special economic situation and their development, trade and 
financial needs. 
112 Australia submitted Job No. 6512, 23 November 1998 for the pre-review meetings. 
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unit.113  New Zealand agreed with the proposed dates and background papers, 
noting that the structure of both should follow “the developments in the sector, and 
the operation of the Annex”.  It also requested other delegates to prepare papers in 
advance of the meetings.  Speakers that followed this intervention generally 
supported New Zealand’s position, adding only comments that specified distinct 
sub-sectors.114  Otherwise there was no contentious debate throughout the 
meeting.   
Oral commentary ranged from suggesting competition policy should be included in 
the Review (Japan115 and Korea) to uncertainty about allowing the Secretariat to 
produce a matrix of the sector.116  Hungary supported the proposal of updated 
secretariat background papers but thought the topics covered needed to be factual.  
The US117 spoke only to clarify the Korean comments, saying that the Members 
should propose and clarify rather than the secretariat.  Korea responded that the 
Members should present answers.  Morocco emphasised that Members should keep 
in mind the impact multilateral liberalisation of this sector under the GATS would 
have on development issues and Mexico asked if the meetings were to be 
“Sessions”. 
The Chair clarified that the Review was to be held in “special meetings”.  He then 
summarised the meeting looking for consensus.  First, the proposed scheduling 
would be accepted and the special meetings would be held in September and 
December 2000.  Second, Members would take into consideration the impact on the 
developing countries, and third, based on the proposal by Australia, the Review 
would be forward looking with a separation between recent developments in the 
sector and the operation of the Annex.  To summarise the meeting, the Chairman 
told the delegates that the Secretariat would commence work to update and finalise 
the existing background papers (W/59 and W/129), circulate them and then engage 
Members in submitting ideas for the first meeting. 
                                          
113 These comments were made at the April 2000 CTS meeting (from my own notes). 
114 Turkey’s intervention specifically supported examining ground-handling and catering.   
115 Japan submitted one paper during the pre-review period.  See S/C/W/134, 10 February 2000. 
116 The EC suggested the Secretariat prepare a matrix of the sector. 
117 The US submitted one paper during the pre-review period.  See S/C/W/71, 24 November 1998. 
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First Session:  28-29 September 2000 
Written Submissions, Secretariat Background Papers, and Delegate 
Interventions 
The first Review Session consisted of reviewing seven papers submitted by 
Members118, and the first in a series of secretariat background papers.119  During 
this Session, it became apparent that Members differed vastly over the substance 
and purpose of the Review with the differences forming into two general groups.  In 
one group, delegates were firmly against any expansion of the Annex while the 
other saw the Review as the appropriate forum for establishing which sub-sectors in 
air transport could be considered for coverage by the GATS.  The Members that 
explicitly supported using the Review as a tool for a general assessment of the 
industry and nothing more felt that bilateralism would and should remain intact.  
This group included the US, Japan, Brazil, Jordan, Poland120, Cuba, and other 
developing countries.  These Members questioned the need for expansion of GATS 
coverage and argued that the bilateral system of economic regulation had worked 
well for international liberalisation purposes and would continue to do so.  This 
same group of Members was also concerned that expanded coverage might 
negatively impact ICAO’s role in governing international air transport affairs.  
However, despite the apparent importance of such concerns, there were few 
specifics cited.   
The US stated in the first Session that “the United States [would] not have a 
position on this issue until after the review is completed”121 (US delegate), and 
“that the Council should review developments in the air transport sector and the 
operation of the Annex before considering the possible further application of the 
                                          
118 See, “The Review of Air Transport”, Communication from Poland, Job 1430, 8 March 2000; 
“Developments in the Air Transport Services Sector”, Communication from New Zealand, 
Document S/C/W/165, 15 September 2000; “The Evolution of Air Transport in Chile”, 
Communication by Chile, Document S/C/W/166, 18 September 2000; an informal note by Chile, 1 
August 2000; “Communication from the European Communities and their Member States: The 
Review of the GATS Annex on Air Transport Services”, S/C/W/168, 26 September 2000; 
“Communication from Australia:  The Mandated Review of the GATS Annex on Air Transport 
Services”, S/C/W/167, 18 September 2000; and an informal paper from Australia, Job No. 3202, 
19 May 2000. 
119 See, “Developments in the Air Transport Sector since the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
Part One”, 3 August 2000; “Air Transport Services – Background Note”, 5 November 1998, 
S/C/W/59; and “Recent Trade Related Activities of the International Organizations in the Field of 
Air Transport”, S/C/W/129, 15 October 1999. 
120 Poland was one of the initial states to ask for clarification over the possible relationship 
between the GATS and ICAO.  However, after its first submission of its paper, it made no 
interventions.  This is most likely because of its intent to enter the European Union and the 
position taken by the European Communities throughout the Review sessions. 
121 This statement was made during the first Review Session at Geneva, Switzerland by the US 
representative, 4 September 2000. 
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Agreement in this sector”.122  The US made it clear that it viewed the Review 
sessions as a forum for industry discussions and not for altering the Annex either in 
substance or form.  To emphasize its position it stated that sub-sectors specifically 
covered in bilaterals are considered to be “directly related to the exercise of traffic 
rights”.123  While this was not the only intervention, it provided a strong indication 
that the US et al intended to use the historical content of bilateral agreements as 
the basis for limiting extensive liberalisation through the GATS forum or preventing 
it altogether.   
Other interventions pertaining to the link between traffic rights and sub-sectors 
were more specific (e.g. ground-handling, air taxis, franchising and wet leasing).  
In each case the sub-sectors were cited as part of existing bilaterals and therefore 
beyond the purview of the GATS.  It is thus possible to discern that while the US 
sought further liberalisation, it wanted to achieve this under established practice 
(bilaterals) and following its vision of how air transport should be liberalised.  This 
also suggests that the US perceives that it can probably gain – or give up less – 
through bilaterally negotiated agreements, rather than within the multilateral 
arena. 
On the other side of the debate, supporters of using the Review to establish a 
consensus over the sub-sectors not “directly related to the exercise of traffic rights” 
included:  the European Communities (EC) and small open economies like Australia, 
New Zealand, Chile, Switzerland, and Norway.  These Members believed that 
discussions about the state of the industry should be held, and in accordance with 
paragraph 5, Members should then seek to identify sub-sectors that could be 
specifically covered by the GATS, although without specifying whether this could be 
done through altering the text of the Annex or by a consensus agreement.  Thus, 
the two largest members, the EC and the US, took vastly different positions over 
how best to achieve further liberalisation of international air transport. 
Those supporting multilateral coverage claimed not only that the Annex should be 
expanded as per paragraph 5 (noted above), but also that the Review Sessions 
should be used to address the perceived ambiguity of paragraph 2(b), and to take 
the opportunity to clarify which air transport services are or are not “directly related 
to the exercise of traffic rights”.124  They argued that establishing a consensus on 
                                          
122 Ibid. 
123 Second Review Session, 4-5 December 2000. 
124 The basic problem with the Air Transport Annex is that it tries to define the scope by saying 
what is and is not covered.  From a legal perspective, only one should be defined not both.  Abdel-
Hamid Mamdouh, Director of Trade in Services Division, Interview 23 October 2000. 
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the text of the Annex would contribute to an improved document with greater 
clarity.   
Despite the differences of perception and intention, it is important for our purposes 
to expose the underlying rational for the positions taken by asking the following 
questions:  what would states gain from a multilateral arrangement that they could 
not otherwise achieve in the bilaterals and conversely, what is gained through the 
retention of bilateral coverage over the sub-sector industries?  The answers can be 
found in two vastly different arenas.   
For the small economies, the relatively small capital pool each possesses would 
benefit from a multilateral arrangement including traffic rights, and in some 
instances (e.g. Australia, Chile, and New Zealand) their geographic distance from 
other markets can be exacerbated through bilateral restrictions.  This includes the 
most contentious issues of foreign ownership restrictions and cabotage.125   
In the case of the EC, multilateral liberalisation of the sub-sectors is complex due to 
the political issues involving competency over air transport.126  The EU Member 
States retain authority over air transport, while the Commission represents all the 
Member States in the WTO and has negotiating authority over trade.  Another 
possible reason for taking this stance over multilateral liberalisation is that EC 
Member States have very competitive sub-sector corporations that have global 
market positions.  This leads to a situation whereby the Commission and Member 
States support liberalisation within the GATS albeit each for different reasons.  The 
Member States that have global corporations in the sub-sectors would benefit from 
a single set of multilateral rules while the Commission would expand its 
competence over covered sub-sectors. 
The differences between the two sides of the debate were clearly highlighted in the 
submissions and interventions.  Despite having agreed to a rough work programme 
in the meetings leading up to the Review, Members’ written and oral submissions 
were wide-ranging and did not adhere to the agenda set out by the Chairman.  In 
most of the presentations Members outlined their general positions on liberalisation 
and did not specifically adhere to the agreed approach of discussing the operation 
of the Annex before dealing with the more sensitive issue of which, sub-sectors if 
any, should be considered for future GATS coverage.  
                                          
125 Op cit. 
126 While the Commission has competence in the WTO for all Member States, it does not have full 
competence over air transport.  However, due to the November 2003 ruling by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) all the Member State bilaterals must be renegotiated to ensure the nationality 
clause conforms to EU law.  
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Session Agenda:  Sub-sector Review 
Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO)  
Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul of aircraft (MRO)127 is one of the three sub-
sectors covered by the GATS through the specified exemption in the Annex.  
Although discussion pertaining to this sub-sector was extremely short, this is not 
surprising as further liberalisation of the covered sub-sectors would occur within the 
GATS 2000 Services negotiations.  The comments that were made did not have a 
common thread and ranged from New Zealand noting that the separation of MRO 
from government and/or airline ownership was not dissimilar to other sub-sectors 
not yet covered by the GATS (paragraph 9, S/W/M/49), to Cuba submitting that 
MRO is directly related to traffic rights – and only covered by the GATS as an 
exception.  Other comments, by the EC, Canada, Brazil, and Korea were made 
about strengthening or addressing specific areas relating to terms of trade 
(S/C/W/49). 
Computer Reservation Systems (CRS) 
Although the meeting agenda listed CRS, there was little discussion beyond the 
introduction by the secretariat and a few short comments by New Zealand, the EC 
and Thailand.  Other commentary came from different Members about the lack of 
commitments and the large number of MFN exemptions that had been taken.   
Specifically, New Zealand submitted that CRS should come under competition law 
not the bilaterals, while the EC noted the technological development of the industry 
and how far it has changed from the time of the Uruguay Round.  Today CRSs have 
evolved into Global Distribution Systems (GDS) and through this change have 
become completely separated from the airlines, which first created CRS.  Due to 
the high concentration of operators, the EC, like New Zealand believe in the “merits 
of pro-competitive principles being applied to this particular sector” (oral 
comments).  The only developing country comment came from Thailand, noting 
“the benefits of liberalization had only focused on the benefits for developed 
countries”. 
Selling and Marketing  
The EC noted that market conditions and changes in this sub-sector were similar to 
CRS.  Because of the technological and market changes in all three of the covered 
sub-sectors, the EC suggested that Members discuss updating the definitions.  
Although supported by some Members, this suggestion was not taken any further. 
                                          
127 This does not include work on aircraft that are in service and classified as ‘line maintenance’.   
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All three topics were discussed throughout the Review sessions when commentary 
involved whether these covered sub-sectors were directly related to traffic rights.   
Franchising 
On the topic of franchising there was slightly more debate than the covered sub-
sectors, probably due to how it was defined in the Secretariat background papers 
(S/C/W/163).  It was suggested that franchising might not be linked to traffic 
rights.  According to the secretariat paper a franchise airline can be equated with 
other non-aviation type businesses. 
[A]lthough in one sense a franchise airline is virtually identical to a 
regional airline it is the purpose of the actual franchise that 
differentiates the two types of corporations.  A franchise is ultimately 
for the dissemination of a brand identity to a broader market and is 
therefore primarily a marketing tool not unlike other franchises (e.g. 
Body Shop, McDonalds Etc.)[sic].  A franchise does not alter underlying 
traffic rights for either corporate partner.  Nor does franchising 
arbitrarily affect or alter established route structures (S/C/W/163, p 
34). 
No Member spoke strongly to agree with this position and a number (Korea, Jordan, 
and the US) adamantly stated that they considered franchising to be the same as 
code-sharing.  It was therefore considered to be directly related to traffic rights and 
hence definitively excluded from the GATS (paragraphs: 50, 51, 52 and 65 of 
S/C/M/49). 
Freight Forwarding and Warehousing 
Although only Hong Kong, China (S/C/M/49, paragraph 67) made a comment on 
this sub-sector, it was in the form of requesting the secretariat to provide a note on 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) work in this 
area and to include it in the cargo section of the Review.   
Rental and Leasing128 
The only part of leasing that was given any serious attention was that of wet 
leasing129 due in part to the differences between the two largest markets, the US 
and the EC.  The US does not permit American carriers to wet lease from foreign 
companies whereas the EU does.  Thus, it was not surprising that the US stated 
                                          
128 In air transport there are four types of leasing arrangements.  “[A] leased aircraft is an aircraft 
used under a contractual leasing arrangement; a wet-leased aircraft includes a crew: a dry-leased 
aircraft does not include a crew: a damp-leased aircraft is a term used in some cases to refer to a 
wet-leased aircraft that includes a cockpit crew but not cabin attendants.” Manual on the 
Regulation of International Air Transport, Doc 9626, p. 5.2-2. 
129 The EC and the US have completely different regulations regarding wet leasing.  In the US 
carriers are only permitted to wet-lease from US companies.  In the EC, foreign wet-leasing is 
permitted under certain conditions. 
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clearly that it considered rental and leasing to be directly related to traffic rights 
(S/C/M/49, paragraph 65).  This position was openly supported by Tunisia and 
implicitly supported by others in more general statements. 
The EC did not specifically disagree with the US et al but rather talked about safety 
standards and regulations.  They stressed these were not conflicting interests such 
that “the introduction into the market of a foreign leased plane did not necessarily 
endanger safety standards” (S/C/M/49, paragraph 68). 
Catering 
Although airline catering is usually considered to be an integral part of ground-
handling, the WTO Members agreed to accept catering as a separate sub-sector for 
the purposes of the Review.  This acceptance opens the debate over whether 
catering can be considered within the scope of paragraph 2(b).130  During the 
review of the developments in the sector, catering did not raise a debate over its 
relationship to paragraph 2(b), nor to implied comments that catering is regulated 
(safety and health standards) by states in accordance with other food and 
restaurant services.   
Indeed, during the entire first Review Session, catering was only referred to 
specifically by two of the five Members that had submitted discussion papers (New 
Zealand, and the EC131).  In both cases the written submissions and the 
presentations by the delegates specifically mentioned catering within the context of 
ground-handling services (reference was also made to fuelling) despite the fact that 
it is comprised of a total of 15 distinct industrial elements including catering and 
fuelling.132   
While New Zealand referred to catering in the context of ground-handling and said 
that this sector appears to be regulated “…in the same manner as all food service 
providers…” (S/C/W/165, p 2), the text is set in the context of an explanatory note 
of New Zealand’s economic regulations and safety standards.  The paper notes that 
this industry (and ground-handling) is open, competitive, and economically viable 
as a separate entity from ground-handling or airlines.  Although not stated 
explicitly, New Zealand used its own competitive structure to imply that a 
                                          
130 Paragraph 2 states:  The Agreement, including its dispute settlement procedures, shall not 
apply to measures affecting: … (b) services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights, …”. 
131 See Document S/C/W/165 from New Zealand, and S/C/W/168 from the EC. 
132 Ground-handling is made up of:  ramp, cargo/mail, passenger/baggage, aircraft servicing, 
aircraft line maintenance, load control/communications, unit load device (ULD) control, surface 
transport, security, flight operations, administration/supervision, fuelling and 
representation/accommodation.  
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liberalised market is superior to one that is closed to foreign suppliers (S/C/W/165, 
p 2).  Additionally, the paper appears to establish that although a competitive 
ground-handling industry is considered possible without compromising safety, 
catering is specifically mentioned as a sub-sector that is regulated by individual 
states.  During the presentation of the written submission, the New Zealand 
delegate was more explicit about considering catering to be a unique industry 
within the sub-sector of ground-handling, which was not directly related to the 
exercise of traffic rights.  Catering was considered to be a sub-sector of food 
service suppliers.   
In S/C/W/168, the EC is more explicit than New Zealand by stating that catering, 
within the context of sub-sector services, is not directly related to the exercise of 
traffic rights despite having been traditionally supplied by airlines.  It notes the 
following.  “In this context it is clear, that a broad range of services sub-sectors are 
actually not related to the exercise of traffic rights themselves, but rather serve as 
supporting services:  these sub-sectors (catering, refuelling, etc.) are self-
contained activities already covered by the CPC, and already liberalised in many 
domestic markets” (S/C/W/168, p 4).  It notes also the consolidation of catering at 
the global level and how airlines have been increasingly out-sourcing or creating 
independent subsidiaries. 
Although addressing catering in such detail may be considered as minutia in the 
context of such a wider-ranging session, it is important to note given that this 
particular sub-sector may be the first to be considered for coverage under the 
GATS.  
Second Session:  4-5 December 2000 
The second Review Session took place over one and a half days beginning 4 
December 2000.  Although it was scheduled to discuss the secretariat background 
papers consisting of the following sub-sectors:  fuelling, ground-handling, airport 
services, air navigation services, general aviation, and general aspects of 
commercial air transport services133; the oral interventions reverted frequently to 
topics from the previous meetings (CRS, Marketing and Sales and MRO).  
Additionally, delegates reviewed an excerpt of the OECD document relating to air 
cargo (S/C/W/181), which is a typology of leasing provisions contained in bilaterals 
                                          
133 See WTO secretariat background papers:  S/C/W/163/Add.1 and S/C/W/163/Add.2. 
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registered with ICAO (S/C/W/182). There were also two new written submissions 
from Australia and New Zealand and one from ICAO.134   
Notably, the secretariat was asked to give a negotiating history from the Uruguay 
Round about the intent of the negotiators at that time.  The secretariat was also 
requested to provide a legal interpretation “… on the legal ability of the CTS to 
amend or interpret the Annex (S/C/M/50, p 17).  The raising of such questions is 
important because it highlights the lack of certainty over what the Review could 
actually accomplish and the vast differences of opinions that were surfacing in the 
discussions.  While the secretariat must remain under the direction of the Members 
and non-partisan in its expert opinions, it also is looked upon as a source of factual 
legal and institutional information that can be utilised by the Members. 
At the specific request by the Members, the Director of the Services Division spoke 
about the Uruguay Round drafting of the Annex.  It was highlighted that the intent 
of the Review process was not to exclude international air transport from GATS 
coverage in perpetuity.  He noted that exclusion reflected the divergent Member 
State perspectives, and the difficulty in reconciling bilateral arrangements due to, in 
some instances, scarce resources (e.g. slot allocation), MFN, market access, and 
national treatment.  It was emphasised that the WTO and the GATS’ coverage over 
air transport would not impinge on national regulatory standards since the WTO 
was not in the business of regulation.  Examples were cited from other politically 
sensitive sectors such as telecommunication and intellectual property rights and the 
role of their respective international organisations (e.g. the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), and the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO)).  In this context, he noted that “trade law is about opportunity, not about 
outcomes … [and] … the MFN problem relates to the criteria by which scarce 
resources are allocated rather than the sharing out on a first-come, first-served 
basis”.  This introduction was intended to broaden the scope of the discussions so 
that delegates might not focus too much attention on detail in advance of reviewing 
the broader agenda of the Review.   
The question over the legal ability of the Council to “amend or interpret the Annex” 
was given later in the meeting and while it was considered to be a legal opinion, it 
                                          
134 See “The GATS Review, an Opportunity for Phase Reform of Air Transport Services”, 
Communication from Australia, document S/C/W/179, 14 November 2000; “The Review of the 
GATS Annex on Air Transport Services”, S/C/W/185, 1 December 2000, from New Zealand; 
“Excerpts from the OECD Document “Principles for the Liberalization of Air Cargo”, S/C/W/181, 30 
November 2000 and; “Typology of the Bilateral Air Services Agreements Containing Leasing 
Provisions”, S/C/W/182, 30 November 2000. 
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was also extremely diplomatic.  In other words there would still be some room for 
interpretation.  Two legal interpretations were given.   
[I]f there was a formal interpretation it would be done in the General 
Council or by the Ministers.  But the WTO Agreement then went on to 
say that in the case of an interpretation of a multilateral trade 
agreement in Annex 1, which covers the GATS, they shall exercise 
their authority on the basis of a recommendation by the Council (CTS) 
overseeing the functioning of that agreement.  So it was clearly laid 
down, that this Council would make a recommendation on the 
interpretation and the General Council would adopt it.  This seems to 
leave very little scope for them not to adopt it (S/C/W/50, p 17). 
The second, on changing the coverage of the agreement, was that the CTS could 
through a consensus make a recommendation to the General Council. 
[I]f Members wanted to change [the coverage] by saying that some 
services which are directly related would now be added to the 
coverage of the agreement, that would constitute an amendment of 
the Annex which was part of the GATS.  So it would fall under Article 
X of the WTO Agreement where it says that the Councils listed in 
paragraph 5 might submit proposals to amend the provisions of the 
corresponding multilateral trade agreement to the Ministerial 
Conference.  In other words, this Council could submit a proposal to 
amend the GATS to the General Council.  And it stipulated that the 
proposal would have to remain on the table for 90 days and after that 
90 days any decision by the Ministerial Conference to submit the 
amendment should be taken by consensus.  Anyway, the basic 
procedure would be the same:  the Council for Trade in Services 
would have the responsibility to submit a proposal for amendment to 
the General Council, representing the Ministerial Conference, and the 
amendment would be adopted by consensus (S/C/W/50, p 18). 
Whether this opinion changed the mind of any delegate who submitted comments 
to the effect that the CTS had no authority to modify anything and was only 
mandated to review the Annex is unknown.  No argument or comments were made 
in response to the secretariat’s commentary on the topic. 
The next speaker, ICAO, then presented the ongoing work in its organisation.  It 
seemed that the purpose of the presentation was to inform the trade 
representatives and the WTO secretariat that ICAO was working toward developing 
guidelines for the liberalisation that was occurring in many areas of the 
international air transport sector.  It is possible to see two levels of communication 
that ICAO wanted to impress upon the trade delegates.  First, in emphasising its 
historical role as the internationally recognised body over safety and technical 
regulations it was defining what it considered to be ICAO’s exclusive domain.  
Second, that it was intending to ensure economic liberalisation under the GATS 
would not compromise its work programme.  In the presentation it highlighted two 
points to emphasize its concerns over the potential expansion of the Annex.  “[W]e 
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do intend to take a look to check all this work against three basic WTO criteria:  
MFN, national treatment, and transparency.  We are also building on existing 
material and recent experience to develop a template” (oral presentation by the 
ICAO representative, 4 December 2000). 
Written Submissions, Secretariat Background Papers, and Delegate 
Interventions 
ICAO Presentation 
The general thrust of the presentation by the ICAO representative was to highlight 
ongoing work and recent initiatives and report briefly on the world-wide ICAO 
Conference that had been held in June 2000.  Highlighted was work that had been 
undertaken at ICAO in the areas currently under review at the WTO.  Within this 
context it was pointed out that in sub-sectors experiencing rapid liberalisation (e.g. 
ground-handling) ICAO had been able, through its navigation commission, to 
“introduce new aviation standards”.  This was presented as “…a good example of 
the interrelationship of the economic and the safety aspects…” that it was in a 
position to ensure (S/C/M/50, p 3).  
Following this, the representative highlighted ICAO’s efforts in the field of economic 
regulation and how it could promote international liberalisation that had already 
begun in different regions of the world.  Although not stated, the intended work 
programme reflected almost exactly the work agenda for the Review and for the 
first time included issues of MFN, national treatment and transparency.  The 
representative also assured the delegates that ICAO would continue to cooperate 
with the WTO and “share its expertise” with Members and the secretariat. 
Not only do these comments show ICAO’s willingness to participate as much as 
possible in the WTO Air Transport Review, its work programme also suggests that 
there is a lack of understanding about the liberalisation process under the GATS.  
Coverage does not imply or impinge on ICAO’s authority in this realm.  On the 
contrary, its role over safety and technical issues would be correspondingly 
increased since the GATS rules have nothing to do with safety and technical 
oversight.   
Session Agenda:  Sub-sector Review 
Refuelling 
Refuelling or aircraft fuelling was introduced by the Chairman, noting that the 
detailed study undertaken by the secretariat indicated “…the link with hard rights 
was extremely thin…” (S/C/W/50, p 3) as aircraft not bound by traffic rights (e.g. 
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general aviation and military) were also serviced.  In response the Swiss delegate 
noted that Switzerland considered fuelling to be an integral part of ground-handling 
(see below).  Rather than suggesting fuelling should not be covered, the intent was 
to add weight to the argument by Switzerland, the EC, et al that ground-handling is 
not directly related to traffic rights and therefore should be covered by the GATS.  
This was stated in support of the EC’s position. 
Ground-handling 
The topic of Ground-handling created the greatest amount of discussion among the 
delegates.  This was possibly due to the contentious nature of ground-handling 
during the Uruguay Round and the writing of the Annex.135  Some Members claimed 
that while they believed ground-handling was directly related to traffic rights per 
say and therefore to be excluded from expansion, they could accept that some of 
the 15 sub-areas might be considered for inclusion should coverage of the Annex be 
expanded.  
One of the strongest advocates of considering ground-handling for GATS coverage 
was the EC with support by, inter alia, New Zealand, Australia, and Chile.  In fact 
the EC went so far as to say that “[i]t appeared to the Community that ground-
handling services were already covered by the GATS since they did not affect the 
rights of Members to distribute traffic rights, or the right of air carriers to use them” 
(S/C/M/50, p 4).  In the EC's view, there was no longer a link between air traffic 
rights and ground-handling.  
Other reasons cited for inclusion by the EC are based on the same findings as the 
Secretariat paper (S/C/W/163Add.1), although this document did not suggest 
either implicitly or explicitly that ground-handling should be covered by the GATS.  
The paper did note however, that beginning in the early 1990s international 
consolidation began to occur while at the same time airlines began to sell-off these 
operations to non-airline companies.  Using the IATA criteria for what constitutes 
ground-handling the secretariat study found that by 2000 the industry around the 
world was open and competitive with few, if any foreign ownership restrictions.  
Third party handling was permitted in most airports and only a few (primarily in the 
Middle East) were actual monopoly operations. 
                                          
135 According to delegates who participated in the Uruguay Round and the writing of the Annex, 
ground-handling was a contentious issue.  Initially it was to be included under GATS coverage, and 
then it was taken off the list.  Later in the negotiations it was returned to the list where it 
remained until it was removed before the document was finalised.  From discussions with 
participants who asked not to be named. 
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The actual debate, like for other sub-sectors being reviewed, ended up centering on 
the definition of “directly related to the exercise of traffic rights” and whether the 
CTS in Special Session could make such a decision.  On one side of the debate were 
the EC, New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, and the Dominican Republic, with 
Hong Kong, China stating that it was leaning toward this position.  On the other 
side was the US, Brazil, Morocco and in part Canada et al.  These delegates argued 
that it was clear that because ground-handling was specifically covered by the 
bilaterals it was beyond the scope of a GATS expansion.136 
Mexico submitted the most extreme version of all, and declared that “the Council 
was not entitled, nor able to interpret what was and was not covered by the Annex.  
Paragraph 5 authorized a discussion of the possibility of extending the Annex and at 
this time Mexico was not ready to do so” (S/C/M/50, p 7).  Rather than discuss the 
point raised, others who favoured expansion of the GATS for this sector raised their 
flags to provide comments on why this particular sector should be covered.  
Airport Management Services 
The discussion on airport management was dominated by the secretariat explaining 
how it designed and undertook its study of airport management.  Comments by 
Members were limited to the EC, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.  Each gave a 
description of how their airport management services had been either privatised or 
operated on a competitive basis with government oversight.  New Zealand was the 
only delegation to emphasize that the secretariat study highlighted the lack of a 
strong link between these services and the exercise of traffic rights.  It also stated 
that with regard to scarce resources and concerns over safety and environmental 
concerns, the GATS framework has sufficient flexibility to accommodate these 
issues (S/C/M/50, p 9). 
Air Navigation Services 
Air navigation services are considered to be one of the most complex parts of the 
whole industry and the area where international coordination is paramount.  While 
each country operates its own navigation system, coordination with neighbouring 
airspace must be taken into account.  Of the three delegates that had comments, 
two (the EC and Hong Kong, China) asked for further clarification of the secretariat 
study and how this sub-sector might be linked to Article Ι of the GATS and whether 
a link could be made with paragraph 2 or 3 of the Annex.  Canada stated 
                                          
136 See S/C/M/50, pp 3-7 for the discussion among the delegates, and S/C/W/163Add.1, pp 4-15 
for the secretariat study. 
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unequivocally that it considered air navigation to come under the exercise of 
government authority and therefore clearly beyond the scope of the GATS.137 
Council for Trade in Services (CTS), Special Session:  8 October 
2001 
Formally, the third dedicated Review session took place on 9 October 2001, 
however, the CTS held a Special Session meeting on 8 October, which included two 
written submissions (S/CSS/W/59, and S/CSS/W/92) that pertained directly to the 
Review.  It is noteworthy to mention this since it highlights the degree to which 
Members use the broader multilateral forum to advance negotiating proposals.  In 
both papers, the negotiating proposals were controversial and addressed aspects of 
the Review that were very contentious, particularly to those who did not want the 
GATS to be expanded. 
Norway (S/CSS/W/59, p 8) proposed the inclusion of transit rights (First and 
Second Freedoms) as horizontal commitments, in addition to proposing the 
inclusion of ground-handling and ancillary services.  Given that most would agree 
these two freedoms do constitute traffic rights and the Annex specifically excludes 
the coverage of such rights, the suggestion was provocative to other Members.  The 
proposal was included within a larger set of negotiating proposals and began by 
asking Members to increase commitments in the schedules.  The main focus 
however was to introduce aspects of air transport that were being discussed in the 
Review sessions in order to create a link to the Services negotiations. 
New Zealand submitted a proposal that also went to the core of the Review debates 
by presenting its interpretation of the Annex text regarding what is directly related 
to traffic rights and how to ‘test’ this interpretation.  The test is as follows. 
Those services where the supply of such a service is constrained to 
the holder of the traffic rights are clearly “directly related to the 
exercise of traffic rights”, whereas services able to be supplied by a 
range of services suppliers irrespective of whether or not these 
suppliers are in a position to exercise traffic rights could not be 
argued to be “directly related to the exercise of traffic rights” 
(S/CSS/W/92, p 2).   
It then used this logic to list the sub-sectors (ancillary services) it believed met the 
above test and therefore were not directly related to traffic rights.  These included:  
ground-handling, airport management services, air traffic control services, general 
aviation services and domestic air services.   
                                          
137 Canada controls one of the largest air space areas in the world and is not a signatory to the 
International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA). 
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The response to the two proposals was, as expected, strong and negative.  The 
response to Norway’s proposal was the strongest with Members reiterating their 
support for ICAO to retain oversight in this area.  Those in favour of expanding 
GATS to cover air transport supported all or part of the New Zealand proposal and 
those against stated that the topic was under discussion in the Review and 
therefore could not and should not be addressed in this negotiating forum. 
Third Session:  9 October 2001138 
Written Submissions, Secretariat Background Papers, and Delegate 
Interventions 
Due to the dramatic and tragic events on 11 September in the US, and the 
relevance and implications this held for topics under discussion in the Review, the 
Chairman suggested that the normal protocol of the meetings be waived.  Standard 
procedure invites official observers (in this case ICAO) to speak after the normal 
agenda items, however for this meeting they were requested to give the opening 
comments. 
ICAO Presentation 
ICAO gave a detailed overview of decisions that had been taken at ICAO resulting 
directly from the 11 September 2001.  Due to the detail and scope of steps being 
taken, the text of the presentation is reproduced below. 
The representative of ICAO indicated that the ICAO assembly strongly 
condemned the acts of terrorism as well as of the misuse of civil aircraft 
with passengers and crew on board as weapons of destruction.  The 
downturn in air travel due to security concerns, and the traffic flow 
management difficulties generated by a higher level of security measures 
were noted.  The assembly requested ICAO to develop, on an urgent 
basis, a detailed plan of action to address new and emerging forms of 
threats, with priority being given to a comprehensive review of the 
existing aviation security legal instruments, standards and recommended 
practices.  The aim of this exercise was to consider the establishment of 
an ICAO security oversight audit programme and to establish special 
funding for urgent action in the field of aviation security.  The assembly 
adopted two resolutions:  one, containing the consolidated statement of 
continuing ICAO policies related to the safeguarding of international civil 
aviation against acts of unlawful interference; and the other, containing 
the declaration on the misuse of civil aircraft as weapons of destruction.  
The Council of ICAO was directed to convene, at the earliest date, an 
international high level ministerial conference on aviation security in 
order to quickly further these objectives.  
                                          
138 In the CTS, Special Session held on 8 October 2001 there were discussions pertaining to air 
transport and the Air Transport Review.  Norway had submitted a paper (S/CSS/W/59) that 
advocated inclusion of transit rights, or first and second freedoms, as horizontal commitments.   
 105 
Economic liberalization issues, including the impact of enhanced security 
requirements, were discussed at the Economic Commission.  In the 
discussion, the view was expressed that in the field of international civil 
aviation, the issues of relationship between safety and security, and the 
effective and sustained participation of developing States raised 
fundamental concerns and questions.  The currently specific nature of air 
transport was noted, together with the extent to which States were 
ready to provide subsidies and assistance for their airlines.  There was 
broad support for the convening of the 5th world-wide Air Transport 
Conference in March 2003, to address issues relating to liberalization 
including air carrier ownership and control, market access, product 
distribution, fair competition and safeguards, conditions of carriage, 
consumer interests, dispute resolution and transparency.  The 
conference was intended to develop a framework for the progressive 
liberalization of international air transport, with safeguards to ensure fair 
competition and safety and security, including measures to ensure 
effective and sustained participation of developing countries.  This would 
also include a review of the existing guidelines on ground-handling.   
There was strong support for ICAO to play a primary role in dealing with 
air transport matters.  It was felt that the constitutional role of ICAO 
should be maintained and strengthened.  In this context the proposed 
memorandum of understanding, to be developed between the ICAO and 
the WTO, was considered to be an important approach to clarify the 
respective jurisdictional roles, particularly as regards to ICAO's 
responsibilities with respect to safety, security and environmental 
protection.  Views were also expressed that any switch to the GATS as 
an approach to liberalization would need to ensure that the current gains 
of liberalization were not lost and that there would be an added benefit 
to the aviation sector in its entirety.  On the question of overflight, an 
element for possible coverage by the GATS, an appeal was made to the 
states that were not yet parties to the International Air Transit Services 
Agreement, to consider applying the provisions of the agreement, at 
least on a preliminary basis, during the present crisis.  Attention was also 
drawn to the cancellation of war risk coverage on a seven-day notice by 
the insurance industry.  While a number of governments had taken 
action to indemnify the carriers against such risk, it was pointed out that 
such action, taken mainly by developed countries, was creating 
distortions in the market place.  There was broad support for the Council 
to establish a Working Group, as a matter of urgency, to deal with the 
issue of war risk coverage and in particular to find a solution in relation 
to developing countries where neither the national carriers nor the 
governments concerned were in the position to pay for or indemnify the 
air carriers for war risk (S/C/M/57, pp 1-2). 139 
Arguably, the steps taken by ICAO as outlined above were absolutely necessary, 
however, it strongly emphasises it is the only multilateral body that has the ability 
and authority to manage economic liberalisation because of its ability to ensure 
safety aspects of the global industry.  It appears that ICAO took the opportunity of 
11 September to openly place itself as the only relevant international body for air 
                                          
139 Details of the proceedings of the Assembly and of the convening of 5th Air Transport 
Conference are available at the ICAO website:  http://www.icao.org.  
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transport.  While many Members agreed with this position, it appeared to be a 
political declaration of who should have authority over economic regulatory affairs.  
The presentation also triggered one of the most active debates on maintaining the 
bilateral framework under ICAO as the preferred avenue for liberalisation or the 
possibility of using the multilateral system of the WTO.  At no time did this debate 
include traffic rights but rather the definition of what constitutes being “directly 
related to the exercise of traffic rights”. 
Brazil:  Presentation 
The written submission from Brazil (S/C/W/201) was presented in three parts:  an 
overview of Brazilian deregulation and domestic policies; the importance of 
environmental issues relating to air transport; and the Brazilian perspective on 
liberalisation.  The common theme throughout the paper advocated (implicitly and 
explicitly) that Members should support the current bilateral system and ICAO’s 
oversight role in economic regulation and safety.  Regarding GATS expansion, Brazil 
emphasized its position that no expansion of the GATS would be acceptable. 
US:  Presentation 
The US made a wide-ranging and strong statement about the importance of 
maintaining the bilateral system (S/C/W/198).  To augment its argument, emphasis 
was placed on the liberalisation that had already occurred, at least in the US and 
the EC, and on the corresponding lack of liberalisation that took place under the 
three sub-sectors covered by the GATS. 
Delegate Interventions 
The Australian, New Zealand, and Chilean delegates responded in strong terms to 
the US presentation and paper.  In particular, the Australian delegate used rather 
evocative language for a formal session, in what appeared to be frustration with the 
US position.  Following this animated exchange a number of delegates spoke either 
to support the US position or the Australian intervention.  This exchange will be 
discussed in greater detail in the subsequent two chapters. 
The last part of the meeting for that day included a second formal presentation by 
ICAO on its policies for airports and air navigation charges, a summary of which can 
be found in S/C/W/188, and wide-ranging commentary unrelated to this 
presentation.   
Members made an effort to state their own positions regarding what might or might 
not be “directly related to traffic rights” and a number specifically asked for the 
Review to be extended in order to better address what they considered to be 
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unfinished business.  The topics of cargo, general aviation and airport services were 
only touched upon in passing at this meeting. 
Session Agenda:  Secretariat Background Papers 
The final set of Secretariat background papers (S/C/W/163Add.3 – 
S/C/W/163Add.6 and S/C/W/200) were presented at this meeting.  These papers 
included a range of more technical topics including:  an overview of air navigation 
systems, the development and changes of Air Services Agreements (ASAs), airline 
industry (passenger and cargo) development, foreign ownership issues, and 
multimodal operations.   
Throughout the meeting the Secretariat papers received little attention until New 
Zealand raised the issue that the background papers had been largely ignored.  
Following New Zealand and Australia, the EC also made comments.  Each took the 
opportunity to link the technical aspects to their individual perspectives on the need 
to address further, existing market barriers such as foreign ownership restrictions 
and sub-sectors for which they were particularly interested in being covered by the 
GATS.  The US, Japan, and Brazil all responded, although not on substantive issues.  
The US wanted to ensure that all the documents were de-restricted, which was 
supported by Brazil.  Japan gave a wide ranging commentary on the state of 
Japanese ownership and control standards, its approach to code-sharing, slot 
allocation, and stated that it could not support a separate regulatory environment 
for cargo.  From the Japanese perspective cargo and passenger airlines were 
inextricably linked.  
There were no comments on the ‘operation of the Annex’, which led the Chairman 
to propose the continuation of the meetings in order to further discuss topics that 
had received little or no attention. 
Fourth Session:  18 March 2002 
Written Submissions, Secretariat Background Papers, and Delegate 
Interventions 
The joint submission (S/C/W/206) presented by Australia, New Zealand, and Chile 
was a succinct overview from their perspective of the importance of keeping 
multilateral liberalisation options open rather than clinging to the bilateral system 
on the sole basis that it existed.  The paper points to a number of avenues being 
pursued that go beyond the traditional bilateral boundaries and argues that the 
GATS is also a forum that should be evaluated and considered for further 
liberalisation of the sector. 
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In particular the paper notes that the Review has shown that the issue is “…no 
longer whether the reciprocity-based system is in need of reform but how this 
reform process might be best approached” (S/C/W/206, p 1).  It presented a list of 
four questions for discussion that go to the core of the debate about bilateral versus 
multilateral liberalisation.  The questions were provocative given the opposition to 
any form of GATS expansion by a number of the delegates.  However, delegates 
chose to remain quiet on the specifics, which resulted in very limited substantive 
discussion. 
Following the presentation of the joint written submission the fourth Review’s 
agenda was divided into three parts:  1) developments in the sector, 2) operation 
of the Annex; and 3) possible further steps for the Review.  The discussion 
regarding developments in the sector was primarily led by the Members that 
supported expansion of the GATS with only a few interventions by Members that 
had not participated much throughout the Review.  These Members made short 
statements in support of the bilateral system and the importance of retaining ICAO 
as the premier institution for global oversight.  This continued until Canada raised 
its strong opposition to including first and second freedoms in the GATS. 
Shortly thereafter Japan intervened with a strong statement about how the Review 
was to be an exchange of views and that this objective had been accomplished.  It 
stated that there was a “…consensus that the Chicago regime had worked 
effectively in the area of promoting competition after the conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round” (S/C/W/134).  Thus, it submitted that there was no longer any need to 
continue the Review.  This declaration effectively launched a debate over whether 
the Review should be ended with Members joining one of the two camps. 
The second agenda item on the operation of the Annex sparked few comments and 
no debate.  New Zealand and the EC were the only speakers on this topic and both 
noted the documents in which their positions could be found.  The third part of the 
meeting, while short, established that there was no consensus to end the Review.  
New Zealand noted that the Annex was silent on how a Review should be ended, 
thus without a consensus on this topic the Review would have to continue. 
The last two secretariat papers submitted to the Review (S/C/W/200 and 
S/C/W/200Add.1) were in essence executive summaries of the entire S/C/W/163 
series of background documents and did not introduce any new topics.  This 
summary had been requested by the delegates due to the volume of text written by 
the Secretariat. 
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Fifth Session:  2 October 2003 
In the official WTO documents and records, this part of the Review is separated 
since the meetings were no longer dedicated to the Review; instead they were 
conducted with other Council meetings.  Although the fifth, sixth and seventh 
meetings of the Review are presented here individually according to the dates they 
were held, officially they are recorded in the minutes as one meeting (S/C/M/68).  
The reason for consolidating the minutes was due to the singularity of the topic:  
how to end the Review and when to set the start date for the next mandated 
Review.  On this topic, Members had difficulty reaching a consensus due to 
controversy over systemic issues about whether the Annex text was being given an 
interpretation.  Due to the vast difference between the two sides of the debate, 
deciding how to close the Review and set a date for the next one was difficult.  In 
order to accommodate this problem the chairperson suggested that the item be left 
open and the meeting recessed rather than ended.  This happened again at the 
subsequent meeting held on 9 October, consensus only being reached at the end of 
the seventh meeting, which took place on 24 October. 
ICAO Presentation 
The oral presentation given by the representative from ICAO was to provide WTO 
Members with a synopsis of the Fifth Worldwide Air Transport Conference that had 
been held in Montreal from 24 to 28 March 2003.  The results of the Conference 
were provided in document Job(03)/117, distributed to Members for this session, 
and the presentation covered most of the detail provided in the document.  In 
essence the representative emphasised that the outcome of the conference “… 
consisted of the Declaration of Global Principles for the Liberalization of 
International Air Transport, two recommendations, conclusions and models for use 
in air transport.  It was noted that the Declaration was adopted by acclamation.   
Australian and New Zealand Presentation 
Following the ICAO presentation there was a discussion over the economic 
regulatory role of ICAO.  In keeping with the entire Review, there were in effect two 
sides.  One side emphasised the importance of ICAO and liberalisation through 
reciprocity within the bilateral system, and the other advocated a shift toward the 
WTO multilateral system due to what were considered limitations of the bilateral 
system. 
The presentations by Australia and New Zealand appear to have three objectives:  
1) to state their disappointment with the first Review regarding the lack of 
consensus to expand GATS coverage, 2) to state that they believe paragraph 5 of 
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the Annex instructs Members to commence the second Review in 2005140, and 3) to 
note the ICAO conference had concluded that “states should use multilateral 
avenues as appropriate” (S/C/M/68, paragraph 19).  These three points were 
supported by like-minded Members (inter alia Chile and the EC).   
Both the written and oral submissions by Australia and New Zealand recognised 
that no consensus would be reached regarding expanding coverage of the GATS to 
any further sub-sectors.  Thus, the informal paper proposed ending the current 
Review on the condition that the Members reach an agreement regarding when the 
second Review would commence.  The importance attached to this position is 
emphasised under point 4 of their paper where they state:  “…we propose that in 
agreeing to closure of the current Review we commit to a commencement date for 
the next Review at this CTS meeting”.  Despite the clarity of this statement, they 
went further by adding in the next sentence that they “…see agreement on a date 
for recommencement that is consistent with the Annex mandate to be integral to 
closure” (Job(03)/193, p 2).  In other words, although they were offering to give up 
their position over expanding the GATS in the first Review, they were going to 
ensure that those wishing to maintain the status quo of the bilateral system could 
not delay the start of the next Review unnecessarily.  
Given that the authors knew that establishing a starting date for the second Review 
would be contentious, they offered a compromise in order to establish their good 
will and flexibility.  From the perspective of these two Members, paragraph 5 “… at 
least every five years…” means there should be a new Review started five years 
after the start date of the first Review (2000).  To show their flexibility and offer a 
point for negotiation they suggested the second Review could have a start date of 
mid 2006.  At the same time, they also indicated in strong terms that any date 
beyond 2006 would be unacceptable to them and if 2006 could not be agreed upon 
they would “…consider that further work to form a common understanding of 
progress in the current Review [would] be necessary” (Job(03)/193, p 3).  Those 
who supported this position submitted that paragraph 5 meant from the starting 
date of the first Review, however in keeping with the spirit of flexibility shown by 
Australia and New Zealand they could be part of a consensus and accept 2006 as 
the date to commence the next Review.  
                                          
140 All Members wishing to expand coverage of the GATS support 2005 as the starting year for the 
second Review, whereas those Members wishing to ensure that no changes are made to the Annex 
would have the start date as five years from the end of the first Review. 
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There was no overt disagreement; instead Members who took an opposing stand to 
the above perspective supported in full the ICAO representative’s presentation and 
the role of ICAO regarding economic regulation of the industry.  As expected, the 
Members supporting the retention of the bilateral system as the preferred means of 
pursuing further liberalisation also took the position that the GATS should not be 
expanded.  This group pointedly expressed their support for ensuring that ICAO 
remains the only multilateral body governing further liberalisation of air transport 
and the primary body overseeing the industry.  They also took the position that 
paragraph 5 and the phrase “…at least every five years…” should be interpreted to 
mean five years from the end of the first Review.  This would place the beginning of 
the next Review as 2008 rather than 2005.   
At the outset of the discussion Members seemed to be willing to accept the 
compromise proposal.  Members that interpreted the Annex text (paragraph 5) to 
mean that a Review should be scheduled every five years from the end of the 
previous Review put forth that they appreciated the flexibility shown in the proposal 
and could probably go along if a consensus started to appear.  At the same time, 
each added a qualifying statement of how their interpretation of text differed from 
that of the Australian and New Zealand proposal.  In a few cases, such as Brazil, 
India, Cuba et al, the delegates would not accept a consensus before they 
consulted with their national authorities and none were willing to take a decision ad 
referendum.   
For all present at the meeting it quickly became clear that there was a desire by 
most to reach a consensus.  Numerous delegates who had not participated 
throughout the Review intervened to show their support for the compromise 
proposal set out in Australia and New Zealand’s paper.  To an outsider the issue of 
dates of ending and starting a Review may seem insignificant.  However, it is 
important since no discussion over GATS expansion can exist outside of the Review 
and it is certain that future discussions will relate back to the timing and length of 
each previous Review in order to further the movement toward an interpretation of 
the Annex.  It is thus noteworthy that most of the active participants in the first 
Review formally stated their preference and that agreeing to a consensus did not 
mean they changed their position. 
Sixth Session:  9 October 2003 
The sixth session was officially dedicated to negotiating how to end the current 
Review and the start date for the second Review.  The delegates who said they had 
to first consult with their authorities stated that they could go along with the 
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proposed compromise dates in order to reach a consensus; that is all except Cuba.  
Shortly thereafter the chairman noted the movement toward a consensus and 
asked the delegate from Cuba “…whether the Council might be able to take a 
decision ad referendum in order to allow the delegation from Cuba time to respond 
within one or two weeks” (S/C/M/68).  Although the Cuban delegate indicated that 
it would have a decision in one or two weeks, the decision to decide ad referendum 
was not acknowledged. 
The statement by Cuba had the effect of stimulating yet another round of 
comments pertaining to the Annex interpretation and the need for flexibility to 
achieve a consensus.  Numerous delegates referred to their own interpretation of 
paragraph 5, adding that they appreciated the flexibility of others and would 
likewise be flexible.  Despite these repetitive interventions, a number of delegates 
did agree outright to a commencement date no earlier than mid-2006.   
After Cuba’s statement, the Chairperson attempted to move things forward by 
asking Cuba directly if it could consider a decision ad referendum.  Cuba stated that 
it was not willing to take such a decision, however it was certain that it would 
receive instructions within a week or two.  Subsequently the Chair presented a 
proposal that the Council decide to conclude the first Review and set the 
commencement date for the second Review to begin in mid-2006.  This proposal 
instigated a flurry of signals from delegates wishing to speak on the issue.  The 
delegates that supported the Australian/New Zealand proposal (e.g. the EC) 
reiterated that they would not agree to end the current Review unless a start date 
for the second Review had been established and a consensus reached.   
Progress toward reaching any consensus halted abruptly when the EC 
representative stated that her delegation’s preference would be to keep the Review 
open, however, it could have gone along with a consensus to end this Review if the 
commencement date for the next was established, as proposed, in 2005.  The 
representative noted that while others would have the next Review begin in 2008 
her delegation would not agree to this.  The argument was based on what she 
called systemic reasons.  In concluding the EC statement she said the EC looked 
forward to setting a date for the next Review meeting to discuss issues that still 
needed to be examined, making it clear that there was no consensus therefore the 
Review was still ongoing. 
In response, Brazil requested that the Council continue discussing the formal 
closing and start date.  The EC reiterated that in its view the next Review would 
have to begin in 2005, according to the terms of the Annex, and that while it would 
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like to reach a consensus, having a starting date in 2006 “touched upon systemic 
issues” (S/C/M/68, p 11).  Although never discussed or explained, the systemic 
issues likely referred to the possibility that a later date than 2005 would set a 
precedence for the timing of future Review sessions.  Moreover, through delays and 
inactivity it would be possible that the Annex would become immutable and there 
would be no possibility of expanding coverage of the GATS over this sector.141  
Following the EC intervention, the meeting was again reduced to a debate of the 
interpretation of the Australian/New Zealand paper and the respective positions 
regarding the interpretation of paragraph 5 in the Annex.   
In response to the Brazil-EC exchange, the US sought clarification on the 
Australia/New Zealand paper regarding the two paragraphs (10 and 11) under 
discussion and suggested that Members reflect on how to assist the EC with its 
‘systemic’ problem.  The representative gave a brief overview of the divergent 
positions between the US and the EC and found the proposed compromise to be a 
solution to end the current Review.  However, it was noted that the US also had 
concerns about systemic issues, given the divergent interpretations of the Annex 
text on the periodicity of the Review sessions.   
Switzerland then proposed a slight alteration to the Australia/New Zealand paper:  
it suggested that the start of the next Review be taken at the last regular meeting 
of the Council in 2005 and the substantive Review to begin in the first half of 2006.  
A number of Members spoke to say that in order to reach a consensus to end the 
Review they could agree with either the original proposal or the slightly altered 
Swiss version.  However, Brazil stated it could only accept mid 2006 and not early 
2006, nor could they accept an ad referendum decision. 
Discussion continued until the Chairman proposed that the Members reflect on a 
short text that could be the basis for concluding the Review:  “the Council decides 
to conclude the first review mandated under paragraph 5 of the Annex on Air 
Transport Services and decides that the formal commencement of the second 
review shall take place at the last regular meeting of the Council for Trade in 
Services of 2005” (S/C/M/68, p 13).  It was then agreed to continue the meeting 
on 23 October in order to give Members time to consult with their governments 
                                          
141 The concern about the Annex becoming immutable was voiced during discussions with the EC 
delegates at the Review. 
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Seventh Session:  24 October 2003 
The final Review session highlighted the overriding concern of delegates that the 
Chairman’s proposed text did not in any way begin to interpret paragraph 5 of the 
Annex and that the majority wanted to reach a consensus and end the Review.  The 
delegates in favour of the bilateral system of economic regulations stated strongly 
and frequently that agreeing to the closing text could not in any way indicate or 
suggest that an interpretation of paragraph 5 was taken.  Those in favour of 
expanding the GATS were satisfied that scheduling a date in 2005 to establish 
effective commencement for early to mid 2006 met their objectives of holding the 
next Review as close to the five-year period after 2000.   
However, at the start of the meeting Cuba raised the issue of interpretation.  
Although the Cuban delegate conveyed her government’s flexibility regarding the 
original Australian/New Zealand proposal, she believed that the Chairman’s text 
was worded in a way that interpreted the text and she could not go along with this.  
The next intervention came from Canada with a request to move to informal mode; 
a way to have a more open discussion.  From this point the other delegates took 
the position that the text did not pre-judge or interpret paragraph 5; therefore 
there was no interpretation and they encouraged “everyone” (meaning Cuba) to be 
flexible.   
Progress appeared to resume with Argentina suggesting that a second sentence 
about not prejudging a Member’s interpretation of the Chairman’s text.  Clarity then 
had to be given regarding translation, as Cuba believed that interpretation still 
remained to be done in the Spanish version.  Cuba also requested that all 
statements be put “on record”. 
The most serious point of contention arose between Australia and the US.  Australia 
had intervened to explain the rationale behind the original proposal to end the 
session.  It “… sought to note that the closure of the review until its formal re-
opening in 2005 was without prejudice to the right of Members to seek specific 
commitments from Members under Articles XVΙ [market access] and XVΙΙ [national 
treatment] of the GATS in relation to services not directly related to traffic rights 
such as ground-handling services” (S/C/M/68, p 18).  Although the statement was 
supported by New Zealand, there was a strong response from the US and Japan. 
Both delegations had been active participants throughout the Review and had 
spoken strongly on more than one occasion about their belief that everything 
included in a bilateral agreement was “directly related” to traffic rights (US position) 
and the three sub-sectors listed in the Annex were exceptions, meaning they too 
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were directly related to traffic rights.  Both delegates stated in strong terms that 
they could not agree with the statement made by Australia.   
The entire process of ending the Review could easily have stalled on this point, 
however the Chairman quickly re-directed the discussion back to the wording of the 
proposed closing text.  He reminded the delegates that the scheduled discussion 
related to ending the Review, not the scope of the Annex.  The Chairman took this 
opportunity to end the meeting by proposing that Cuba work with the Secretariat 
on the Spanish wording of the text, and summarised that all the statements were 
‘on record’. He immediately proposed to formally adopt the text and asked if there 
were objections.  Without waiting, he adjourned the meeting. 
Summary 
Although it is tempting to say that the first Review amounted to nothing or very 
little, it does in fact provide a good insight into the importance that Members attach 
to international air transport and that the basis of debate is not about whether to 
liberalise the industry, but rather in which forum, bilateral or multilateral and the 
reasons behind this choice.  Those in favour of the bilateral system argue that there 
is a fundamental incompatibility between the principle of MFN and reciprocity in the 
bilaterals, in addition to emphasising the traditional role of ICAO and the success of 
liberalisation under the bilaterals. 
Those in favour of expanding the GATS to cover some sub-sectors of air transport 
maintain a diametrically opposite position.  While many different arguments were 
put forth, the ones that stood out were issues of distance to major trading partners, 
access to international capital, and how some of the sub-sectors were no longer in 
the sole domain of airlines.  It was noted that many of the corporations involved in 
the infrastructure industries were non air transport conglomerates, therefore the 
link to being directly related to traffic rights had already been broken.  It was 
notable that most of the corporations in question are world market leaders seeking 
to expand their interests and are headquartered in Member States supporting 
expansion.  It was argued by this side that the two systems can operate 
simultaneously without difficulty as seen by the three sub-sectors already covered 
under the Annex.  The true problematique however is the text of the Annex, which 
can be read from and understood from different perspectives.   
Key to the debate must be clarified before much progress can be made:  what is 
the meaning of “directly related to traffic rights” as noted in paragraph 2(b) of the 
Annex.  Currently there is no clarification about the precise meaning.  The other 
point of contention discussed previously in this study is paragraph 5 of the 
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Annex.142  As noted in the debates between and among the Members, one group 
argues the marking point is the commencement date of the first Review (2000), the 
others state it is five years from the end of the Review.  This would likely be argued 
into the future regardless how long the Review lasted. 
It is clear from submissions and interventions during the Review that Members 
supporting expansion of the GATS to this sector also advocate that future Reviews 
occur on a timely and regular basis.  Those opposed sought to ensure that future 
Reviews would be delayed for as long as possible.  The ambiguity of the Annex text 
allowed each to adhere to their staked out position.  However, the overview of the 
meetings does not reveal the complete picture regarding why one position was 
taken, over another.  Nor is it clear that these positions will be sure to remain the 
same into the future.  Thus, the next part of the chapter will provide an overview of 
the statistical analysis that was done in order to uncover some of the reasons 
Members argued for or against expansion. 
Part ΙΙ:  Empirical Evidence 
Including an empirical section in the study is intended to not only deepen the scope 
of the study and to improve understanding of why Members took a particular 
position in the Review, but to establish a framework from which to test the initial 
observations of the written submissions and interventions.  It is intended to provide 
a basis for drawing a comparative analysis between the two methodologies in an 
attempt to uncover as many of the factors as possible that influence a Member’s 
position in multilateral trade negotiations.  The comparison is important because it 
helps to understand multilateral negotiations and why they might be preferred over 
bilateral ones and vice versa.  From this information one can begin to understand 
the incentives behind specific positions and where Members believe their BATNA is 
located.  Using both observation and data analysis the researcher is able to test 
expected results and when a difference is found, raise questions as to the 
reason(s). 
Reading the paper submissions and listening to the delegate interventions provided 
a set of information that, while subjective, gives a degree of understanding about 
the national policy objectives.  From this vantage point one can begin to 
understand some of the reasons Members took radically different positions and 
what these choices were based upon.  Adding an empirical analysis allows 
                                          
142 Op cit. 
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observable elements to be tested, in order to uncover whether initial expectations 
were or were not met or indeed exceeded. 
Dependent Variable 
The selection of dependent and independent variables was drawn from Member’s 
submissions and interventions.  The criteria for the selection were based on sub-
sectors that Members highlighted, emphasised, or repeated during the Review.  
Data was then collected for a nine-year period (1995-2004) in sub-sectors that 
were discussed and where consistent and reliable data could be found for each of 
the eight cases (see Chapters 6 and 7 for the case analysis).  The most contentious 
issue and the one that divided the Members most clearly was the operation of the 
Annex and whether or not coverage should be expanded.  On the basis of this 
clearly demarcated divide among the delegates the dependent variable for the 
empirical analysis was established.   
In seven of the eight cases, the Members were categorical in their positions while 
the eighth might have accepted expansion but only in one sub-sector.  Thus, for the 
analysis this Member was categorised with the pro-bilateral cases.  After selecting 
the cases, each position was coded as -1, 0, or +1.143  The variable was then 
labelled as ATRPos, standing for Air Transport Position. Minus one represents 
Members who were against expansion, zero for those that made no comment and 
plus one for those who advocated expansion of GATS coverage.  The next step was 
to determine the independent variables that might influence a Member’s position 
throughout the Review. 
Independent Variables 
Noted above, the independent variable selection was based on the Members written 
and oral submissions and where the data was considered reliable.   Both criteria fit 
within the theoretical framework that claims the marketplace both affects and 
influences national policy makers.  This in turn establishes the basis from which a 
country is willing to negotiate and the limits negotiators are given by their political 
masters.  For each of the cases (chapters 6 and 7), the same independent variables 
were used and the full data set covers a sequential nine-year period.  The period 
begins with the same years as was used in the Secretariat research and includes 
four subsequent years in order to show change over time and to reduce the 
distorting effects of exogenous events that contribute to the normal cyclical nature 
                                          
143 See Appendixes 4 to 7 for the full list of Members’ positions throughout the Review. 
  118 
of the whole industry.  While the tragic events of September 11, 2001 had a 
massive impact on the global industry, the Iraqi invasion (2003) and the outbreak 
of SARS (2003) impacted the industry at a more regional level.144   
In order to reduce the short-term distortion created by the above mentioned 
exogenous events, and to take a sample from three time periods that were roughly 
similar in spacing, 1997, 1999, and 2003 were chosen (see appendixes 8-15 for the 
full data set).  In addition, the choice of years would provide data from before the 
Review (1997), the beginning of the Review (2000) and 2003 because it was far 
enough away (in time) from 11 September 2001.  It was also the last year of the 
Review and the effects of the Iraqi invasion and the SARS outbreak were 
considered to be regional and short-term.  Linear regression was then used to 
identify the degree of significance for each of the independent variables to see if 
they correlated to the Review observations.  See Tables: 1, 2, and 3 below for the 
outcome of the linear regression exercise. 
It is noteworthy that only one Member actually withdrew from its original position 
(Poland) and although it was beyond the scope of this paper to analyse this 
specifically, it is possible to make a supposition that the change came as a result of 
Poland’s imminent accession to the EU (the EU supports expansion of the GATS).145  
This exception aside, all Members maintained a solid position regarding whether to 
expand the GATS to some selected sub-sectors of air transport.  It was therefore 
possible to establish the position taken by delegates in the Review as the 
dependent variable.  Using the above points, the independent variables selected 
include:   
• the great circle distance to the two major markets of the EC and the US,  
• the GDP (US$ constant 2000);  
• the types of Air Services Agreements the Member has signed;  
• the corporate health of a Member’s flag carrier(s) (revenue/loss);  
• the sub-sectors of airport services;  
• ground-handling; and  
• airport cargo volumes.   
Each will be addressed in turn.   
                                          
144 See “CEO Brief”, April 2003, IATA. p 2.  
http://www.iata.org/NR/ContentConnector/CS2000/SiteInterface/sites/pressroom/file/ceo_brief_a
pr_2003.pdf 
145“The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining Coalition:  the Like Minded Group in the World 
Trade Organization” in Negotiating Trade:  Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA, ed. John 
S. Odell, pp 115-144. 
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The findings from the statistical analysis are presented below, by input variable, to 
show how each is related to the positions taken by the case study Members (see 
the following two Chapters for a more detailed discussion).  
One argument of this study maintains that market forces, as represented by 
Members’ corporations, have a strong impact on the negotiating position of a 
Member within the WTO.  Whether or not influence is a direct result of domestic 
peddling by corporate representatives and/or hired lobbyists is not the issue.  The 
point being made is that policy makers and trade representatives would be aware of 
whether their industries are economically stable, growing or in distress.   In other 
words, the more successful and dynamic a corporation becomes in the global 
market the more likely the Member will advocate multilateral liberalisation, at least 
for the specific sector.  The opposite would also be true.  Thus, what we expected 
to find in the data analysis using linear regression is a strong link between the 
areas that were considered to be important issues to the Members.   
Drawing from the submissions and interventions, ground-handling, airport services 
management, and the distance to and from major trading partners were found to 
be very important elements for Members advocating multilateral liberalisation, 
including the one Member (Canada) that was categorised in the pro-bilateral camp.  
In addition the study has taken into account other factors that are in part reflective 
of national economic growth, liberalising trends within the industry as a whole and 
the economic health of the flag carriers to see if any of these give us further 
insights about the degree of influence any one or more of the independent variables 
are likely to impact on the dependent variable. 
Table 1:  1997 Coefficients(a)146 
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -1.980 .613  -3.229 .004 
DistEC -3.24E-005 .000 -.128 -.755 .459 
DistUS .000 .000 .655 3.510 .002 
GDP 1.87E-005 .000 .244 1.532 .141 
ASAs .242 .087 .482 2.790 .011 
RevLoss 8.00E-007 .000 .327 1.712 .102 
APSs -.071 .132 -.087 -.541 .594 
GHg -.164 .340 -.093 -.481 .635 
1 
APcargo -5.67E-007 .000 -.378 -2.153 .043 
a  Dependent Variable: ATRPos 
                                          
146 Data for the regression exercise included the data from 30 Member States. 
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Table 2:  2000 Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -1.996 .593  -3.367 .004 
DistEC -3.25E-005 .000 -.131 -.787 .442 
DistUS .000 .000 .466 2.593 .019 
GDP 5.81E-006 .000 .087 .506 .620 
ASAs .296 .080 .584 3.686 .002 
RevLoss 1.24E-006 .000 .411 2.307 .034 
APSs .048 .117 .067 .411 .686 
GHg -.089 .169 -.087 -.528 .604 
1 
APcargo -4.90E-007 .000 -.427 -2.387 .029 
a  Dependent Variable: ATRpos 
Table 3:  2003 Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -1.926 .797  -2.417 .028 
DistEC -5.03E-005 .000 -.204 -1.007 .329 
DistUS .000 .000 .445 1.697 .109 
GDP 1.81E-005 .000 .268 1.503 .152 
ASAs .268 .089 .534 3.021 .008 
RevLoss 4.23E-007 .000 .229 1.065 .303 
APSs .038 .141 .055 .269 .791 
GHg .071 .287 .053 .246 .809 
1 
APcargo -2.87E-007 .000 -.277 -1.581 .133 
a  Dependent Variable: ATRpos 
Distance to the Two Major Markets (EC and US) 
Using an on-line calculation programme, it was possible to construct a database of 
great circle mileage between the international hub airports for the case studies.147  
In some cases (e.g. US, EC, and Canada) the top three to five airports were used.  
This was done in order to factor in the geographical size of countries.  The routes 
between cities are only approximate since they do not take into account the need 
for aircraft to refuel or routings that would normally be used when taking into 
account jet streams or over-flight prohibitions.  In some instances airlines do not 
operate non-stop flights for the distances shown.  Nevertheless, the data provides a 
rough estimate of the obstacles that need to be overcome by airlines located great 
distances from major markets, as noted in the Review by some delegates.  In 
particular New Zealand and Chile referred to the competitive disadvantages they 
faced because of their geographic location from major markets.   
                                          
147 Great Circle Mapper, http://gc.kls2.com 
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Since the issue of distance was raised in the Review and linked to the need for 
further liberalisation on a multilateral basis, the data was collected to see if, in fact, 
distance from either market was statistically significant. 
Distance to the EC Market 
In all three years, the distance from a Member’s main international airport to the 
EC market remained statistically insignificant.  Nevertheless the trend showed this 
variable to be slightly more significant in the last year (2003) than the first (1997).  
Based on the years used in the linear regression, it is possible that not enough 
years were used and that by inputting more years, the outcomes might indicate 
movement toward becoming statistically significant.  Although it would be tempting 
to remove either the variable from the testing in order to improve the results of 
other variables it was decided to keep all testing the same for each of the sample 
years.  This was done for the purposes of having a data set that could be compared 
across time and accept that the statistical analysis does not always correspond with 
Member positions.   
In all markets except South America the EU has a strategic advantage over the US 
due to the shorter distances, which appears to be reflected in the lower statistical 
significance over the seven-year period (the years covered by the three-year 
sample set).   Given that some Members spoke about distance as an impediment to 
being able to compete effectively in the international market by linking this to their 
belief that multilateral liberalisation would be beneficial to achieve this end, the 
shorter distances to the EU would be statistically less significant. 
During the period of time covered by the sample set, the EU Third Package was 
already in place and operating.  However, since we are looking at the EC as a whole 
and not the individual Members States it is difficult to give any precise 
observations.  On the one hand the EU had begun to liberalise beyond its borders 
with neighbouring countries and individual Member States had signed open skies 
agreements with the US.  The liberalising trend had begun albeit in a fragmented 
manner due to the lack of negotiating authority by the Commission over air 
transport. 
Distance to the US Market 
The exact opposite trend can be observed in the relevance of the distance from the 
US market:  over the sample period, distance to the US market produced significant 
results in 1997 but then they decrease.  Like the EU case, this raises questions 
about the sample size and whether this pattern can be correlated over time.  The 
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pattern indicates that the distance to the US is becoming insignificant over time.  
Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this study to run a regression analysis for 
longer periods and/or if the degree of liberalisation directly impacts the relevance of 
distance.   
In 1997, the first year of the sample, the importance of having access to this 
market is very significant, registering .002.  At this point in time, open skies 
agreements were still relatively few with most countries having Bermuda ΙΙ type 
agreements.  As noted earlier, Bermuda ΙΙ agreements specify the number of 
airlines that can be designated by a state and the entry city to which they can fly.  
Although more liberal than the original Bermuda Ι type ASAs, Bermuda ΙΙ 
agreements are considered to be restrictive.   
The significance of the distances to the US market is less in 2000 (.019), and again 
in 2003 (.109).  Given that these distances are statistically significant, it is possible 
to suggest that the US would have a stronger negotiating position over the speed, 
degree, and amount of liberalisation in a bilateral setting.  However, if the pattern 
of decreasing significance holds true over time, then this perceived strength would 
also correspondingly diminish.  Whether this would have a strong influence on 
future US negotiators remains unclear without first examining other factors that 
could possibly influence their position. 
GDP Using US$ Constant 2000 (per capita) 
Due to the inclusion of cases that are not classified as high income or developed 
countries (Brazil and Chile), Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was included to see if 
economic development factored into the delegates’ positions.  In each of the years, 
the data revealed that GDP was either completely insignificant or just barely 
significant.  There were also no discernible indicators that provided a potential 
pattern formation.  Indeed, the results were random.  When taking into account 
arguments for or against multilateral liberalisation, only Chile cited potential gains 
in GDP.  It specifically highlighted its recent economic growth as a factor of shifting 
to a market driven economy and liberalisation policies that had been put in place, 
including the air transport sector.   
A number of other trials were run using: PPP (constant 2000 international $); travel 
services (% of commercial service exports); and travel services (% of commercial 
service imports).  In each of the trials no statistical significance was found for any 
of the years and therefore not included. 
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Air Services Agreements (ASAs) 
The linear regression results for ASAs were the most statistically significant of all 
the independent variables.  To ensure that there were no random anomalies, the 
analysis was run using a number of different inputs.  In each case, ASAs were 
statistically significant, indicating that the more liberal a Member’s ASAs the more 
likely that Member would advocate expanding the GATS to parts of air transport.  
To determine whether a Member has liberal ASAs, all the available ASAs of the 
Member were collected and then put into categories. 
The method used for coding the type of ASA was drawn from the standard elements 
of a bilateral agreement.  In total there were seven ‘types’ of agreements.  The first 
and most restrictive is the original Bermuda Ι (BΙ) type agreement, which was 
based on the first bilateral agreement signed between the US and the UK in 1944 in 
Bermuda.  This set the standard for other bilateral agreements between countries.  
The second is when states have liberalised the original agreement through 
diplomatic letters of understanding (MBΙ).  Normally this is done to increase the 
number of designated aircraft permitted rather than negotiate a new bilateral.  BΙ 
or MBΙ agreements have been signed and/or modified between 1944 and 1976.  
The third group is coded as Bermuda ΙΙ, which was first signed in 1977 in Bermuda 
between the US and the UK and is considered to be more liberal than BΙ.  The 
major changes occurred in freedom of aircraft type and how tariffs are set.  The 
fourth type is a modified version of the BΙΙ (MBΙΙ) using the same criteria as MBI. 
The fifth type of agreement is the Open Skies type (OS), which first appeared in 
1992 between the Netherlands and the US, and is much more liberal regarding 
destination choices, tariffs, and the ability to use third and fourth freedoms.  The 
number of airlines a state wishes to designate is unrestricted so long as the state 
adheres to the articles pertaining to ownership and effective control of the 
designated carrier.  This type of agreement was followed by the first plurilateral 
agreement, consisting of five states.148  Although this agreement has been heralded 
as a breakthrough in the march toward international liberalisation, it remains based 
on the principles of a bilateral whereby ownership and control, and foreign 
ownership restrictions are still present, albeit more liberal than other agreements. 
The final type of agreement is a Common Aviation Area (CAA).  Of all the types this 
is the most liberal insofar as it removes foreign ownership restrictions among the 
members and all participants are considered to be domestic operators within the 
                                          
148 The original signatories to the agreement include the US, Chile, New Zealand, Brunei, and 
Singapore. 
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territory of the Members.  Although third party bilaterals still remain in force, the 
signatories to a CAA have effectively removed the standard restrictions of the 
bilateral framework.   
The greatest percentage of agreements between countries remains in the BΙΙ or 
MBΙΙ level of liberalisation.  However, this is based on the number of agreements 
that were found and not on the total number of agreements in existence.  For the 
purposes of the analysis, each type was assigned a number from one to seven, 
indicating the degree of liberalisation.  Through this method it was possible to 
determine that states with the most liberal agreements, regardless of how many, 
would be more likely to support GATS liberalisation than those who had less liberal 
agreements.  The break point appears between the plurilateral agreements and a 
CAA for the study cases.   
All the cases supporting GATS liberalisation have entered into a CAA except Chile 
and all cases supporting bilaterals except the US have not signed agreements more 
liberal than MBΙΙ agreements.149  For a listing of the agreements found and ranked 
see Appendix 10. 
Net Revenue or Losses of a Member’s Flag Carrier(s) 
The data collected for regression analysis was to test if there might be a correlation 
between the position of a Member regarding GATS expansion and the profitability of 
the flag carrier(s).  In order to provide some comparison between the EC and the 
US, the six largest international carriers were chosen.   
The results of the linear regression exercise showed that there was no discernable 
pattern of increasing or decreasing importance for the three sample years.  
However, two of the three years (1997 and 2000) produced statistically significant 
results.  Using 2000 as a demarcation point, the bulk of the flag carriers (except 
New Zealand) remained in a positive revenue position.  However after 2000 most 
carriers saw a marked decline and post 11 September 2001 saw, as can be 
expected, dramatic losses.  The differences appear to reside in the post 2000 
period, whereby those in favour of GATS expansion had carriers that either 
remained profitable throughout, or had stemmed the losses and were moving 
toward increasing revenues.  In each of the cases where Members preferred 
retaining the bilateral framework, the carriers exhibited the largest sustained 
losses.   
                                          
149 After the data for study was collected Canada and the US have signed an Open Skies 
agreement.  Nevertheless it still places Canada as a less liberal country according to the study’s 
ranking as it has not signed a plurilateral or CAA agreement. 
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Airport Management Services 
The results of the data analysis for airport services gave no significant results.  The 
only pattern that appeared showed that over time the correlation diminished.  
These results could have been due to the imbalance of the data that arose from the 
fact that over the period in question, the EC based corporations were dominant at 
the outset, with very few other non-EC corporations participating in this area.  This 
imbalance increased over time and by 2004 the top five international operators 
were all from EC Member States.  Despite the lack of interesting results from the 
linear regression exercise, during the sessions this was one of the sectors for which 
delegates that were pro-expansion of the GATS advocated coverage. 
Ground-handling 
Although ground-handling is one of the sub-sector industries almost included by the 
Annex during the Uruguay Round and was discussed frequently throughout the 
Review, the linear regression exercises produced no significant results.  Indeed, in 
each of the years it was consistently the most insignificant of all the independent 
variables.  Nevertheless, like airport services, the global players of this industry are 
primarily EC based and interested in expanding further in the international market. 
Airport Cargo Volumes 
The regression analysis for the volume of cargo handled at Members’ airports 
returned positive values insofar as each year indicated some level of significance.  
Although the results do not reveal a distinctive pattern or trend in either a positive 
or negative direction, each of the three years showed this sub-sector’s relevance to 
the study.  Cargo traffic, although not often at the forefront of airline liberalisation 
discussions, is the facilitator for modern global trade.  It permits just-in-time 
manufacturing operations and opens up global trade for perishables and overnight 
package delivery services.   
Looking at national cargo volumes allows us to understand the importance of 
ensuring the efficient movement of goods across borders.  In this study the 
relevance relates to how much national control Members believe is required.  GATS 
coverage of this sector would directly impact national airlines.  In each of the cases 
the Members wishing to retain the bilateral framework have airlines that have not 
enjoyed sustained profitability over the period in question. 
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Initial Observations 
It is difficult to ascertain at the outset how closely the discussions throughout the 
Review relate to the data analysis.  However, taking both sets of information into 
account linkages can be observed between the results of the independent variables 
and the Members’ position in the Review (dependent variable) as verified through 
oral and written submissions.  It is fairly clear that while individual market sectors 
were important factors for the Members, they produced relatively unimportant 
results in the linear regression exercise.  At the other end of the scale, the ASAs 
were not directly discussed in the Review, yet they consistently produced significant 
results in the statistical analysis.  Nevertheless, the key to liberalisation remains 
embedded within the ASAs and therefore directly affect the key market sectors.  
Looking at the results leads us to suggest that the market inputs do have an impact 
on a Member’s position.  In order to strengthen this initial observation it is 
necessary to go a step further and examine specific cases to see if the linkages 
strengthen or weaken.  It is also important to look at the cases in order to 
determine which findings were expected, and which were unexpected. 
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Chapter 6 
States in Favour of Expanding GATS Coverage over Air 
Transport  
The cases that are examined in this study were selected on the basis of active 
participation (oral and written) in the first Review and, as much as possible, for 
geographical representation.  Members that are in favour of expanding GATS 
coverage over sub-sectors of the air transport industry include:  the European 
Communities (EC), Australia, New Zealand, and Chile.  While the cases represent 
Members from different geographical regions it was not possible to include any 
African Members due to the lack of oral or written submissions (see Appendix 3 for 
a complete list of written submissions and notation of oral participation) and 
available data that was either coherent or reliable.150  Attention was also given to 
the level of economic development where possible. 
While the EC is not a state in the traditional understanding of a nation state, it has 
full negotiating authority within the WTO on behalf of its Member States and 
represents one of the world’s largest single markets.  Australia and New Zealand 
are developed states and both are geographically distant from either the US market 
or the European market.  Chile, while not officially considered to be one of the 
developed states, has vastly improved its economic standing over the past fifteen 
years151 through liberal economic reform.  These Member States roughly match 
geographic locations of States who took an opposing stance (see next chapter).  
The analysis for each of the cases follows approximately the same criteria.  First the 
interventions (oral and written) will be noted, followed by dependent and 
independent variables that were used in the linear regression exercise and the 
observations about a Member’s incentives and possible BATNA.  What is being 
looked at are the factors thought to influence a Members’ negotiating positions and 
                                          
150 During the research phase of the Secretariat Background Papers, every effort was made to find 
reliable data in order to be able to include this region of the air transport industry.  In most of the 
sub-sectors and in the core airline (flag carrier) sector there was very little information.  The only 
sub-sector where any reliable information was available was ground-handling, which was included 
in S/C/W/163Add1. 
151 “Solid fiscal management and a deepening of reforms during the 1990s cemented a favourable 
investment climate and improved the resilience of the economy. Trade liberalization triggered 
significant export diversification into forestry, fishing, wines, fruits, and other agro-based 
products. As a result, Chile decreased its dependence on copper and grew at an unprecedented 
6.8 percent per year until 1999, when it was affected by the East Asian crisis. Since then, the 
country has avoided recession and restored growth, albeit at lower levels, with real GDP per capita 
growing at an average of 1.25 percent annually between 1998 and 2003.” World Bank 2005, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/CHILEEXTN. 
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include inter alia:  geo-strategic location, level of GDP152 in standard 2000 US 
dollars, liberalising patterns within the bilateral framework, and some of the sub-
sector industries153 including flag carriers’ revenue and losses, ground-handling, 
airport management services, and airport cargo handling.  All were considered to 
have relevance and/or an influence on a Member’s position at the outset of the 
study.  For the cases, unlike the linear regression exercise, the full data set is 
presented in line charts and data tables in order to examine the actual changes 
over time in a realistic context.   
According to negotiating theory, one needs to examine the ever-changing market 
conditions (domestic and international) to determine where a State’s BATNA is 
located and how the different factors are exhibited in a negotiating forum.  BATNA 
is also considered to be an important factor for determining the incentives 
influencing the formulation of a government’s policy position.  Although each of the 
cases holds the same position regarding GATS expansion, the underlying incentives 
and perceived BATNA are different.  For the EC it is inter alia about integration 
(political and economic) and negotiating authority over air transport.  Despite 
prolonged efforts by the Commission to acquire this authority the Member States 
have refused.154  Any inclusion of sub-sectors would give the Commission the 
authority to be the single voice on behalf of the Member Stats in negotiations.   
Chile, New Zealand and Australia have similar incentives that are based on access 
to markets and the perceived disadvantage of distance to their trading partners.  
New Zealand and Australia are economically developed and members of the OECD.  
Although Chile’s has enjoyed strong economic growth since adopting an open 
market economy it remains classified as a developing country.  A common incentive 
for each of these three States would be in terms of voice; each would gain a 
stronger voice within the multilateral arena than they have in the bilateral setting.  
All three have advocated liberalising the air transport industry beyond Open Skies, 
                                          
152 Noted in Chapter 5, this variable was included in the statistical analysis to see whether or not 
GDP plays a significant role in a Member’s position regarding multilateral or bilateral liberalisation.  
Intuitively, this measure would be difficult to argue since there were Members from developing 
and developed countries arguing for both positions and there are no least developing countries in 
the study due to lack of participation and data beyond GDP levels.  The intuitive conclusions were 
backed up by the statistical analysis.  Regardless how GDP was factored into the analysis the 
findings were consistent; there is no link between the level of GDP and the position taken 
throughout the Review.  See Tables 1, 2, and 3 above in Chapter 5. 
153 The choice of sub-sectors was based on the consistency and availability of data for at least six 
years.  In many instances there was available data for nine years.  In other instances such as 
some of the sub-sectors it was not possible to acquire enough or accurate enough data to include 
in the study, as noted above in Chapter 5. 
154 Numerous speeches were given by Neil Kinnock during the 1990s advocating the need to move 
beyond a fragmented European transport structure that was based on individual states and not 
the EU as a whole. 
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are liberal and open trading nations, and strong advocates of the multilateral 
trading system.   
The EC 
Position on Expanding GATS Coverage in the Air Transport Review 
The EC was one of the more active participants throughout the Review and it was 
clear from the outset that it was pushing to expand the coverage of the GATS to 
ancillary services (sub-sectors).  In total it submitted three papers (pre-Review 
included) and made regular interventions to other presentations and papers.  The 
EC delegates and representatives from each of their Member States met for a few 
hours prior to each Review session in order to ensure that all were represented with 
one voice during the meetings.  It is also known that industry experts (operators 
and advisors) were consulted throughout the Review.155   
It noted that “[t]he review is an opportunity to reach a clearer understanding of the 
services, that Members agree are not directly related to the exercise of traffic rights 
pursuant to paragraph 2 and are thus presumably covered” (S/C/W/168, p 3).  It 
also raised the notion that any regulatory changes need to ensure increased 
operating efficiency for industry players and that Members should take the 
“…opportunity to address the tension between an increasingly globalised market 
and the limitations of the current regulatory framework” (S/C/W/168, p 4). 
A two-track approach was taken:  one addressed the operation of the Annex and 
the other highlighted significant changes in market structure over the preceding 
number of years.  It argued that the former needed to be examined due to the lack 
of a precise definition in the text over what constituted “directly related to traffic 
rights” in order to adequately address changes in the latter.  Its written and oral 
submissions listed the sub-sectors that can and have been divested from core 
airline operations as potential areas that could be covered by the GATS.   
The reasoning suggests that once independent companies are created and 
oftentimes owned by non-aviation corporations, they no longer are bound by 
foreign ownership restrictions and they can operate without having to acquire or 
hold traffic rights.  As independent sectors they can be directly linked to the United 
Nations Central Product Classification (CPC) in areas other than transport (e.g. 
                                          
155 It is known that the proposed Common Aviation Area between the EC and the US was primarily 
designed and written by the air transport experts at the Association of European Airlines, with 
input from representatives of Swissair.   
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catering would fall under Division 64156).  A virtual shopping list of ancillary services 
in air transport are listed in the first written submission (S/C/W/168) and reiterated 
throughout the Review. 
In each of the papers submitted, including one which was first submitted in the CTS 
Special Session (S/CSS/W/41), the EC presented how economic efficiencies could 
be gained through multilateral liberalisation while at the same time ensuring that 
safety and regulatory standards are maintained.  It argued that the European 
experience of liberalisation supported the findings of the economic and regulatory 
overview provided in the Secretariat background papers, which gave numerous 
examples of sub-sectors that operated independently of airline ownership and 
control, and therefore did not require traffic rights to conduct business operations.  
The list included:  ground-handling, airport management services, leasing or rental 
services without an operator (dry leasing) and services auxiliary to all modes of 
transport when delivered in an air transport context (e.g. cargo handling and 
storage and warehousing).   
Economic Development 
Each of the 15 Member States of the EC is classified by the World Bank as a high-
income OECD member country. In combination the 15 form the largest single 
market in the world.157  The EC is an active participant in the WTO and is 
considered to be a liberal trading bloc in many areas of trade in goods and services 
(excluding agriculture).  The political and economic integration of the European 
Member States has been continually working towards taking down all the historical 
barriers to trade within the Union, including air transport.  Shown in the two charts 
below (1-2), all the Member States have enjoyed a continual rise in GDP over the 
nine-year period being studied.  For the full set of GDP data see Appendix 8.  In 
terms of the statistical analysis there is some degree of significance.  The EC’s 
interventions noted the economic growth of all Member States during and after the 
creation of a single internal air transport market and made direct linkages to the 
economic importance of this industry.   
In the EC’s first written submission they noted that “… air transport services are an 
essential facilitator of trade and actually a precondition for the expansion of other 
economic activities, and thus form, with other service sectors such as construction 
                                          
156 “Sub-divisions 6421 and 6431 of the UN CPC refer to the service of meals and beverages “in 
transport” facilities”, instancing trains and ships.  They also cover airline catering.  They fall under 
Division 64, “Hotel and Restaurant Services”.” S/C/W/163, p 51 and United Nations Central 
Product Classification, 1991. 
157 “World Development Indicators”, World Bank 2005. 
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or telecommunication, the infrastructural backbone necessary for the development 
of any economy” (S/C/W/168, p 3). 
Chart 1 
The European Communities (15)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Years
G
D
P/
ca
pi
ta
 C
on
st
an
t U
S$
 2
00
0
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland
Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal
Spain Sweden United Kingdom
 
Geostrategic Location 
When compared to the US, the EC is located in a geographically advantageous 
position in terms of origin/destination and transit.  Many of the major European 
cities (e.g. Amsterdam, London, or Paris) are located on the northern great circle 
routes, are closer in absolute distance to the large Asian markets, are part of the 
transatlantic market, and are proximate to the Middle East, Africa and the Indian 
sub-continent.  The only potential markets further from Europe than the US are in 
South America, however, Southern European countries (e.g. Spain and Portugal) 
have direct links to these markets.   
Some people may take issue with categorising the EC as one market, particularly 
since bilateral negotiations in air transport are still conducted at the Member State 
level with third countries, despite increasing EC participation.  From this 
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perspective, evaluating distance to the EC market as one rather than 15 or 25 may 
be contested.  However, since the EC is the representative of all Member States in 
the WTO, depicting it as one is appropriate in this instance.   
For the data analysis the main international hubs were used as departure and 
arrival points in the same manner as for the US data; in each case the airports 
were a reflection of the top entry points into the EC.  In each of the three years 
used for the data analysis, the distance to the EC market returned very insignificant 
numbers showing that the distance to this major market had little if any bearing 
upon a Member’s position in the Review.  However, despite the unexpectedly poor 
numbers, a trend appeared indicating that over time statistical significance is 
increasing.  This indicates that something from the other independent variables was 
also changing and therefore impacting the results in this category.   
For example, a noticeable difference appears with the Air Services Agreements 
(ASAs) variable.  Both increased in significance over the same period.  If the 
significance is linked to increased liberalisation of agreements, then it is relevant to 
note that 1997 (the first input year) was the same time that the Third Liberalisation 
Package came fully into effect.  It can therefore be assumed that the more 
liberalised the agreements, the greater the statistical significance becomes for the 
EC market.  This means that other Members’ position in future Reviews could be 
influenced by their distance to the EC market and position that the EC adopts. 
ASAs and Foreign Ownership Limitations 
The EU began liberalising the air transport sector in 1988 through the 
implementation of what are known as the Three Packages, which laid out the 
institutional steps to create a single aviation market (see Chapter 3 for details).  
The process began in 1988 and was completed in 1997.  The first phase took two 
years to implement and the second and final stages each took three years.  In 
launching this process the Member States of the EU were the first countries to 
create a common aviation area, the most liberal of the different types of 
international agreements.   
Although geographically regional, the structure has overcome one of the most 
contentious and restrictive elements of the bilateral agreements.  Foreign 
ownership limitations and designation criteria among the Member States were 
dropped, allowing a national of any Member to start, own and operate an airline in 
any other Member State.  The common area also permitted stand-alone cabotage 
operations, the so-called ninth freedom (ICAO Doc 9626, p 4.1-10).  The EC noted 
in their first written submission that “… all restrictions on market access and 
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investment have now been removed allowing airlines from any of the Member 
States to fly any route according to market principles” (S/C/W/168, p 1).   
Foreign Ownership Restrictions  
Although the liberalisation of the European market removed ownership barriers 
internally, each Member State continued to negotiate third-country bilaterals on 
their own, which included ownership and designation articles.  That is until a ruling 
by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2002 (see Chapter 3 for more details) 
that the foreign ownership and designation criteria were in conflict with European 
law.158  Although the Courts did not give full negotiating authority to the 
Commission, the ruling did instruct the Member States to bring all of their third-
country ASAs into conformity with EU law.  In the re-negotiated bilaterals 
designation of airlines must be on the basis of “Community Carrier” rather than the 
traditional “flag carrier”.  The only exceptions were with the European Economic 
Area (EEA) countries and Switzerland due to agreements that already existed and 
thus already compatible with the court ruling. 
Through membership in the EEA, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and two 
comprehensive bilateral agreements with Switzerland, foreign ownership 
restrictions no longer exist.  For all other bilateral agreements the foreign 
ownership levels for all Member States is set at 49%.  These countries have also 
had to make arrangements with third-party countries to accommodate the 
agreement with the EU.  Not surprisingly, Switzerland and Norway took the same 
position as the EC or backed EC interventions throughout the Review. 
Flag Carriers’ Revenue/Loss159 
For the nine-year period of the study, the revenue/loss results among the six 
largest European carriers were quite varied (Chart 2 below).  In the period prior to 
the Review (1994-1999) the carriers posted mixed results; one or two carriers 
achieved large net profits while others lost or maintained a relatively stable 
position.  For all carriers the period beginning in 1997 and lasting approximately 
two years, net revenue was positive.  Two dramatic events that were outside the 
normal cyclical nature of the industry appear to have had strong impacts on the 
revenues of all carriers.  The first was a direct result of the terrorist attacks in the 
US on 11 September 2001 and the second was the outbreak of SARS in 2003.   
                                          
158 Op Cit. 
159 See Appendix 11 for the full data table of revenue and loss for all flag carriers in the study. 
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Chart 2 
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Note:  KLM and Air France merged in 2004. 
These are reflected clearly when looking at the averages of the revenue/loss data in 
Chart 3.  
Once an average is taken, it is easier to see that overall the net revenue showed a 
marked increase leading up to and including 1997 whereupon the returns began to 
diminish.  There was a marked downturn in 1998 with radical losses occurring prior 
to and including 2001.  Despite a rather sharp turn-around in 2002, 2003 saw 
profits fall to the same level as 2001.  Thereafter the industry has enjoyed a 
relatively stable return to profit.   
Given the historical linkages between the European flag carriers and the State, it 
would be normal to assume that the State would advocate further liberalisation 
when the flag carriers were enjoying increasing net revenues and the status quo 
when they were experiencing losses.  However, this was not the case given that 
there was a marked downward trend in the period prior to and during the Review.  
Possibly this could be accounted for because the EC is not a State in the traditional 
sense and it has never had independent authority over the carriers in the same way 
as the individual Member States. 
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Moreover, in the period following the application of the Third Package that created 
the common aviation area, the low cost (non-flag carriers) sector appeared, 
increased rapidly, and took market share away from the traditional flag carriers.  
Thus, while one part of the airline sector was experiencing a downward trend in 
revenues, others were experiencing exactly the opposite.  The data for the low cost 
sector has not been included since it remains currently an internal market 
(domestic) and therefore not subject to bilateral negotiations and access to traffic 
rights. 
Ground-handling 
Traditionally, ground-handling was a department within an airline – and still is for 
many airlines.  However, due to many airlines downsizing operations and 
outsourcing many non-core activities, the ground-handling sub-sector of air 
transport began to undergo dramatic changes.  While independent handlers have 
been around for many years, domestic and international mergers began 
consolidating the industry in the early 1990s.  In 1993, the establishment of the 
European single market began the first and very limited opening of the ground-
handling market. Until then ground-handling remained dominated by monopoly 
suppliers and was the preserve of the nationally controlled airport authorities 
and/or the national flag carriers.  Most often, the national flag carrier established 
reciprocal handling arrangements with other flag carriers, sometimes under the 
auspices of State negotiated bilateral agreements.  Where bilaterals provided for 
self-handling or third party handling, the foreign-designated airlines did not need to 
be handled by the host-country flag carrier (S/C/W/163Add1, p 11). 
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From the empirical data (see Table 1) it is possible to see the emergence of 
independent handlers that not only operated at the national level but also, in the 
cases of Switzerland (a non-EU country) and the UK, at the global level.  An 
independent subsidiary of KLM had also begun to expand globally in the cargo 
sector (Cargo Service Centre Holding B.B.).  Once started the consolidation of the 
industry continued.  The years 1993, 2000 and 2004 show that not only has the 
industry grown and consolidated, but also for the first time non-air transport 
corporations began purchasing independent handling corporations.  Tables 1-3 
highlight the size and reach of the early independent ground-handling corporations. 
Table 1:  Independent Ground-handlers 1993 
Ground-Handling 
Corporations 
Airports Employees Headquarters 
Turnover 
(US$ Million) 
DynAir 
519 
(US) 
5600 US 519 
Jet Aviation 
14 
(12 worldwide) 
331 Switzerland 233 
Belgavia (Aviapartner 
Grp) 
4 
(Europe) 
1350 Belgium 119 
Ogden 
85 
(worldwide) 
14000 US 28.5 
Servisair 
55 
(worldwide) 
 UK  
GroundAir Services 
8 
(Germany) 
350 Germany 4.9 
Source:  "Handling Focus", Airport Support, September 1993 (also used in S/C/W/163Add1, p 15). 
After the implementation of the Three Packages, the ground-handling sector began 
consolidating throughout Europe, and around the world.  This appears to be the 
result of the internal liberalisation in the EC and downsizing at US airlines, which 
saw infrastructure industries like ground-handling sold off from the airlines.  In 
1993 there were six large ground-handling corporations that generated a total of 
approximately 1.4 billion US dollars.  By 2000 the number of large independent 
companies had grown to eight with four located in the EU, three in the US and one 
in Switzerland.  Three were global (Switzerland, Germany, US), two regional (North 
America and Asia) and three operated throughout Europe.  At this point in time the 
companies in Europe had revenues of 1.3 billion US dollars whereas the US 
corporations were earning approximately 700 million US dollars.  Comparing Table 
1 (above) with Table 2 (below) it is clear that this sub-sector industry began to 
undergo global expansion and international consolidation.  By 2000, airlines were 
no longer the sole operators of ground-handling. 
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Table 2:  Independent Global Ground-handlers 2000160 
Ground-Handling Corporations Airports Employees Countries 
Client 
Airlines 
Head-quarters Ownership 
Turnover 1998 
(millions) 
Swissport (purchased DynAir in 
1999)* 
119 +13,000 
23 
(5 continents) 
+320 Switzerland SRairGroup 625 
Frankfurt Airport  12,573 8  Germany Frankfurt Airport 486 
Ogden Aviation** 
(Provisional purchase 
agreement by Menzies PLC, 
August 2000) 
145 
5,500 
(2000 more 
in joint ventures) 
20 
(5 continents) 
500 
USA 
(UK) 
Ogden Corp 310 
Servisair 101 10,000 11 375 UK/France Penauille 305 
GlobeGround (purchased 
Hudson General in 1999) 
85 17,000 
23 
4 continents 
 Germany Lufthansa Group 260 
AviaPartner 
27 
(1996:8) 
+4000 
(1996: 3,425) 
6 
(Europe only) 
 Belgium 
Verougstaete 
family (75%) 
243 
Worldwide Flight Services 
(WFS) (acquired by Castle 
Harlan III March 1999 and 
purchased Miami Aircraft 
Support and Aerolink 
International in 1999) 
98 10,000 14 +300 USA 
Castle Harlan 
Partners III 220 
ASIG 41 3,900 5  USA Ranger Aerospace 170 
*   Ogden is also a partner of ADR Handling.  This is a joint venture between Ogden and Aeroporti di Roma. 
** Inter alia, Swissport affiliates or partner companies as of May 2000 include:  Aerogate Munich, Air Littoral Assistance, DAHACO, Dutchport, Havas, 
Miascor, NFS, Q.A.S and Serlipsa. 
Note:  Swissport turnover includes DynAir and GlobeGround figures include Hudson General, both of which were acquired in 1999. 
Note:  Cargo Service Center Holding B.B, is not listed as a supplier since they only provide ground services for cargo.161  
                                          
160 Only Swissport and GlobeGround are airline subsidiaries. 
161 Airline Business, January 2000; http://www.asig.com; http://www.servisair.co.uk; http://www.swissport.com; http://www.frankfurt-airport.com; 
http://www.globeground.com; “A New Age of Global Ground Handling?  Going it alone in vastly different markets” Ogden Aviation, Bob Kievits, Managing Director, 30 
November 1999; Regulatory Affairs Review Volume 28 No. 3  IATA 1999; and  “The Swissport Profile”, Swissport, May 2000. 
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The pattern of growth and corporate consolidation continued and by 2003 the 
landscape had again changed quite dramatically, showing the European carriers as 
market leaders in what had become a global industry on its own right.  Based on 
the top eight global ground-handling corporations, the economic value of the whole 
sector (including fuelling, but not catering) amounted to approximately US$ 2.6 
billion, and employed more than 76,000 persons.  While these figures do not 
include all ground-handling service providers, they do indicate that this sector 
represents a significant economic element of air transport in broad terms.  Two 
trends appeared to be emerging:  1) a competitive bidding process for the various 
operational licences awarded by airport authorities; and 2) independent global 
operators are emerging at primary hub airports in all geographic regions of the 
world. 
The global market has rapidly consolidated.  What is of particular interest in this 
process is the emergence of global service providers that are non-US-based 
multinational corporations.  This is in strong contrast to the pre-1996 period when 
US-based independent handlers (DynAir, Hudson General, and Ogden) were among  
Table 3:  Top 7 Ground-handling Corporations162 
Country Company Principal Business 
Revenues 
(Euro Millions) 
Reach 
Spain 
Swissport 
(Ferrovial) 
Construction 836 Global 
France 
Servisair 
Globeground 
(Penauille 
Polyservices) 
Ground-Handling 792 Global 
Germany Fraport 
Airport Service 
Provider 
608 Europe 
UK 
BBAviation 
Services 
Aviation services 
and 
material 
technology 
600 
Europe/ 
North 
America 
France Vinci 
Construction and 
Maintenance 
500 Global 
UK Menzies 
Support services, 
distribution and 
aviation 
389 Global 
Belgium Aviapartner Ground-Handling 267 Europe 
 
                                          
162 Ferovial.  “Acquisitions of Swissport and Webber”, 21 September 2005, p 25, 
http://www.ferovial.com. 
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the largest providers due in part to the large US market and restrictive policies that 
prohibited self-handling or a competitive third-party market.  In 2004 the number 
of leading corporations in the industry was reduced from eight to seven and the 
number of non-aviation corporations owning ground-handling companies increased.   
Table 3 gives a brief overview of the sector consolidation and the increasing 
participation of non-industry owners. 
What the above three tables show is the growth and vitality of the Europeans in this 
sub-sector industry and thus their interest since the Uruguay Round to have 
ground-handling covered by the GATS despite the lack of statistical significance 
throughout the years in the linear regression exercise. 
Airport Cargo 
The airport cargo sub-sector represents a cross-section of operators that include 
ground handlers, warehouse operators, airport service providers, airlines, customs, 
and freight forwarders.  In the EU, airports operate on a market basis and thus 
there is no set division regarding the type of company (air transport or non-air 
transport) that handles any specific area for the movement and storage of goods.  
Looking at the largest international airports and the total movement of cargo 
provides a good indication of the importance it has to economic growth and 
development (national and global).  Below, Charts 4 and 5 provide an overview of 
the total amount of goods handled and the breakdown at the six largest airports.  
In each of the six (except the UK) growth has been steady over the study period, 
reflecting the degree of competition among the European airports.   
When consolidating each total, it was found that the sheer volume passing through 
the UK had the ability to alter the overall numbers of the six airports.  Although it 
would have been tempting to remove the UK as an anomaly, because of its size and 
the importance of the UK market to all aspects of international air transport, it was 
purposely included. 
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Chart 4  
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Chart 5 
EC:  Top Six Cargo Airports
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This is one of the sub-sectors the EC advocated to have covered by the GATS 
because it’s considered it to be an aspect of ground-handling and an important 
element of multi-modal transportation.  Cargo handling is also one of the sub-
sectors that EC corporations are dominant in the world market.  Thus from a 
market perspective having one set of transparent rules under the WTO rather than 
a plethora of bilaterals, each with their own conditions and restrictions, it is not 
surprising that GATS coverage would be welcomed.   
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Airport Management Services,  
In this sub-sector the European corporations have become major international 
players with steady expansion of operations both in the EU and throughout the 
world.  The corporations operating in this area have expanded through buying 
airports (or percentages thereof) and/or acquiring management and development 
contracts.  The number of corporations that have either entered this market since 
1994 or have expanded operations globally has grown in both size and number.  
There has been dramatic global expansion and an increasing trend toward large 
corporations as a result of the construction sector entering this market.  Chart 6 is 
presented to show the revenue growth of the top five airport services management 
corporations.  Notably all are EC based. 
Chart 6 
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Although governments own most international airports around the globe, an 
increasing number are now privatized and permit foreign ownership and foreign 
operators to run the airports.  In this area the EC based corporations have 
aggressively expanded their international presence.  It is notable that these are 
also the largest airport services corporations in the global marketplace. 
Incentives and BATNA 
The EU is not a state in the traditional sense and thus the incentives that drive it to 
support expansion of the GATS over air transport are more nuanced (some might 
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say complicated) than for other Members.  As noted above, while the internal 
aviation area of the EU has been liberalised, the external authority (third-country 
relations) has remained until 2002 under the sole jurisdiction of Member States.  
Thus, in keeping with the political and economic integration objectives of the 
Commission it is not surprising that absent any other factors, the EC would seek to 
obtain negotiating authority over any part of the air transport sector.  Once a sub-
sector is covered by GATS the EC would automatically gain negotiating authority.  
Although the statistical analysis indicated that the market based independent 
variables were rather insignificant, the actual market trends match the importance 
of these sub-sectors to the EC that were observed in the descriptive section of the 
analysis.  
From the economic (GDP) stand point the statistical analysis does not indicate 
much significance nor does it show either a negative or positive growth pattern.  
The statements and interventions support this finding.  Beyond noting that an 
efficient air transport system is critical to the economic well being of a state, no 
direct linkages were made to GDP growth levels.  Looking at the raw figures, there 
are no discernable comparisons that can be made between GDP and other 
independent variables.  
In contrast to the lack of indicators and statistical significance of the GDP variable, 
ASAs were consistently significant in the data analysis, showing a tendency to 
increase over the period used for the linear regression exercise.  This finding 
strongly supports comments made by the EC that creating a single market has 
benefited the air transport sector in terms of economic size and employment 
figures.  In addition, there is industry support for a common aviation type 
agreement with the US and others.   
In terms of geostrategic location, the data analysis shows that there appears to be 
an inverse link to the degree of liberalisation in the EC.  Although the results did 
not show a strong statistical significance, an apparent trend was revealed indicating 
that the EC is becoming more significant for other Members.  This suggests that in 
the future others who enter into common aviation type agreements with the EC will 
be more likely to support some degree of GATS expansion in future Reviews. 
From the market perspective, the revenue/loss variable showed little significance 
statistically, nor was it referred to by the EC during the Review.  Although the 
findings are counter-intuitive, given the history for strong government participation 
and support of their flag carriers; clearly this tendency has diminished with the 
liberalisation of the EC market and the creation of a common aviation area.   
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The negotiating theory’s proposition that markets have a strong impact on a 
negotiating position was not born out by the data analysis.  In each of the market 
sub-sectors that were analysed, none produced significant results nor were there 
obvious tendencies to one direction or the other.  However, during the Review the 
EC referred specifically to each of the sub-sector examined in this study.  This 
observation supports the theory’s position that Members will advocate multilateral 
coverage for industries that are significant operators in the world market.  This 
would be the case for ground-handling, airport services management and airport 
cargo handling.  
Thus, in the case of the EC it has an interest in expanding GATS coverage on the 
basis of domestic objectives achieved through the multilateral process rather than 
bilateral and that a number of corporations in this sector are world market leaders 
with an interest in a set of rules that are transparent and reliable with increased 
market access. 
Australia 
Position on Expanding GATS Coverage in the Air Transport Review 
Australia was one of the strongest advocates of GATS expansion in the Review.  It 
not only supported expanding coverage over sub-sectors of air transport through 
written submission and oral presentations, it gave forthright interventions when 
others hailed the attributes of the bilateral system.  It submitted numerous papers 
to this end on their own and in conjunction with other like minded Members such as 
New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore.   
Prior to the Review, Australia advocated greater commitments for the covered 
sectors, noting that the Annex on Air Transport services “…did not supersede any 
bilateral obligation relating to these elements which was in place at the time the 
GATS entered into force” (Job No. 6512, p 2).  It noted that economic regulation 
was primarily bilateral and therefore this was Australia’s principal method of 
pursuing liberalisation.  While it strongly advocated pursuing liberalisation of the 
industry, it remained focused on the covered sectors.  Two years later, its stance 
shifted from using the bilateral approach as the best vehicle for liberalisation to 
advocating the multilateral approach. 
One of the first statements Australia made at the beginning of the Review was 
about the inevitability of continuing liberalisation of the air transport industry.  It 
acknowledged that it was through bilaterally negotiated ASAs that liberalisation had 
taken place, but pointed out “…the bilateral system has practical limitations that 
have become … apparent over the [previous] five years” (Session transcripts).  It 
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also highlighted that bilateral liberalisation limitations have been recognised, 
extending “…beyond market access to limiting the quality of opportunity and the 
chances to operate in the international air services soundly and economically” 
(Session transcripts).   
The first proposal it submitted listed cargo services (dedicated freight), non-
scheduled services, and ownership and control as sub-sectors it wanted covered by 
an extension of the Annex.  It also noted that any change, whether regional or 
multilateral, must contain the same basic elements of the bilateral system, which 
are:  1) universality, 2) well understood principles, and 3) the ability of 
governments to tailor changes to meet national interests (S/C/W/167, p 2).  These 
points are of particular interest since Members that were against expanding GATS 
coverage used these same ones to argue for excluding this sector.   
Although Australia listed specific areas it would consider for expansion, the thrust of 
its argument was that liberalisation must proceed on the basis of individual national 
interests and timing.  It argued the only forum outside the bilateral system that 
could achieve this goal was the GATS.  It went on to highlight that while covered 
sectors are subject to general obligations of the GATS, Members make specific 
commitments at their own timing.  While the general obligations such as MFN 
presented complex issues that need to be worked out carefully, particularly areas 
involving allocation of scarce resources, Australia noted that a precedent already 
exists in the telecom sector (radio frequencies) that could be tailored to air 
transport.   
To Australia the GATS provides a forum that is open, transparent, and most 
importantly one that allows progressive liberalisation to occur at the timing of each 
Member.  It argued that locking in existing liberal elements would ensure Members 
could not withdraw from commitments.  It believes that for developing nations, 
Article IV163 would provide increasing participation taking into account their level of 
development and particular needs.  For everyone, Article XIX164 ensures that 
                                          
163 Article IV of the GATS pertains to “Increasing Participation of Developing Countries”.  “1. The 
increasing participation of developing country Members in world trade shall be facilitated through 
negotiated specific commitments, by different Members pursuant to Parts III and IV of this 
Agreement, relating to:  (a) the strengthening of their domestic services capacity and its efficiency 
and competitiveness, inter alia through access to technology on a commercial basis; (b) the 
improvement of their access to distribution channels and information networks; and  (c) the 
liberalization of market access in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to them.”  The 
GATS:  the General Agreement on Trade in Services and Related Instruments, April 1994. 
164 Article XIX is found in Part IV of the GATS that addresses progressive liberalisation.  Article XIX 
paragraph 2 states, “The process of liberalization shall take place with due respect for national 
policy objectives and the level of development of individual Members, both overall and in 
individual sectors.  There shall be appropriate flexibility for individual developing country Members 
for opening fewer sectors, liberalizing fewer types of transactions, progressively extending market 
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progressive liberalisation through negotiation would proceed into the future and not 
be solely dependent on unilateral policy objectives of the more powerful over the 
weaker.  Moreover, any liberalisation commitments made in the schedules of 
specific commitments would accrue to others, unlike the bilateral system that 
restricts benefits to the participants only. 
Economic Development 
Australia is an OECD high-income country.  As indicated in the Chart 7, it has 
enjoyed a steady increase in GDP throughout the period of this study.  Although 
there appears to be very little correlation between GDP and the revenue/loss 
figures of the flag carrier (Chart 8), it clearly links economic stability and growth to 
the air transport sector.  
Chart 7 
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Having a GDP below US$25,000 (constant US$ 2000), and a small population 
provides a limited base for capital investment.  Relative to other economies such as 
the US or Japan, Australia is considered to be a smaller economy with less to 
negotiate and is at a disadvantage in bilateral negotiations. 
Geostrategic Location:  Distance to Major Markets (US and EU) 
From a geostrategic perspective, Australia is located in a poor position.  It is not 
located on a great circle route between large markets, it is not one of the main 
manufacturing centres for sought-after goods, and it is very distant from the two 
                                                                                                                         
access in line with their development situation and, when making access to their markets available 
to foreign service suppliers, attaching to such access conditions aimed at achieving the objectives 
referred to in Article IV.”   The GATS:  the General Agreement on Trade in Services and Related 
Instruments, April 1994. 
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major markets of this study (the US and the EC).  Its only comparative advantage 
is its location relatively close to the Asian markets for goods and tourism.  If 
economic regulatory restrictions make trade more costly, most markets beyond 
Asia increase transport costs significantly due to vast transport distances.  In short, 
Australia would benefit from lower transport costs, which it sees as occurring 
through greater liberalisation of air transport. 
Since the US market is closer to Australia than Europe, the importance of distance 
correlates to the statistical analysis insofar as access to this market would be 
desired before access to the EU market.  Thus, a more liberal US policy would be 
beneficial for Australia.  If however the statistical trend is correct, then the 
importance of the EU to Australia will increase over time.  The change would be 
facilitated through further liberalisation of either the EU or Australia or if they were 
to conclude a common aviation area. 
ASAs and Foreign Ownership Limitations 
The position taken by Australia in the Review is consistent with the data analysis 
results that suggest a Member will likely support multilateral liberalisation over the 
bilaterals if it has concluded an agreement more liberal than an Open Skies 
agreement.  Australia is one of the countries that adopted a policy to work actively 
toward creating a liberal air transport environment beyond the traditional bilateral 
agreement.  Although most of its fifty-seven ASAs are standard Bermuda II 
agreements, it has been a strong proponent for the multilateral liberalisation of 
sub-sector industries in the WTO.  This indicates that it had difficulty advancing its 
liberalisation agenda in the bilateral forum. 
Australia has taken the first steps beyond the traditional bilateral and signed an 
agreement with New Zealand, creating a common aviation area.  One could argue 
that because this is just between two countries it remains no more than a bilateral.  
However, a key element in a traditional bilateral agreement is the reciprocal foreign 
ownership restrictions, which limit carrier designation.  In this agreement these 
limitations have been removed, therefore it is not classified as a traditional ASA.  
“An example of a restrictive ASA is that with the United States.  It is quite open in 
terms of access for Australian and US airlines but, apart from New Zealand, no 
major third country has airline rights to fly the Australia-United States route”.165  
                                          
165 Research Brief No. 14, Liberalisation of international passenger airline services, Richard Webb, 
Economics, Commerce and Industrial Relations Section, on behalf of the Parliament of Australia, 
24 March 2006.  
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New Zealand has this right based on the negotiated agreement between the US and 
Australia, which makes an allowance for the established common aviation area. 
Foreign Ownership Restrictions  
According to a government research brief, Australia has two sets of foreign 
ownership requirements, one for Qantas and one for other Australian international 
airlines.166  For the latter carriers, the foreign ownership limitation is limited to 
forty-nine per cent. The ownership of Qantas by foreign interests is limited to a 
total of thirty-five per cent and twenty-five per cent for a single foreign owner.  The 
condition of effective control by Australians must also be demonstrated.  These 
restrictions do not apply vis-à-vis New Zealand since the signing of the Single 
Aviation Market (SAM) in 1996.  Although foreign ownership and effective control 
restrictions remain, these now apply jointly to Australian and New Zealand 
nationals.  The limitation for foreign interests is capped at fifty per cent.167 
Despite these existing restrictions, Australia explicitly stated their desire to move 
away from the standard ownership and effective control article found in bilateral 
agreements.  In S/C/W/167 it states that it “…intends to focus [its] efforts on three 
main subjects…”, which included “…the removal of substantive ownership and 
effective control restrictions on international airlines” (p 3).  It also provided an 
explanation claiming these restrictions limit benefits and provide an advantage to 
the bilateral partner with greater economic resources. 
In domestic operations Australia permits what is often referred to as end-to-end 
cabotage or the so-called ninth freedom.  This is when foreign interests set-up, own 
and operate a domestic airline in a foreign state.  For example, Virgin Blue was 
wholly owned by Richard Branson who is a UK citizen.  Under the terms and 
conditions permitted by Australia, the airline was considered to be Australian since 
it was legally registered in the country and its principal place of business was 
Australia.  
Flag Carrier Revenue/Loss 
Despite the stated disadvantages of the bilateral system and the lack of access to 
large amounts of capital for the air transport sector, the Australian flag carrier 
Qantas posted net revenues prior to and during the Review.  Chart 8 below shows 
that Qantas’ net revenues increased rapidly during the period covered by the 
secretariat background papers (1994-2000), with the greatest increases realised 
                                          
166 Ibid. 
167 Australia-New Zealand Single Aviation Market Arrangements, 1 November 1996, Article 8, p 3. 
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between 1998 and 2000.  Subsequently revenues fell and like most other 
international airlines Qantas was impacted by the events of 11 September 2001 
and was unable to recover until the SARS crisis ended after 2003.  Since that time 
however, Qantas has continued to make financial gains.  During the nine year 
period of the study Qantas did not incur any losses. 
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Ground-handling 
Despite not having any corporations that are world market participants, Australia 
supported other Members who were asking to have ground-handling services 
included under any GATS expansion.   
Airport Cargo 
The cargo handling sub-sector appears to reflect a picture that does not have any 
correlation to the above sub-sectors.  The volumes handled during the period of the 
study (Chart 9) do not vary greatly other than to indicate a slight downward trend.  
It differs from the GDP figures and the flag carrier revenues, which both show an 
increasing trend (see Charts 7 and 8 above).  It is clear from the submissions and 
interventions on liberalising the cargo sector, Australia believes that the amount of 
cargo handled could be increased further through liberalisation and by separating 
cargo from passenger operations. 
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In the oral presentation during the second Review session, Australia noted that air 
cargo should be considered as a sector in its own right and “…already covered to a 
large extent by the GATS…”.  Knowing it had already been established that 
Members could not make market access or national treatment commitments in 
sectors excluded by the GATS, it was a challenging statement to Members wishing 
to ensure no expansion would occur during this Review.  The statement also 
appeared to refer to an Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) recommendation 
that showed its Members having some degree of experience with more liberal cargo 
arrangements than in the passenger area.168  In particular it was argued that 
liberalising this sector under the GATS would provide “…one more option to help 
free up the movements of goods…” across borders. 
Airport Management Services 
From 1994 to 2000 Australia had only one large international airport management 
services corporation, which was a jointly owned property development group.  
Australia noted that a non-aviation corporation having management contracts at 
four Australian airports might have strengthened the already liberal market 
perspective in the air transport sector.  Beyond supporting others who specifically 
championed this sub-sector, Australia did not present its own specific arguments.  
It wasn’t until after the Review ended when an Australian private investment equity 
fund entered the international market that an Australian company started to gain a 
foothold in the world market for these services.   
                                          
168 “Implementing the Eight Recommendations for a Competitive Air Services:  For Information”, 
Australia, Job No. 3203, 19 May 2000. 
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Incentives and BATNA  
The incentives motivating Australia to actively pursue multilateral liberalisation in 
the air transport sector in general and the Review in particular appear to be driven 
by four of the independent variables used in the study.  Three of the variables were 
argued by Australia throughout the Review and the fourth, liberal ASAs, is drawn 
from the statistical analysis.  In combination the incentives to pursue GATS 
expansion tell us that Australia finds its BATNA located in the multilateral arena 
rather than the bilateral.   
Its arguments are based on success with the liberalisation it has already achieved, 
including the common aviation area type agreement with New Zealand.  It is a 
small, high income, open market economy that is distant from its main trading 
partners (excluding Asia).  Its flag carrier has consistently produced net profits over 
the years, including the post 11 September 2001 period and throughout the SARS 
crisis, which negatively affected the revenue of many carriers.  Despite not having 
a sub-sector industry that is a global market player and thus no incentive to 
promote the interests of specific corporations, its positive experience with 
liberalisation has given it sufficient incentives to continue pursuing what it sees as 
the best avenue for its industry and economy.  The only sub-sector or independent 
variable that was not particularly positive is the cargo sector, strengthening 
Australia’s argument that the bilateral system has reached the limits of its ability to 
deliver further liberalisation, and sees the multilateral system bringing economic 
benefits to the sector in the future.   
New Zealand 
Position on Expanding GATS Coverage in the Air Transport Review 
New Zealand was also a very strong advocate for expanding the GATS to cover 
aspects of air transport.  Not only did its position not waiver throughout the 
sessions, a lot of time was invested in preparing written submissions and it actively 
participated in every meeting.  New Zealand’s stated position was based on the 
“…desire to move beyond the traditional bilateral system through the negotiation of 
regional and multilateral air services agreements” (S/C/W/165). 
New Zealand is ideologically directed toward progressive liberalisation in all 
economic affairs.  Having an open international transportation regime (air or 
maritime) is a critical element of its belief that economic efficiencies would be 
gained through progressive liberalisation under a single set of multilateral rules.  
Moreover, as a small developed economy, New Zealand would gain a stronger voice 
within a multilateral framework with the economic powers of Japan or the US.  A 
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possible example for this stance could be found in the negotiations leading up to 
the creation of a liberal plurilateral agreement (2000).  It is arguable that New 
Zealand was able to extract concessions from the US because it was not alone in 
the original negotiations but had the support of the other negotiating partners 
(Chile, Brunei, and Singapore).  It is therefore questionable whether the final 
outcome of a pure bilateral with the US would have achieved the same level of 
liberalisation. 
The written submission S/C/S/165 and oral presentation during the first Review 
Session echoed the early submission given in conjunction with Chile and Singapore 
(S/C/W/113) that emphasised the desire to increase the scope of the GATS over 
some air transport services (not including traffic rights).  New Zealand has 
consistently argued that a single set of multilateral rules would benefit the whole of 
international air transport, particularly the affiliated sub-sector industries.  It 
argued that the WTO is a good forum for building on liberalisation that has already 
occurred in the sector and to use cargo as a forerunner for expanding coverage of 
the GATS.  New Zealand’s position regarding cabotage is that it is seen as a “matter 
of commercial presence”, rather than one of traffic rights.  One of their strongest 
positions relates to foreign ownership restrictions.  They advocate replacing the 
traditional definition of “ownership and effective control” with “place of 
incorporation and principal place of business whilst retaining effective control” 
(S/C/M/49, p 2). 
Economic Development 
Despite being physically located very distant from most of their trading partners, 
New Zealand is a high income OECD country that has enjoyed steady economic 
growth over the years.  They have a small, open, free market economy and are 
known for advocating liberal trade policies in all economic areas.  Its GDP figures 
appear to support its liberal ideology and economic openness through a steady 
increase over the period of the study. 
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Geostrategic Location: Distance to Major Markets (US and EU) 
New Zealand is at a serious disadvantage in terms of distance to markets and thus 
lacks a competitive advantage in exporting goods (see Appendix 9).  It is neither 
close to major markets nor located strategically to benefit from being a transit point 
for goods and people.  Additionally, it have a relatively small domestic market, 
which under the bilateral system of foreign ownership restrictions also limits access 
to foreign capital.  These points were raised numerous times by its delegates and 
included in some of their written submissions.  Like Australia it perceives that the 
bilateral system has reached its limits, arguing that New Zealand and the global 
industry would be better served by allowing some of the air transport sub-sectors 
to be covered by the GATS. 
ASAs and Foreign Ownership Limitations 
In keeping with its efforts to be as competitive as possible, New Zealand has 
supported liberalisation of air transport through all available options.  It was keen 
to sign Open Skies agreements and participated actively in liberalisation efforts 
within APEC and through the five-member plurilateral agreement.  During the 
negotiations of the plurilateral agreement it advocated radical liberalisation of the 
ownership and control restrictions.  Although unsuccessful in achieving this goal, it 
was able to ensure that restrictive “ownership and effective” control was not part of 
the final agreement.  New Zealand continues to negotiate agreements that include 
more liberal terms for the designation of carriers whereby “principal place of 
business” and “place of incorporation” are the criteria required for the partners to 
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designate a carrier that wishes to operate between the two countries of the 
agreement.169 
Together with Australia it has created a common aviation area and negotiated 
liberal cargo agreements with other countries.  It has also worked toward 
increasing the number of designated carriers with their bilateral partners; of the 
forty-seven bilaterals there are only five that do not permit more than one 
designated airline (S/C/W/165, p 4).   
Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
Twenty-five per cent of a New Zealand international airline may be owned by a 
single foreign carrier and thirty-five per cent may be owned by foreign carriers in 
aggregate, with a maximum overall foreign ownership level of forty-nine per cent.  
Its overall level of foreign ownership matches the levels of the EC.  New Zealand 
also supports moving away from strict adherence to designation being linked to 
ownership and control levels.  It would like to establish that designation could apply 
to a group of states that are substantially owned and effectively controlled, to assist 
developing states in particular.  The underlying criterion for this position is the 
recognition that many airlines that are based in smaller states have difficulties 
accessing sufficient capital.  It argues this is one of the reasons many airlines fail 
and in other cases the reason for injection of public money into a failing airline 
(S/C/W/165).  Moreover, New Zealand also argued that “…national ownership 
criteria, restricts broader integration” (S/C/W/165). 
Flag Carrier Revenue/Loss 
The chart below shows that New Zealand’s flag carrier sustained heavy losses 
during the period leading up to the Review in 2000.  Despite a national policy to 
promote private sector independence, losing the flag carrier was clearly not an 
acceptable option for New Zealand’s Government.  In 2001 public funds were 
injected into the airline and the Government took an eighty-two per cent share in 
ownership to ensure the survival of its flag carrier.170  Based on comments made 
throughout the Review New Zealand believes that by relaxing foreign ownership 
restrictions it might have been possible to avoid a public bailout of Air New Zealand. 
                                          
169 “Air Services Agreement Signed with Vietnam”, Hon. Paul Swain, Government Spokesperson, 
New Zealand, 17 October 2003, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=18145. 
170 Asian Economic News, “Wellington Announces Bailout terms for Air New Zealand” 3 December 
2001.  
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Ground-handling 
New Zealand supports the expansion of coverage by the GATS over ground-
handling despite not having any corporations with stakes in the global handling 
market.  They do however support open and competitive third-party handling at 
their airports and maintain no foreign ownership restrictions.  Foreign based third-
party operators can and have established a commercial presence in New Zealand 
offering services on a competitive basis.  The main international airport has three 
foreign third-party handlers (2 US and 1 Fijian), which operate in all areas of the 
airport except surface transport and security (S/C/W/163Add.1).  Beginning with 
the pre-Review sessions, New Zealand advocated expansion of the GATS to include 
ground-handling.   
In their joint communication with Chile and Singapore, New Zealand stated its 
position that auxiliary services like ground-handling are of significant economic 
importance and therefore should be taken out of the bilaterals and covered by the 
GATS.  The delegate noted that New Zealand believes catering (a sub-sector of 
ground-handling) is already covered by the GATS in other service categories such 
as restaurants and hotels, based on the UN CPC.   
In S/C/W/165, which New Zealand submitted for the first Review session, it again 
raised the proposal to consider GATS coverage of ground-handling.  It noted that 
this sub-sector has become separate from airlines and when subjected to greater 
competitive forces would adapt better to the expected growth in air transport under 
the GATS.  It also noted that once separated from the airlines, ground-handlers 
could be likened to support services that supply hotels and restaurants, such as 
catering. 
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Airport Cargo 
The national cargo figures for New Zealand highlight the difficulties facing a small 
economy.  During the period of the study when the cargo volumes for the US and 
Japan were increasing, its volume of goods handled began to steadily decline. This 
trend was not reversed until five years later (2002).  Although the same period saw 
a rapid increase in GDP per capita, this is not reflected by the import/export of 
goods.  Given that New Zealand believes liberalisation will improve economic 
efficiencies it is not surprising that, rather than try and protect a struggling sector, 
it takes the position that improvements will be realised through greater reliance on 
market forces.   
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Airport Management Services  
There are no internationally significant airport management corporations.  
Nevertheless, New Zealand fully supports private operators at airports and/or full 
privatization, based on the principles consistent with an open market oriented 
economy (S/C/W/165).  It believes that through an open market for these services 
operators, especially those in small economies, there will be greater access to 
capital markets, which will promote vibrant and competitive service providers. 
Incentives and BATNA 
A small, developed and open nation, New Zealand is located geographically distant 
from the world markets (financial, manufacturing and tourism) and therefore lacks 
a geo-strategic position or a large domestic market.  Despite being remote from its 
major trading partners it is a developed economy and a member of the OECD.  It 
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believes that a single multilateral set of rules could strengthen its negotiating power 
with more strategically located markets such as the US, or Japan, particularly if air 
transport as a whole, but sub-sector services in particular, is removed from the 
bilateral negotiating process.  From all the oral and written submissions plus its 
interventions throughout the Review sessions it is clear that New Zealand believes 
its interests regarding aspects of air transport liberalisation can be better served 
through progressive liberalisation under the GATS.   
In each of the independent variables that were used in the study, New Zealand took 
the position to advocate GATS expansion regardless of whether it had a market 
position, a failing flag carrier, or no serious corporate presence in a sub-sector 
world market.  It noted numerous times its geographic distances and small 
economy, arguing that only by removing barriers to trade could it hope to compete 
successfully.  In the bilateral arena it has worked toward its stated liberalisation 
goals with all its negotiating partners.   
New Zealand’s position reflects strongly the results produced in the statistical 
analysis that shows a strong and increasing correlation between the degree of 
liberalisation in a Member’s ASAs and their position regarding expansion of the 
Annex.  Not only would it have negotiating support from other like-minded 
Members, but could make commitments in its schedules that would allow it to 
liberalise covered sub-sectors unilaterally and through negotiation encourage others 
to make further sector specific commitments. 
Chile 
Position on Expanding GATS Coverage in the Air Transport Review 
Chile was a strong advocate throughout the Review for expanding coverage of the 
GATS.  For the first Review Session it produced an extensive paper documenting 
the incredibly rapid growth of its air transport sector, which occurred immediately 
following Chile’s economic reform in the mid 1970s.  The thrust of Chile’s written 
submissions and interventions was to argue from its deregulation and liberalisation 
experiences, highlighting national economic benefits that accrue to the sector and 
noting the differences between what is or isn’t directly related to the exercise of 
traffic rights. 
In their first submission (S/C/W/166) and an internal document sent to the 
Secretariat, Chile outlined the numerous economic benefits that could be directly 
linked to its policy of privatisation, market solutions instead of government control, 
and liberalisation.  It also highlighted its geographic weakness vis-à-vis some of its 
major trading partners and noted that its own drive to liberalise is hampered by the 
 157 
bilateral system.  Although it recognised that achieving full multilateral liberalisation 
either within or outside the GATS framework was its objective, Chile made 
persuasive arguments that every opportunity should be taken to move beyond a 
purely bilateral system. 
Economic Development 
In 2000 Chile was ranked as a middle income developing country.  This was a vast 
improvement from the early-mid 1970s when Chile “switched to a free-market 
economy open to the world, from which no sector, particularly air transport, was 
excluded” (S/C/W/166, p 1).  The economic reforms radically improved the 
country’s GDP and economic growth.  The benefits are particularly in the strong 
growth of the air transport sector (domestic and international), including both 
passenger and freight.  Since there is normally a correlation between economic 
growth and the air transport sector it is relevant  
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to use the two Charts (13 and 14) submitted by Chile in the first Review Session; 
clearly the Chilean economy benefited directly from economic reform that was 
undertaken.  The third chart (15) shows the GDP levels that, while slower than the 
initial years after reform, continued nonetheless to improve. 
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Geostrategic Location: Distance to Major Markets (US and EU) 
Although Chile is closer to the US market than the EC, it is considered to be 
proximate to both (in terms of this study).  In Chile’s written and oral submissions, 
it noted a number of times the competitive disadvantage it faces because of long 
transportation distances (see Appendix 9 for great circle mileage).  Chile’s 
perception is that because of its geostrategic position, and the physical shape and 
size of the country, limitations on fifth freedom rights171 restricts the ability to 
                                          
171 See Chapter 3 for an explanation of Freedoms of the Air. 
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compete on a level playing field with others located closer to the major markets.  In 
its first written submission Chile noted the following disadvantages. 
Limitations on "fifth freedom" rights continue to be the main impediment to 
airlines expanding their operations along market lines.  Because of Chile's 
geographical position, these rights are needed in many cases to support 
certain routes economically, especially within the continent.  However, not 
only are Chilean companies prevented from offering daily services, but the 
airlines of certain countries are able to justify daily flights to Chile on the 
basis of "sixth freedom" traffic which is very often not covered in the 
bilateral agreements.  What Chilean companies are asking for is to be given 
the same conditions as domestic companies in those countries 
(S/C/W/166). 
Although the statistical significance did not indicate that Members would be influenced 
strongly by geostrategic position, Chile is clearly convinced this is an important factor 
and that liberalisation of the sector would assist its development objectives. 
ASAs and Foreign Ownership Limitations 
Chile is one of a growing number of countries that have embraced liberalisation 
within the bilateral system through Open Skies agreements and is an original 
signatory to the five state plurilateral.  It is very much in favour of concluding 
agreements that build upon existing liberalisation; however it notes in S/C/W/166 
that it has been unable to make as much progress as desired.  Although it seeks 
further liberalisation in air transport, it has not yet entered into a common aviation 
type agreement.   
Foreign Ownership Restrictions: 
There are no particular limitations on foreign ownership of airlines in Chile.  It is the 
legal framework for general rules on foreign investment that govern this aspect of 
the industry.  Similar to other progressive states, Chile favours the newer 
ownership clauses of “principal place of business” and effective control rather than 
the older “ownership and effective control clause”. 
Flag Carrier Revenue/Loss 
For the period of the study, Lan Chile (re-named LAN) was able to maintain 
profitable operations, although in some years the profit was marginal.  Unlike cargo 
volumes, revenues at LAN do not reflect the steady rise in GDP, but rather, 
highlight the cyclical nature of the passenger airline operations.  Nevertheless, LAN 
did not have a single year of losses, including for the post 11 September 2001 
period and during or after the SARS epidemic, which affected many airlines around 
the world. 
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Chart 16 
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According to S/C/W/166 Chile implied that benefits have accrued to the national 
economy from liberal open market policies, including that of its flag carrier.  It is 
therefore natural that Chilean politicians and policy makers pursued, wherever 
possible, liberal bilateral and regional arrangements in air transport.  It would also 
support any liberalisation options in the multilateral arena.  Due to the consistent 
profitability of the flag carrier there is evidence that it is economically beneficial to 
pursue the liberalisation trend. 
Ground-handling 
There are no Chilean corporations with a presence in the growing global market for 
ground-handling services.  At Chile’s main international airport in Santiago (SCL) 
third-party handling is relatively competitive with a total of five foreign operators (3 
US, and 2 German).  The only operational area without a foreign services provider 
is airport surface transportation (S/C/W/163Add1, p 20).  In its written submission 
Chile considers ground-handling to be related to air transport services, but not 
directly related to the exercise of traffic rights.  The reason given is that “… they 
may be provided by countries that do not operate air services or can be provided to 
third countries, or even by foreign companies to airlines that operate in a domestic 
market” (internal document).  In short, Chile believes that ground-handling has 
nothing to do with traffic rights and disagrees with the argument made by others 
that all elements of a bilateral agreement are directly related to the exercise of 
traffic rights. 
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Airport Cargo 
The tonnage of cargo handled at Chile’s airport reflects the steady economic growth 
of the country.  Chile experienced a slight dip in its GDP/capita in 1999, which is 
mirrored by the decrease in cargo volume at the Chilean airports.  In 2001, after 11 
September 2001, the volume of cargo handled decreased.  Due to the relationship 
between the amount of goods moving in and out of a country and the GDP/capita, 
developing countries like Chile benefit from pursuing open and liberal trade policies.  
This type of policy position is even more important when the country is located at 
great distances from the major trading centres of the world.  This is both in terms 
of access manufacturing centres like in Asia or the Indian sub-continent and 
consumer markets like the US or the EC. 
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Airport Management Services  
Chile does not have any airport management service providers that operate 
internationally.  However, its seven airports permit foreign owners and operators to 
bid for contracts or buy into the airport system.  Additionally, all new runways and 
terminals will be constructed with private funding from both international and 
domestic investment capital. 
Incentives and BATNA 
Although Chile only produced one written submission, it was comprehensive, 
covering all the areas to be addressed and discussed in the Review.  Its position is 
perfectly clear; its economy has benefited from adopting an open free market 
policy.  As a small and still developing nation that is located at a great distance 
from many trading partners outside of South America, it views multilateral 
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liberalisation of air transport as a vehicle that will facilitate its economic growth.  
Due to its perceived disadvantage in bilateral negotiations, Chile’s BATNA can be 
located in the multilateral arena giving it a strong incentive to pursue the expansion 
of the Annex over sub-sectors of the industry.  In the multilateral forum it believes 
it has a stronger voice in the negotiations than in bilateral arrangements.  
Additionally, it views having one set of rules set out in a negotiation as preferable 
to numerous bilateral negotiations.  It also views the dispute settlement of the WTO 
as a preferred forum to the bilateral system (S/C/W/166).  It noted that no air 
transport dispute has been settled through the articles of the bilaterals, citing 
“…lack of adequate dispute settlement mechanisms stands in the way of the legal 
certainty required by an air services regime.  Indeed, history shows that no 
bilateral dispute has ever been submitted to the dispute settlement mechanism 
contained in an agreement, the preference being to exert political or economic 
pressure, or in many cases, simply to cancel the agreement.  It would be useful to 
examine how to improve legal safeguards, including resorting to dispute settlement 
systems such as that of the WTO” (S/C/W/166, p 6).  Thus, for a country like Chile 
it is important to have access to an independent and legally binding process for 
resolution of its grievances.  In the bilateral system it’s at a disadvantage since 
access to the major markets is more important than access to Chile by its large 
trading partners. 
In lieu of being able to make commitments in the air transport sector it adopted a 
pro-liberal position within the bilateral system, by participating in regional 
agreements and through its commitment to work toward expansion of the GATS 
over this economically important sector.  It is also (as shown in the above sub-
sectors) working to liberalise its air transport sector as much as possible within the 
existing regulatory framework and would welcome any gains made expanding the 
GATS coverage in the future. 
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Chapter 7 
States in Favour of Liberalising Air Transport within the 
Bilateral System 
The method of selecting Members in favour of retaining the bilateral regulatory 
regime and not expanding GATS coverage was the same as used in the previous 
chapter.  Each of these Members actively participated through oral and written 
submissions in the first Air Transport Review (the Review) and include the US, 
Japan, Canada, and Brazil.  Again, to the extent possible, geographic 
representation and economic development were taken into account when selecting 
the cases.  The analysis of the cases follows the same criteria presented in the 
previous chapter in order to ensure standardisation and a common platform for 
comparison.  However, aside from the US each of the sub-sectors will be shorter 
due to the commonality of arguments used by each Member and the lack of written 
submissions.   
To reiterate the pattern, each case has a brief introduction of the Review 
interventions (written and oral) followed by the independent variables used in the 
linear regression exercise and include:  the economic development level, 
geostrategic location vis-à-vis the US and the EC, affinity to liberalising behaviour 
within the bilateral framework, and foreign ownership regulations for national 
airlines.  Finally, the sub-sector industries will be used to show market positions as 
possible influencing factors.  These industries include: the revenue/loss of the flag 
carriers, ground-handling (including catering), airport management services, and 
airport cargo handling.  Each of these variables is considered to have some level of 
influence on a Member’s incentives and possible BATNA.  Unlike the linear 
regression exercise, the full data set is presented in line charts in order to examine 
the actual changes over time in a realistic context. 
The chosen cases representing WTO Members that would like to retain the status 
quo of the bilateral regime are a mix of countries that either led the current 
bilateral liberalisation process or have maintained relatively restrictive bilateral 
agreements.  At one end of the spectrum the US is credited with being the catalyst 
of bilateral liberalisation.172  At the other end Japan has not pursued liberalisation 
                                          
172 In 1977 the US and the UK signed what is commonly referred to as Bermuda II.  In comparison 
with today’s world of common aviation areas like in the EU, the 2000 MALIAT agreement (US, New 
Zealand, Chile, Brunei and Singapore), and the bilateral Open Skies agreements (the US and the 
Netherlands, 1992), Bermuda II is very restrictive.  However, in comparison to Bermuda I it is 
relatively liberal.   
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and does not have any Open Skies agreements although it is a member of the 
Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group of states.  Canada only recently 
(1 November 2005173) signed a full Open Skies agreement with the US and while it 
is also an APEC Member, has not signed many liberal agreements.  Brazil does not 
have any Open Skies agreements.  While two of the four cases have liberalised 
within the bilateral framework, none have signed any agreements that are 
significantly outside the bilateral boundaries.   
The United States 
Position on Expanding GATS Coverage in the Air Transport Review 
The US position, based on written and oral submissions plus interventions at the 
meetings was to retain the status quo of the bilaterally negotiated Air Services 
Agreements (ASAs).  Although never once stating it would not accept or block any 
expansion of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) it was 
unequivocal about retaining the bilateral system for the sector.  Its primary 
argument was based on its belief that anything written into a bilateral ASA should 
be considered as “directly related to traffic rights”.  Given that bilateral agreements 
were the only forum for exchanging traffic rights and determining economic 
regulations since the first one was signed in 1945, it is not surprising that all 
commercial aspects would be covered.  Its secondary argument was about the 
speed with which liberalisation has occurred under the bilaterals compared it to the 
lack thereof in the GATS.  Moreover, it believes that bilateral agreements have 
shown their flexibility to changing market realities over time and are the most 
appropriate forum to further liberalise the sector.  It also emphasised that it fully 
supported further liberalisation of international air transport, just not multilaterally 
in the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The US position regarding air transport 
has been consistent since the GATS was negotiated during the Uruguay Round.  It 
considers anything in a bilateral to be directly related to traffic rights and therefore 
must be excluded from coverage.  It also noted that the three exceptions to the 
exclusion were considered to be directly related to traffic rights.   
At the outset of the Review, the US stated it would not have a position until after 
completion.  It went on to say that the Council for Trade in Services (the Council, or 
CTS) should review developments in the sector and operation of the Annex before 
considering expanding GATS coverage to the sector, and that Open Skies 
                                          
173 Although the US and Canada have had fairly liberal relations for some years, an Open Skies 
agreement was only concluded 1 November 2005, 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2005/22281.htm. 
 165 
agreements had become the model for air transport (S/C/M/49).  It noted there 
were other agreements that, while not ‘Open Skies’ per se, have some features in 
common, citing the ones with Canada, Japan, and France.174  It also highlighted 
that Open Skies agreements are an example, showing how flexible the bilateral 
system is and that these types of agreements could be ‘extended’ to become 
plurilateral or multilateral.  The word extended was emphasised, noting that it 
“…deserved emphasis because each participant should retain progress already 
made in bilateral and regional agreements” (S/C/M/31, p 7).  In particular, it felt 
the importance of this type of liberalisation was based on the assurance that those 
who joined in the future would embrace the high standards of liberalisation set in 
these agreements.  It noted that the US would seriously consider “…any other 
proposals that might provide equal or superior prospects for liberalization and 
growth in air transport.”  The last statement is important because it implies that the 
GATS is not an option under consideration, nor would it meet the US test of equal 
or superior prospects.  The intervention was concluded by citing the gains that have 
accrued to the industry through the existing liberalisation under Open Skies 
agreements and on the growth of alliances among airlines. 
The US written submission, S/C/W/198, was similar to the pre-Review statements 
and the above intervention, but contained more detail.  The paper highlighted all 
the changes made since the first liberalisation began, although it used only the post 
Open Skies era (1992) rather than the earlier post BII era (1977).  This included an 
overview of the direct economic benefits that have resulted from liberalising the 
industry since 1992.  It then went on to draw a comparison with the three covered 
sub-sectors that were exposed to liberalisation under the GATS since 1995, noting 
“there is no appreciable liberalization that can be attributed to the GATS” 
(S/C/W/198, p 5).  
The one unique point the US made was to draw attention to the intent of the Air 
Transport Annex (the Annex) drafters since the person presenting also participated 
in the negotiations.  Some of the statements are therefore questionable as to their 
accuracy since there was no one present to refute the claims.  The particular sub-
sector that it referred to was ground-handling, stating that there was a “…common 
understanding that ground-handling services are directly related to the exercise of 
traffic rights” (S/C/W/198, p 7).  In the numerous Uruguay Round documents and 
notes that were reviewed for this study, no corroboration can be found to validate 
or challenge the statement. 
                                          
174 Noting France is of interest since it highlights the EC’s authority to negotiate in the WTO and its 
lack of the same authority in bilateral air transport negotiations. 
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Economic Development 
The US has long enjoyed having the largest domestic market in the world and one 
of the highest gross domestic product (GDP) levels.  The most lucrative and 
competitive air transport markets are to and from the US on the North Atlantic and 
it is a highly sought after destination for foreign carriers.  Chart 1 below highlights 
the steady economic growth throughout the entire period of the study.  What is 
noteworthy is the similarity between GDP growth and cargo volumes for the US 
(Chart 7 below), showing a direct correlation between the two.  This stands in 
contrast to a number of the cases where there was little or no correlation.  
However, other than to cite the economic benefits from the Open Skies 
liberalisation trend, the US did not make any specific reference to GDP levels.  The 
insignificance of this variable in the statistical analysis adds to the expectation that 
a Member’s position regarding GATS expansion will likely not change over time 
based on this variable.  This holds true for the US. 
Chart 1 
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Geostrategic Location 
The US has been the leader in the air transport industry throughout the post-war 
period.  Its market was and is one of the more sought after destination for goods 
and people, making it a desired location to operate into and out of for most 
international airlines.  It is natural the US was considered (for the purposes of this 
study) as one of the two major markets for which entry is sought and therefore its 
position in the Review could influence other Members.  Although in absolute 
distance, the US is further from many of the manufacturing centres around the 
world in comparison to the EC, it remains one of the most important markets for 
much of the world and as such its geostrategic location is an important factor to be 
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considered when trying to evaluate why they have a preference for bilateral 
agreements.   
Set in the context of destination and transit, today the US remains an important 
destination and trading partner with many countries.  In terms of origin and 
destination, US cargo volumes are the highest in the world for one country, which 
indicates the degree to which airlines seek market access for goods and passengers 
alike and indicates that the US understands its negotiating strength vis-à-vis other 
states in a bilateral setting.  This would be particularly true for states having small 
or virtually no domestic markets and who are striving to maintain a competitive 
position against the US flag carriers on routes that do not carry large volumes of 
traffic.   
The linear regression exercise showed the distance to the US market is statistically 
more significant than the EC in each of the years that were analysed.  The 
expectation of the exercise was that the US and the EC would have similar results 
or the US slightly would be slightly less significant due to the greater distances.  
What the analysis showed was market access to the US was more important than 
for the EC.  However, the results also revealed that over the period analysed, the 
significance of distance to the US showed a definitive downward trend.  This 
indicates the geostrategic location of the US is slowly losing importance, from a 
statistical perspective, relative to impacting a Member’s position over GATS 
expansion.  Examining the other independent variables that were used for trying to 
understand how or why Members took certain positions, the one that stands out as 
the most significant is the degree of liberalisation that has already occurred 
bilaterally. 
ASAs and Foreign Ownership Limitations 
Together with the UK, the US signed a liberal version of the restrictive Bermuda I 
agreements in 1977175 (Bermuda II), thereby initiating the first steps to liberalise a 
very restrictive economic regulatory regime.  It was the first country to initiate 
domestic deregulation (1977-1978)176, the first to begin advocating international 
liberalisation, and the first to initiate Open Skies agreements.177  Since the first 
Open Skies agreement was signed, the US has actively sought out bilateral partners 
                                          
175 “U.S. Standard “Post 1977” Agreement, Office of International Aviation, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Office of the Secretary of Transportation.  This is the agreement known as 
Bermuda II. 
176 The cargo sector of the US industry was deregulated in 1977 and the passenger sector in 1978. 
177 The first Open Skies agreement was signing between the US and the Netherlands in 1992. 
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to enter into this type of agreement.  To date, the US has successfully negotiated 
seventy-six Open Skies ASAs178 when provisional agreements are also included.   
Continuing on the success of these types of agreements and its drive to create new 
forms of liberal bilateral agreements in 2001, it was the catalyst for the first 
plurilateral agreement (MALIAT).  However, the substance remained firmly bilateral 
and retained the restrictive foreign ownership articles.  In the MALIAT the US made 
some concessions for more liberal foreign ownership rules desired by the other 
participants but ensured some restrictions remained for US citizens.  Thus, while 
supporting and promoting liberalisation of the industry, the essence of the 
restrictive nature of bilaterals regarding foreign ownership levels have not been 
changed much at all. 
As noted already, the data analysis showed the degree of liberalisation found for a 
Member was the most statistically significant independent variable.  This trend 
appeared regardless of how the input data for the analysis was constructed.  
Indeed, the high level of significance increased over the three year period.  
Although the five-state plurilateral was coded as higher (more liberal) than the 
Open Skies agreements, the US has not entered into any type of common aviation 
area and overall is considered to be less liberal than Members which have moved 
beyond the traditional boundaries of the bilateral agreements.  This expectation 
also agrees with the arguments presented by the US insofar as it strongly 
advocated liberalisation, but only under the types of agreements it has designed 
and successfully negotiated. 
Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
The US maintains a twenty-five per cent foreign ownership limitation and includes 
the traditional criteria of “effective ownership and control” in all of its bilateral 
agreements.  The only divergence from this strict limitation appeared in the MALIAT 
signed in 2001.  In this agreement the US accepted the newer form of ‘principal 
place of business’ as a criteria to permit airline designation, however there remains 
a clause pertaining to ‘substantial ownership’ and ‘effective control’ (albeit in 
separate paragraphs).  In particular, Article 3:3 states:  “ …a Party need not grant 
authorizations and permissions to an airline designated by another Party if the 
Party receiving the designation determines that substantial ownership is vested 
with its nationals.”  In short, important elements of a bilateral ASA that restrict 
market access and national treatment are maintained in this agreement. 
                                          
178 http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2006/22281.htm. 
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Flag Carriers’ Revenue/Loss 
Although US carriers have historically been some of the most financially sound 
airlines, the post regulatory period (1978) saw a radical change; those unable to 
adapt to the new competitive environment all but disappeared (e.g. TWA, and 
PanAm).  While the US highlighted the economic benefits brought on by Open Skies 
agreements, by 1994 only three out of the top six largest US flag carriers were 
making a net profit.  Subsequently these carriers enjoyed a period of financial 
success until 2000; when there was a sharp downturn that was accelerated with the 
events of 11 September 2001 from which few successfully recovered during the 
period of the study.   
Chart 2 
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According to negotiating theory, a country’s position will be affected by the market 
and market players (corporations).  Where the market is growing and financially 
sound, the negotiators will likely support a multilateral option, and where the 
opposite is true economic nationalism will emerge and the negotiators will seek to 
retain the status quo.  Although never directly citing the financial difficulties of its 
flag carriers, this theory would fit in the case of the US airlines.  Additionally, the 
government not only informed the major carriers during any negotiations, it 
actively and directly sought input from the carriers (see Chapter 3 for details).  
Given the financial difficulties most were having in the post 2001 period, it is not 
surprising that little if any support existed for multilateral liberalisation, regardless 
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that such a movement would not touch upon airline operations.  Thus, the 
expectation was that the statistical analysis would return significant results for the 
revenue/loss variable.  Instead the results strongly indicated that there was no 
significance regarding the financial health of the flag carriers. 
Chart 3 
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Ground-handling 
The US argued in its formal submission (S/C/W/198) that it considered ground-
handling to be directly related to the exercise of traffic rights and therefore beyond 
the scope of the GATS.  It reiterated this stance through interventions when other 
Members proposed including this sub-sector.  Its position is based on the belief that 
the issue is about “scope” and “definition”, whereby confusion is created by mixing 
a given service with identification of the service provider.  In a draft version of 
S/C/W/198 that was sent out to nine major US carriers for comments, it noted that 
during the Uruguay Round “…the addition of ground handling services … was avidly 
debated…” suggesting that other Members, like in the Review, strongly advocated 
the inclusion of this sub-sector.179  Why would this sub-sector be so controversial 
especially given that ground-handling became an industry in its own right as 
airlines (particularly in the US) began to outsource this work to non-airline 
operators? 
According to the results of the statistical analysis the condition of a Member’s 
ground-handling corporations should have virtually no bearing on its position in the 
                                          
179 “Draft Communication from the United States:  The Review of the GATS Annex on Air 
Transport Services, Industry Review”, 8 February 2001, p 9. 
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Review since they were insignificant across the sample years.  However, the results 
do not begin to answer why some would be adamantly against coverage and others 
equally adamant about the need for coverage.  Under negotiations theory the 
answer would be found in the marketplace.  Members with corporations attaining 
global status and expanding are likely to support multilateral rules whereas those 
without a presence or one that is declining will support the status quo.  This 
matches with the market changes prior to and during the Review.  During the early 
1990s the independent operators were beginning to expand into the international 
arena.  As noted in Chapter 6 the largest six in the field included one Swiss, two 
US, three EC based corporations and within this group only two were considered 
worldwide operators with neither being from the US.180  By the end of the 1990s the 
industry had consolidated leaving only one US operator participating in the world 
market for these services while the EC had three and the Swiss, one.  Thus, at the 
start of the Review it was already becoming clear that the Europeans were 
beginning to dominate the global industry.  During the Review period consolidation 
rapidly accelerated and by the end, all the top global players (four in total) were 
from the EC and none from the US.  
Airport Cargo 
The cargo at airports is oftentimes (but not always) a direct reflection of the 
economic well-being of a nation.  As noted above the amount of cargo being 
handled at US airports is very similar the increasing GDP levels.  Noticeable is the 
downturn in 2001, which came as a direct result of the 11 September attacks.  
However, this slump was short-lived and recovery was realised the following year.  
These results differ radically from the revenue/loss of the US flag carriers that are 
highlighted above in Charts 2 and 3, which are interesting insofar as it is the major 
passenger airlines that carry over fifty per cent of international cargo in the belly of 
the passenger aircraft.181 
Based on this theory it would be expected that with a steadily growing cargo sector 
the US might tacitly support airport cargo even if this support manifested in the 
ground-handling sub-sector rather than directly for the cargo sub-sector.  However, 
as noted above, this was not the case at all.  In terms of the statistical analysis 
similar outcomes would be expected if the data output showed some degree of 
significance.  In this case the results were significant in each of the three years, 
                                          
180 See Tables 1 to 3 in Chapter 6 for the market data. 
181 This excludes overnight express airlines but not full cargo carriers. 
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although there was an emerging pattern indicating a negative trend.  Again, the US 
response did not correlate to the data results. 
Chart 4 
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Airport Management Services 
The US was not an international participant in this sub-sector prior to, during, or 
after the Review.  Houston Airport Systems, the only US corporation included in any 
international ranking, is based on revenue rather than scope since it operates only 
within the US domestic market.  The lack of US participants may be the reason why 
the US did not include this sub-sector in its written submission or respond with any 
strong interventions when other proposed GATS coverage.  In contrast, the EC 
advocated inclusion of this sector and unlike the US its corporations dominate the 
international arena.  Like ground-handling the statistical analysis showed little if 
any significance for this variable.   
Incentives and BATNA  
It is quite clear that the US conforms to both the data analysis and the negotiations 
theory and knows its strongest forum for gaining what it wants out of an air 
transport negotiation is firmly located in the bilateral arena.  In this sector it does 
not have globally competitive sub-sector corporations looking to expand, nor does it 
have financially sound flag carriers.  According to the linear regression we would 
also expect the US to support the status quo of the Annex since it has not yet 
signed any ASAs that are beyond the bilateral framework.  Additionally, it knows 
that it still remains one of the most sought after market and access rights, which 
remains a strong negotiating tool.   
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The answer to the question about why the US supported any sub-sector inclusion of 
the Annex (Chapter 4) can also be found in its domestic arena.  The US supported 
including MRO under GATS coverage based on previous legislative change.  In this 
instance domestic legislation and the active participation of industry lobbyists 
permitted the US trade representatives and their aviation experts to support 
coverage and to make national commitments rather than taking an MFN exemption 
on this sub-sector.  The US representative put it in plain words.  The US had to be 
seen to be giving something during the Uruguay Round and domestic legislation for 
MRO had already occurred so it was simple and easy to allow that sub-sector to be 
covered.182 
Japan 
Position on Expanding GATS Coverage in the Air Transport Review 
Japan took the same position as the US and fully supported retaining the bilateral 
system of agreements.  It noted in its written submission prior to the 
commencement of the Review (S/C/W/134) that there are classification problems 
and that it is important to seek a clearer understanding about the scope of the 
GATS, and which services are possibly already covered.  However, it did not submit 
any further papers (formal or informal).  Instead it responded to other 
presentations and interventions.  Japan made it clear that it supported discussions 
about expansion only at the end of the Review.  It did note however, that the 
bilaterals had proven their adaptability to changing economic environments and 
thus could accommodate further liberalisation, and that the Review must be kept 
separate from the Services negotiations that were also underway.  The last 
comment was in response to other Members raising aspects of air transport in the 
Services negotiations, which was not welcomed by any of the pro-bilateral 
Members. 
Japan entered a relatively specific written submission that outlined their Review 
objectives.  This included:  the information it believed was required for the Review; 
the secretariat work that should be undertaken; the time-frame of the Review: the 
request for expert contributions regarding ICAO and other Members; and the 
difficulties they saw regarding incompatible elements of MFN, Market Access, 
National Treatment and the bilateral system of reciprocity (S/C/W/134).  As would 
be expected, the paper does not outright reject the possibility of expanding the 
                                          
182 This comment is from discussions with the US expert(s) from Washington during the Review. 
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GATS beyond the three covered sub-sectors, however it implied that Japan prefers 
to face any form of liberalisation through the bilateral system.   
During the first session, Japan supported a comment made by Egypt to the effect 
that the Review should be kept separate from the services negotiations and agreed 
with the US that any consideration of a possible further application of the GATS to 
other sub-sectors should only commence once the Review was completed.  They 
also responded negatively to New Zealand and the EC’s suggestion that cargo be 
considered separately from passenger airlines due to the large number of combi-
operations (passenger and cargo).   
Although their participation was not as active as some of the others, Japan did 
participate and worked together with the US and Canada by formulating 
intervention strategies prior to the meetings.  In some instances where the US 
might be seen as over-bearing, Japan would speak first, followed by the US and/or 
Canada.  The coordination was not the same level that can be found in other like-
minded negotiating groups at the WTO, but they did consult with each other 
throughout the Review. 
Economic Development 
Japan enjoys one of the highest GDP per capita income levels in the OECD.  It is a 
market economy and has high levels of import and export trade.  Although it 
experienced a long recession period during the late 1990s its GDP figures began to 
recover in 1999 (see Chart 5 below).  Like the US the GDP growth rate is similar to 
that of the cargo sector shown in Chart 7.   
Given that in the period leading up to the Review Japan was still in a recession, it is 
not surprising that its position remained in the pro-bilateral group.  This would 
allow it to retain any and all limitations on liberalisation in order to protect air 
transport industries or to liberalise by letters of understandings attached to BI or 
BII type agreements.  Its position does not appear to be affected by the lack of 
statistical significance but does fit into the negotiating theory that argues a state 
will be less willing to liberalise under the multilateral umbrella when its markets are 
not rapidly growing or expanding beyond national borders. 
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Geostrategic Location: Distance to Major Market (US and EU) 
The vast distance between North America and Asia puts Japan in a very strong 
geostrategic location vis-à-vis wanting to retain as much bilateral control over 
liberalisation as possible.  Not only is Japan a major exporter of goods by air, but it 
is also one of the top global financial centres making it an important destination 
point for people and goods.  More importantly, it is strategically located as a transit 
point between North America and Asia, being located on the Northern Pacific great 
circle route.  From this geographically advantageous position, Japan’s bilateral 
negotiating position is relatively strong.  It would be expected that in Japan’s case, 
access to either the US or the EU would be less relevant than for others in less 
advantageous locations.  Unfortunately it was beyond the scope of the statistical 
analysis to be designed in a manner that would capture the importance of access 
into Japan. 
Nevertheless, the analysis does tell us that Japan’s distance to the US is statistically 
significant with a downward trend while the EC is currently not but shows 
increasing importance.  Since bilaterals are negotiated on a reciprocal basis, the 
increasing number of designated US carriers would indicate that Japan recognises 
the importance of its location as a transit point.  It would therefore be in its interest 
to retain the bilateral negotiations with the US.  It would be less important for 
Japan to retain their bilateral relationship with the EC given that all the bilaterals 
were signed with individual Member States rather than as one block, although this 
will change.  From the EU Member State side of the equation the distances from 
some countries are such that Japan is not highly significant in terms of transit into 
Asia but rather as a destination point.  Were this situation to exist vis-à-vis the US, 
Japan might be more willing to accept some small level of multilateral liberalisation. 
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ASAs and Foreign Ownership Limitations 
In comparison with other states in this study Japan is rated as one of the least 
liberal in terms of their air services agreements.  According to the government 
website, the bulk of Japanese agreements fit into the BI (pre-1977) or BII (post-
1977) type with a few modified BII agreements, whereupon letters of 
understanding have been signed with specific countries to increase the number of 
foreign flag carriers permitted to operate into and out of Japan (see Appendix 10 
for types of agreements between case study Members).  They have not joined any 
specific regional agreements beyond APEC, nor have they concluded any Open 
Skies type agreements.   
The statistical analysis showed that there was a strong correlation between a 
Member’s position in the Review and the most liberal agreement signed.  In this 
instance it is not surprising that Japan seeks to retain the status quo.  This also 
correlates to the importance of its geostrategic location and the long running 
recession.  Each of these would, according to the theory, explain the reticence to 
liberalise in any forum.  The lack of liberal bilaterals signed with Japan bears out 
the argument. 
Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
Japanese law stipulates that an airline with more than thirty-three per cent foreign 
ownership cannot be registered as a Japanese carrier.  However it appears that up 
to fifty per cent (ownership and control) could be allowed.183  Foreign carriers 
operating into Japan must be in accordance with the criteria laid out in each 
bilateral. 
Flag Carriers’ Revenue/Loss 
The two Japanese flag carriers have experienced radical shifts in revenues and 
losses over the nine year period of the study.  Due to these dramatic swings it is 
difficult to ascertain with certainty the impact on Japanese negotiators.  According 
to Chart 6 below in the period just prior to the Review Japan Airlines was enjoying a 
rapid and significant recovery from deep losses.  However, at the outset of the 
Review the flag carrier’s revenues evaporated to zero before rebounding again prior 
to the events of 11 September 2001.  Losses at this point in time dropped to their 
lowest levels before again rapidly changing at the very end of the Review.  In short, 
the Japanese flag carriers were struggling financially throughout the entire period.   
                                          
183 Ownership and Control, “Report of the Think Tank World Aviation Regulatory Monitor 2000”, 
Peter van Fenema, Government and Industry Affairs Department, IATA, 2000, p 46. 
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Although the statistical analysis does not give any guidance, negotiating theory 
captures the Japanese position in the Review.  Due to the instability of both flag 
carriers it is highly unlikely that the Japanese would risk exposing these carriers to 
further competitive forces through any type of liberalisation be it bilateral or 
multilateral. 
Chart 6 
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Ground-handling 
Japan does not have a presence in the international ground-handling market and 
therefore it is not possible to provide an analysis of how this variable would affect 
its position in the Review.  Although Japan does not compete in the international 
marketplace, ground-handling is important, particularly from the cargo handling 
aspect, which will be discussed below. 
At its main international airport, Narita, there are a total of four ground-handlers of 
which only two are foreign operators (both from the US).  While it is not possible to 
discern whether these are airline or non-airline operators, in all likelihood they are 
the former.184  The US normally insists on self-handling for its flag carriers at 
foreign locations, which is written into the bilaterals.   
                                          
184 “Developments in the Air Transport Sector since the Conclusion of the Uruguay Round: Part 
Two”, Background not by the Secretariat, S/C/W/163Add1, p 63. 
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Airport Cargo 
Airport cargo volume and its handling is an important service for Japanese 
corporations and government.  Whether it is considered part of ground-handling or 
not, it is an important area at Japanese airports.  Noted in the geostrategic section 
above, the import and export of goods (origin and destination) in addition to goods 
transiting through Japan into parts of Asia from North America make it a key 
location for foreign airlines, particularly those from the US. 
Although the net revenues of the Japanese flag carriers were erratic prior to and 
during the Review, the economic indicators (GDP) compare with the growth in 
cargo volumes (Chart 7).  This indicates that there is a relationship between 
national cargo volumes and the general well-being of Japan’s economy, despite the 
lack of correlation between the statistical significance of the former and the 
marginal significance of the latter.   
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From its submissions and interventions Japan made it clear that anything related to 
this sub-sector would not be considered due to the amount of cargo that is flown by 
passenger airlines.  Referring to the OECD proposal for liberalising air cargo 
separately from passenger services, it noted that separating the two areas would 
make it very difficult for passenger carriers to compete with the more liberalised 
all-cargo carriers.185  
                                          
185 “Liberalisation of Air Cargo Transport”, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry 
Division of Transport. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
DSTI/DOT(2002)1, 30 November 2001.  
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Airport Management Services 
This is another sub-sector where Japanese interests are virtually non-existent in the 
international arena.  Airports are owned and operated by Japanese nationals and 
there appears to be no indication that this situation would be altered to allow 
foreign interests into the market.  Even though this variable appeared to be 
statistically insignificant there seems to be no incentive for Japan to change its 
existing market structure.  There is also little evidence that the airports are either 
struggling financially or intending to expand their services to give Japan any market 
incentives to open up this sub-sector to foreign interests.  Thus it is not surprising 
that Japan gave no indication throughout the Review that it might begin to consider 
discussions pertaining to GATS coverage. 
Incentives and BATNA  
Using the data analysis and oral interventions, it appears that Japan’s incentives 
are driven primarily by its favourable geostrategic position and the lack of existing 
liberal bilateral agreements with other states.  The statistical analysis revealed the 
following:  that distance to the US is significant, albeit slightly waning, and the 
amount of liberalisation that has occurred under the bilaterals suggests that Japan 
would not have much incentive to support multilateral liberalisation.  To do so 
would likely be viewed as a loss of negotiating power, particularly vis-à-vis the US.  
Thus its perceived BATNA would be firmly located in the bilateral arena.   
Canada 
Position on Expanding GATS Coverage in the Air Transport Review 
Canada’s position is classified as pro-bilateral, despite its expressed interest in 
classifying airport management services as not directly related to the exercise of 
traffic rights and thus potentially covered by the GATS.  The reasons for including it 
in this group are that it supported each instance another Member advocated 
retaining the bilateral agreements in full and considered everything included in a 
bilateral not to be covered by the GATS.  Upon being questioned by the EC 
regarding what Canada considered to be directly related to traffic rights, it 
answered by using the same terms as the US, although less adamantly.  Canada 
stated their “rule of thumb” was based on what was traditionally included and that 
this would be consistent with their support of airport management services, but not 
aspects of ground-handling services.  Unlike the other pro-bilateral Members 
however, Canada intervened to support extending the Review in order to ensure all 
debate had been exhausted and would not agree to end the meetings prematurely.   
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Canada did not submit any formal or informal papers and therefore also did not 
make any presentations in meetings prior to, or during the Review.  However, 
Canada did actively participate through interventions and supported statements 
made by other Members that reflected their general position on a given topic.  It is 
from these interventions that Canada has been placed in the group of Members that 
would prefer to see further liberalisation in the bilateral arena rather than in the 
multilateral forum of the WTO although it is the least adamant of the four cases.  It 
was the only one that advocated extending the Review beyond three dedicated 
sessions when the debate arose and it was the only one that would consider any 
expansion at all.  However, it was also one of the most adamant about rejecting 
any proposals pertaining to Freedoms of the Air.   
It emphasised that it had withdrawn from the International Air Services Transit 
Agreement (IASTA) due to what it considered an issue of territorial sovereignty, a 
primary concern for Canada.  In response to the proposal by Norway (S/CSS/W/59) 
during an earlier meeting in the CTS Special Session to include first and second 
freedoms Canada gave its strongest response:  an emphatic no.  It was explained 
that Canada viewed even the suggestion of including these freedoms with great 
concern.  It was their belief that any freedoms of the air were an issue of territorial 
sovereignty and noted that Canada had even withdrawn from IASTA despite being 
an original signatory and the host country for ICAO.186  It went on to say that it 
considers ICAO to have the constitutional responsibility for international air 
transport, and it would be very cautious with regard to expanding the Annex.  This 
is noteworthy due to the Secretariat Background paper S/C/W/163Add.3 (p 188), 
which stated that first and second freedoms “…may not be covered by the definition 
of traffic rights in the relevant GATS Annex which states that the right has to be 
exerted for "remuneration or for hire" (see Chapter 3, Chart 2).   
It was therefore in Canada’s interest to take a strong position and support others 
that did not want any expansion of the Annex.  It was also not surprising that it 
agreed with the US et al that any decision to expand GATS coverage should only 
occur after the Review is completed and must be kept separate from the services 
negotiations.   
                                          
186 “Canada signed the Agreement on 10 February 1945 and deposited an instrument of 
acceptance thereto on the same date with the Government of the United States of America.  On 
12 November 1986, a notice of denunciation of the Agreement by the Government of Canada was 
received by the Government of the United States of America which was to have taken effect on 12 
November 1987.  However, this notice was revoked by a note dated 10 November 1987.  By a 
second note dated 10 November 1987, the Government of Canada gave a new notice of 
withdrawal from the Agreement, which took effect on 19 November 1988.  The International Air 
Services Transit Agreement, signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944.  
http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/transit.pdf.  
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In specific comments regarding the sub-sectors listed in Job No. 2451 it believed 
that air navigation is considered to be services supplied in the exercise of 
government authority and therefore would not be covered by the GATS.  However, 
it had not reached a conclusion as to whether these services were directly related 
to traffic rights.  Like Japan, Canada found it difficult to envision the possibility of 
cargo liberalisation because of the high level of combi-operations.  This refers to 
cargo carried in the belly of passenger airlines.  It made no specific comments on 
ground-handling other than to note that some of the ancillary services in this sub-
sector might already by covered by the GATS.  This referred to activities such as 
aircraft cleaning and disinfection and firefighting services.   
Economic Development 
Canada is an OECD high income country with a similar per capita as the average 
found in the EU (the first 15 Members).  Unlike the EU, which has a dense 
population and a highly developed public rail system in addition to a relatively small 
landmass, Canada’s geographic size and small population makes air transport an 
important aspect of the Canadian economy.  Although it deregulated the sector in 
1988, provisions were included to ensure the remote northern communities would 
not be cut off from air transport services.  
Despite the importance of air transport for Canada, its economic prosperity does 
not have the same degree of correlation between the movement of air cargo and 
the GDP level of the country.  Chart 8 below notes that Canada has enjoyed a 
steadily increasing economic pattern, whereas the cargo sector (Chart 10) indicates 
more volatility.  Neither appears to have any correlation to the radical financial 
changes in the national airline (Chart 9). 
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Geostrategic Location: Distance to Major Markets (US and EU) 
Canada’s geostrategic location is an important factor that feeds into virtually all of 
its international air transport policies.  It controls one of the largest airspace areas 
in the world, it is located on both the northern Pacific and northern Atlantic great 
circle routes; the latter being one of the busiest corridors in the world for aviation 
(civilian and military), it is directly adjacent to the US market and would be an 
over-flight territory to Russia if the routes over the Arctic were ever to be opened 
up for regular commercial routes.  The importance Canada attaches to its 
independent sovereignty and control over territorial boundaries was noted above 
with its intervention on discontinuing its IASTA membership.  At the same time, 
access into the US market is extremely important for Canada, which makes it 
noteworthy that its most liberal bilateral agreement exists with the US.   
ASAs and Foreign Ownership Limitations 
The statistical analysis revealed that a Member’s position in the Review was mostly 
influenced by the most liberal ASA a country had signed.  During the period of this 
study Canada’s most liberal ASAs were MBIIs.  The full Open Skies Agreement did 
not come into force between Canada and the US until after the data analysis had 
been completed.  However, even if it had, Canada is not a participant in any 
plurilateral or common aviation agreements, which were ranked as more liberal 
than MBIIs.  Thus it would be expected that Canada would support retaining the 
status quo.  Adding the importance Canada places on territorial sovereignty it could 
also be expected to maintain this position even if were to conclude numerous Open 
Skies agreements.  Drawing from the analysis it is also expected one is not likely to 
see Canada entering into a common aviation area type of agreement in the near 
future. 
Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
When Air Canada was privatised in the late 1980s, the Government (Federal 
Cabinet) retained authority to change foreign ownership levels of Canadian carriers.  
Canadians believe strongly in the need to protect what they see as a clear national 
interest that is highlighted in the following note submitted as a corrigendum to the 
Secretariat Background papers. 
Control of a Canadian carrier must reside with "national interests".  For 
a Canadian domestic service, the Minister may exempt the non-
Canadian carrier from the licence condition requiring it to be Canadian 
where the Minister considers it necessary or advisable in the public 
interest that a domestic licence be issued to a non-Canadian carrier. 
The Minister does not have the power to make a similar exemption for 
carriers operating international services" (S/C/W/163Add.4Corr.1). 
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Canadian policy on the issue of foreign ownership levels is similar to the US and 
remains at twenty-five per cent, although there can be a larger number of non-
voting shares held by foreign interests.187  Measuring ownership and control in this 
manner allows Canadian carriers greater access to foreign capital.  Carriers such as 
Air Canada responded to this structure by developing a variable share structure.   
[Its] holding company created two classes of publicly listed securities:  
class A variable voting shares, held by foreign investors, and class B 
voting share, owned by Canadian residents.  The class A shares, in 
aggregate, are limited to only 25% of all shareholder votes.  If the 
number of class A shares exceeds 25% of all shares outstanding, the 
vote attached to each class A share drops proportionately, but the 
combined voting power of all class A shares stays at 25%.  If a 
foreigner buys a class B share from a Canadian it instantly converts 
into a class A share, and vice versa when a foreign investor sells a 
class A share to a Canadian resident.  The two classes of shares trade 
at the same price (Airline Business, March 2007, p 29). 
This highlights the creative measures that must be taken in order to gain access to 
the international capital markets due to restrictive ownership requirements of the 
current system.  It also shows that despite being an open trading country and an 
advocate of multilateral liberalisation in other areas of trade in goods and services, 
air transport services remain an anomaly.   
Flag Carrier Revenue/Loss 
Although the net revenue/loss pattern for Canada’s flag carrier seems to indicate 
only minor financial difficulties leading up to the Review, it does not capture the 
financial distress of the domestic industry and the resulting political turmoil that 
occurred during this period.  The end result was the loss of one flag carrier, 
Canadian Airlines International188, through its absorption by Air Canada.  The two 
carriers had always been bitter rivals and represented one of the political east-west 
tensions in the country.  After the industry was deregulated in 1988 the competition 
increased and resulted in Canadian Airlines facing bankruptcy in 1992.  A bitter 
battle that lasted approximately two years ensued over saving the airline and 
involved issues of foreign ownership, organised labour and eventually became a 
political battle between Central Canada and the West.  During this period Air 
Canada expended capital resources in the courts to acquire Canadian.  The 
conclusion came about in early 2000 when the Government tabled legislation 
                                          
187 The twenty-five per cent foreign ownership limit for Canadian airlines was included in the 
National Transportation Act, 1987.   
188 Canadian Airlines was created out the merging of PWA, CPAir, and Wardair.  CPAir was the rival 
flag carrier to Air Canada until it was bought-out by PWA in 1988. 
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allowing Air Canada to take-over Canadian.  Notably this is the same point in time 
that the losses at Air Canada took a steep downward turn. 
Chart 9 
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The timing of this acquisition corresponds to the beginning of huge losses for Air 
Canada that resulted in the corporation seeking bankruptcy protection three years 
later (2003).  Also impacting the industry during this time was the closure of 
Canadian airspace for almost four days subsequent to the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks in the US.  In addition, the SARS crisis impacted Canada directly 
due to Air Canada’s high frequency of flights to and from Asia.  These routes have 
always been a revenue area for the airline.  Thus it is difficult to attribute the 
revenue/loss analysis in the case of Canada from a statistical perspective but 
strongly supports the theory that a failing industry will likely be protected by the 
state.  Given the domestic turmoil throughout the industry in Canada during this 
period it can be expected that the negotiators would support any proposition that 
advocates retaining the bilaterals. 
Ground-handling 
Canadian ground-handlers do not have a significant presence in the global market 
and it has no corporations ranked in the top ten international ground-handling 
corporations.  Within Canada, this sub-sector is competitive and Canada permits 
third-party handling.  All the international airports have foreign operators.  As of 
2000, at the two largest Canadian airports, Toronto (YYZ) and Vancouver (YVR), 
there were at total of fifteen foreign operators; eight and six respectively from two 
countries (US, Germany) and one from the Netherlands.  However, despite the 
existing openness of the market place Canada did not support the EC et al in their 
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proposal to have this sub-sector covered by the GATS other than a few minor 
ancillary services.  In fact it considers ground-handling in the traffic rights 
classification.   
Canada noted “…ground handling services, in general, need to be considered 
services directly related to traffic rights” (transcripts Session one).  It went on to 
explain that despite this position, it does not believe this would include all the 
services listed under ground-handling.  Cited were catering, cleaning and 
disinfecting aircraft as part of other supporting services.  It also included airport 
management services despite the fact that these services have never been 
considered part of ground-handling, either operationally throughout the industry or 
in the secretariat sub-sector list Job No. 2451.  At the end of this particular 
intervention it stated its position was given without prejudice to any further 
negotiations or discussions. 
Airport Cargo 
Unlike the other Members in the pro-bilateral group Canada’s cargo sector does not 
follow the same pattern as the growth in GDP levels.  This is most likely because it 
exports a huge volume of natural resources that are transported by ship rather 
than by air.  As a stand-alone sector Chart 10 shows that air cargo shipments 
began to decline slightly in the period leading up to the Review and by the end 
there were lower volumes than in 1995.  Since cargo volumes are considered to be 
statistically significant we would expect Canada to block any suggestions proposing 
GATS coverage.  The same expectation would be present within the theory due to 
the relatively steady decline in absolute volumes during the period of the study. 
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Airport Management Services 
Airports are privatised in Canada, but are nevertheless considered to be a “service 
provided in the exercise of government authority” under GATS Art. I 3(b) and 3(c) 
(transcripts, Session one).  However, Canada does consider airport management 
services as an independent and competitive service not directly related to traffic 
rights, and therefore not excluded by the Annex.  It is the only Member in the pro-
bilateral view that supported even one of the listed air transport sub-sectors (Job 
No. 2451).  
Canada has a growing presence in airport management services that is dynamic 
and expanding in the world market.  For the period of time of the data collected for 
this sub-sector (1993-2004), Vancouver International Airport Authority has had an 
international presence that has seen considerable expansion in a number of 
geographic regions either through management contracts or equity stakes in the 
airports where they operate.  Although the statistical analysis showed this sub-
sector to be insignificant, Canada’s position in the Review supported its inclusion 
under the GATS accords with the negotiating theory as it pertains to operators 
seeking to expand internationally.  In such an instance the competition is 
international and having a single set of rules for market access and national 
treatment simplifies market entry and presence and helps to facilitate regulatory 
efficiencies. 
Incentives and BATNA  
Territorial sovereignty is an important public issue in Canada and any 
encroachment on the country’s ability to have a flag carrier would instantly become 
a national political cause.  The stated belief that only through sovereign control 
over its airspace can Canada ensure its negotiating strength and this can only be 
achieved in the bilateral rather than the multilateral arena.  Its geostrategic 
location and vast size provides Canada with a strong negotiating position in the 
bilateral arena.  Nevertheless, its position on airport management services supports 
the theory that markets can and will influence negotiating positions in the 
multilateral forum.  Canada supports the inclusion of airport management services; 
a sub-sector where Canadian corporations have a strong and growing international 
presence.  In accordance with expectations found in the statistical analysis Canada, 
a country with relatively traditional bilateral agreements, does not support 
expansion of the GATS to any sub-sector other than airport management services 
and three minor sub-areas of ground-handling. 
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Brazil 
Position on Expanding GATS Coverage in the Air Transport Review 
Brazil positioned itself solidly in the pro-bilateral group of Members.  This was 
evident in both its oral interventions and written submission (S/C/W/198).  At the 
outset of the Review it echoed the US position regarding expanding the scope of 
the Annex as something that should be undertaken after developments in the 
sector and operation of the Annex were reviewed.  It noted that any direct 
discussion over expanding the GATS was a negotiation and therefore should not be 
mixed up with the Review.  It also emphasised that the bilateral system was under 
the “aegis” of the ICAO, strongly implying the WTO was an inappropriate forum for 
air transport negotiations and the Review was not considered to be a negotiation 
(Review transcripts, Session one).   
Brazil’s written submission S/C/W/201 is designed, as would be expected, to 
highlight the positive developments of the overall industry to emphasise the 
strength and flexibility of the bilateral system.  The paper presents eleven charts 
showing the numerical change in the number of aircraft (including specialised 
services) movements (including international).  Whilst these charts show a general 
increase in aircraft movement, suggesting dynamic growth in the industry, there is 
no reference to financial stability or increased revenue in any of the presented data.  
In contrast, this study found that the national flag carrier is in financial distress and 
cargo volumes show a slightly downward trend for the same period. 
Beyond the discrepancies found in airline revenues, the paper outlines the steps 
taken by the Government to encourage the air transport sector.  Upon close 
examination however, it is apparent that there has been little substantive 
undertaking in this area.  The paper notes that the Government has “encouraged” 
greater utilisation of code-sharing arrangements and made reference to Brazil’s 
participation in regional initiatives on the continent.  However there are no specifics 
regarding liberalisation in the sense that it has been used throughout this study.   
The paper concludes with a call to other Members in the Review to “strengthen” the 
role of ICAO and emphasised the special treatment given to developing countries.  
What makes this stance odd is the acknowledgement by ICAO that does not have 
the constitutional authority to create or enforces rules on its Member States. 
[T]he Convention is silent on progressive liberalization as an objective. 
This does not preclude Contracting States from pursuing the 
liberalization objective individually or in their bilateral relations with 
other States.  A bilateral air-services agreement can be as restrictive 
or protectionist on market entry, capacity and pricing or as open or 
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liberal on these matters as the partners wish.  Bilateralism can be a 
vehicle for progressive liberalization among pairs of like-minded States 
or a means for protecting national air-transport interests, or it can 
take an approach falling between these two (ICAO, MTN.GNS/W/36, 
16 May 1988, p 9). 
Which position (protectionist or not) would apply to Brazil is open to debate and its 
paper does not provide clarification.  For example, its position on the evolution of 
Brazilian air transport over the previous ten years suggests that the Government 
has taken steps to deregulate, but there is no evidence that it has undertaken any 
liberalisation.   
Economic Development 
Brazil is a developing nation that has experienced relatively strong economic 
growth in terms of GDP per capita and is poised to become one of the more 
dynamic South American economies.  However, the economic growth does not 
appear to be affecting the air transport sector to any great degree.  Comparing the 
per capita figures in Chart 11 with the subsequent charts (12 and 13 below), 
neither the airlines nor the cargo sector reflect to overall positive economic growth 
in the country.   
It is interesting to note that in Brazil’s written submission (S/C/W/201, 3 October 
2001) it highlights that “civil aviation [is] an essential tool for social and economic 
development”.  It thus links the economic expansion to air transport in contrast to 
the findings of this study that shows there appears to be a lack of economic success 
in this sector.  Despite these findings, Brazil noted that the supposed success of the 
sector and the economy in general could be directly attributed to the “significant 
reduction of State intervention” and the “greater participation of private capital” in 
the economy (S/C/W/201, p 1).   
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Geostrategic Location: Distance to Major Markets (US and EU) 
Unlike Chile, Brazil made no reference to its geographic location and the cost of 
transportation over long distances despite similarity of distances facing both 
countries.  According to the data analysis the importance of access to the US 
market is high, yet unlike Chile, Brazil does not appear to be pursuing more liberal 
arrangements with the US.  Chile’s air transport sector, however, is benefiting from 
participating in a more liberal arrangement with the US than Brazil.   
ASAs and Foreign Ownership Limitations 
The most liberal ASA that Brazil has signed with another country is of the BII and 
MBII type agreements.  This was established after Chile questioned Brazil about its 
intention to negotiate an Open Skies agreement with other states in the region.  In 
response it gave the following answer short answer:  “[t]he Brazilian government 
currently has no plans to negotiate bilateral “open skies” agreements [and] Brazil 
has not signed a bilateral “open skies” agreement with Peru” (Job(02)/27, 12 March 
2002).   
Brazil’s position in the Review is in accordance with expectations derived from the 
data analysis that show a Member’s position regarding multilateral liberalisation is 
strongly linked to the most liberal bilateral type of agreement already signed.  
Since Brazil has not yet signed any Open Skies type of agreement it would be 
expected that it would support fully the status quo of the Air Transport Annex. 
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Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
The foreign ownership level in Brazil during the period of the Review was set at a 
maximum of twenty per cent.  However, due to the national flag carrier’s financial 
crisis and lack of access to sufficient capital that could potentially rescue the airline, 
the Government was prompted to examine lifting the limits.  Brazil's National Civil 
Aviation Council (CONAC) started discussions in 2001 to construct an emergency 
plan to help the country's major airlines through the current crisis.  “It approved, in 
principle, an increase in the foreign ownership of national carriers, now limited to 
20%, to new ceilings ranging from 25% to 50%.”189  
Flag Carrier Revenue/Loss 
The revenues of Brazil’s flag carrier were almost zero in the years leading up to 
2000 and the Review (Chart 12), whereupon they dropped massively over the 
following two years.  For both the statistical analysis and the theoretical framework, 
the lack of financial success or growth of the country’s flag carrier it can be 
expected that Brazil would block any attempts to expand GATS coverage.   
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Ground-handling 
Brazil has no presence in the international trade of ground-handling services.  
However, ground-handling at Brazil’s largest airport in Sao Paulo (GRU) is open and 
competitive with a total of seven companies.  Included in this number (as of 2000) 
were three US and one Swiss company.  Looking at the ground-handling sub areas 
                                          
189 Aviation Daily, “Brazil Designs Emergency Plan For Its Troubled Airlines”, Aviation Daily Staff, 
28 Aug 2001. 
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(12, not including fuelling and catering), all but three (Cargo/mail, surface 
transport, and security) have an international presence.  Brazil confirmed that it is 
open to foreign suppliers in its response to Chile during the Review (Job(02)/27, 12 
March 2002). 
Airport Cargo 
Like Canada, there appears to be little correlation between GDP and total cargo 
movements.  Between 1995 and 2004 Brazil experienced solid economic growth 
whereas air cargo volumes increased slightly between 1995 and 1997 but declined 
below the 1995 levels and remained roughly flat for the next five years.  There also 
appears to be no link to the revenue/loss of the flag carrier during the same period 
that the flag carrier experienced massive losses and the cargo sector.   
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Airport Management Services 
Brazil has no presence in the international trade for airport services and it has not 
been possible to ascertain with certainty whether international operators are 
permitted in Brazil. 
Incentives and BATNA  
From both the theoretical perspective and the data analysis, Brazil conforms to the 
expectations of each.  It does not have corporations participating in the global 
market in any of the sub-sectors, nor does it have a financially sound flag carrier, 
thus it is unlikely that it would seek any type of multilateral liberalisation.  
Additionally, the data results linking the existing degree of openness in the bilateral 
ASA realm confirm that Brazil would support the status quo of the bilateral regime. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
The Air Transport Review (the Review) was chosen as the topic of study, despite 
the stalemate that resulted, because it provides a wealth of information that 
informs us about the incentives that contribute toward national policy choices and 
what lies behind a negotiator’s position, particularly in a politically sensitive 
industry.  It is through analysing international air transport and the WTO that we 
uncover the paradox that simultaneously highlights regime strength, importance of 
state sovereignty and likelihood of moving from the bilateral world to a single set of 
multilateral rules.  Studying this sector also increases our understanding about the 
institutional setting within the WTO and how decisions are achieved in multilateral 
negotiations and it shows the degree to which it is a Member driven organisation.  
The interest in this sector also stems from the oddity of air transport in the GATS as 
the only sector that was excluded from coverage during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations that created the GATS.  Air transport is not only a global services 
industry but it is also an important factor in economic growth and development.   
The exclusion of air transport in the GATS is puzzling because of the industry’s 
importance to both international trade in services and goods and it is one of the 
service industries that is known to trade internationally.  This raised a number of 
questions regarding the potential reasons for the exclusion.  Was it the particular 
time-frame when the negotiations took place; or was it, as many claimed, an issue 
of national security or territorial sovereignty?  Reading the Annex on Air Transport 
Services of the GATS did not provide any satisfactory answers.  Paragraph 2 is clear 
that “traffic rights” and “services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights” are 
excluded, however, it also mandates that a review of the sector must be carried out 
“at least every five years … with a view to considering the possible further 
application of the Agreement in this sector” (GATS, p 27).  The text defines “traffic 
rights” (paragraph 6.(d)) but it does not define what is directly related to the 
exercise of these rights.  In short the text does not provide clear answers about 
whether coverage of the GATS will extend to sub-sectors of the industry or whether 
the mandated reviews will be a waste of time and effort on the part of the 
participants. 
After studying the historical development of air transport and the multilateral 
trading system it became clear that while both existed for approximately the same 
time they evolved in two vastly different frameworks until the GATS came into 
existence.  Air transport was strictly bilateral and agreements were negotiated on 
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the basis of reciprocity while the fundamental principle of the GATS rests inter alia 
on MFN treatment and transparency.  Despite the exclusion of air transport and 
because of the mandated reviews, the question arose about whether this would 
eventually impact or influence how international air transport would liberalise in the 
future.  Using the questions that arose when examining the two frameworks led to 
the hypothesis, which claims that in time GATS coverage will be expanded to 
include sub-sectors of air transport.  To argue this position the study was situated 
within Odell’s theoretical framework on negotiations that argues market forces have 
an important role to play in how states define and approach their negotiations 
regardless of the forum (i.e. bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral) and have a strong 
influencing factor over whether a State would see its Best Alternative to a 
Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) in the multilateral or bilateral setting.   
The approach was comparative, whereby four cases were selected that represented 
Members supporting multilateral liberalisation of the industry and four that 
supported the bilateral system and did not want to see any expansion of the GATS 
in this sector.  The selection was also based on the Members that actively 
participated in the Review (oral and written) and that represented as much of a 
geographic spread as possible.  Using the sub-sector (market) data compiled for 
the Review background papers that covered 1994-1999 and updated to include 
2004 the study sought to show factors that are relevant to Members in the 
formulation of their position for or against GATS expansion.   
The methodology chosen to accomplish this task was four-fold.  First, an 
examination of the Member State written submissions and interventions was used 
to gain an understanding of what important, if not critical, elements were used to 
argue either for or against expanding coverage of the GATS over this sector.  
Second, all the compiled data was entered into a statistical analysis programme 
using linear regression to see if the observations could be validated empirically.  
Third the actual data, set in line charts, was presented and discussed in relation to 
the results of the linear regression and the Member’s submissions throughout the 
Review.  Fourth, the results for each of the independent variables were set in the 
context of the theoretical framework in order to help identify why each might be 
important factors to a Member’s overall position. 
A WTO Member’s incentive to negotiate, in the context of the WTO is useful for 
understanding the incentives that motivate policy choices and to identify where a 
negotiator’s perceived BATNA is located.  Here one will find that given the mandate 
to negotiate within the WTO, a Member may have more incentive outside the 
multilateral arena in a given industry and will work to ensure the status quo is 
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maintained.  Since it is known that bilateral negotiations tend to favour the more 
powerful of the two parties, it is likely that a stronger state will prefer the bilateral 
forum, particularly if their industry is in turmoil.  The incentive to protect the 
industry would be driven by domestic political concerns rather than economically 
rational choices.  It would be the perception or belief that more could be gained 
bilaterally and any liberalisation would occur at the timing of the more powerful 
State.  Economically weaker states that are competing with neighbours in a similar 
economic position may favour the bilateral to gain a better agreement than their 
neighbours.   
States preferring the multilateral option are oftentimes small open economies that 
have already benefited from this form of liberalisation and are likely to perceive 
that they will have a stronger voice through the consensus driven decision-making 
process.  The one anomaly that stands out is the EC.  For this Member multilateral 
liberalisation is attractive from the negotiating authority perspective.  Internal to 
the EU there is a single market, however third-party bilaterals in air transport are 
still the norm and in this arena the Commission has only recently acquired limited 
authority to negotiate anything.  In the WTO however, it is the EC that speaks on 
behalf of its Member States.  Any sub-sector that would be covered by the GATS 
would automatically fall under the negotiating authority of the EC.  Regardless of 
the other important factors, this is a strong incentive to have the GATS expanded. 
In order to validate what in essence is a descriptive analysis, an empirical approach 
was also used.  Data for the eight cases was collected for a nine-year period and 
analysed using linear regression to see if there was any correlation between a 
Member’s position in the Review and written and oral submissions.  From the full 
data set a sample of three years was chosen to avoid the immediate after effects of 
11 September 2001 and the SARS crisis in 2003 and provide for a larger 
timeframe.  This was done in order to empirically test whether market conditions 
will heavily influence a negotiators position.  Through using this analysis we have 
been able to underscore our observations of the negotiations, indicating market 
elements or sub-sectors can and do influence negotiating positions in the 
multilateral arena, albeit to a lesser degree then expected.   
The dependent variable was a Member’s position for or against expanding the GATS 
coverage and the independent variables included some of the sub-sectors that were 
proposed as potential areas that could be covered, and other variables that were 
considered to have possible relevance to a given position.  These included:  
geostrategic location (distance to the US and EU markets), GDP, types of ASAs, 
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Revenue/Losses of flag carriers, airport management services, ground-handling and 
airport cargo volumes.   
The outcome of the empirical analysis had both expected and unexpected results.  
It was expected that because of the strong support by some on including sub-
sectors like ground-handling and airport management services the analysis would 
show this to be true, however in both of these sub-sectors there was no statistical 
significance.  It was expected that GDP levels would show some positive results or 
that cargo volumes, which contribute to a national economy, would either be 
consistently correlated and/or statistically significant.  Both gave poor results. 
It was also expected that distance to the US and the EC market would be 
significant, especially since this was cited as an obstacle to competing effectively in 
the market.  The results were both surprising and interesting.  While the distance to 
the US market was far greater then the EC, both showed a trend that was moving 
in the opposite direction; the US is becoming less significant while the EC is 
becoming more significant.  The revenue/loss category was expected to be far more 
important than it showed, however it was not completely insignificant.  The most 
significant variable, regardless how the data analysis was run, were the ASAs.  It is 
this variable that appears to be the primary factor determining a Member’s position 
about whether to expand the GATS.  Nevertheless is it not the only factor and it is 
very likely that states supporting the bilateral system would vehemently disagree, 
particularly those which advocate further liberalisation of the sector.   
For some states the size of the domestic economy and the distance to its major 
trading partners are important factors that are taken into consideration in advance 
of any negotiations.  For other states, their geostrategic position is considered to be 
an important a bargaining chip and its strength can only be utilised in the bilateral 
forum.  In the case of the EC, it appears that the negotiating theory holds true 
insofar as the sub-sectors it strongly advocated for coverage were the ones which 
European corporations are dominant in the world market.  Although Canada was 
classified in the pro-bilateral group of cases, it supported coverage for the one sub-
sector where it had corporations that were becoming global participants (airport 
management services).     
Although the US has been an industry leader throughout the history of modern 
commercial aviation, over the past decade it has been losing its dominant position.  
It does not have many global players in the sub-sectors, its flag carriers are in 
financial distress and its Open Skies agreements have been superseded by the EC 
common aviation area.  In combination it is not surprising that the US would rather 
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ensure the bilaterals remain intact, particularly because market access is still being 
sought after by other nations. 
Nevertheless, because the Review is mandated to occur at regular intervals into the 
future, it is likely that one or two sub-sectors will eventually be included under the 
GATS.  Given that it is the degree of liberalisation that has occurred outside of the 
WTO and occurs between states, expansion of the GATS will occur after more states 
move away from the restrictive bilaterals; possibly by joining or creating a common 
aviation area.  Thus, it can be concluded that further liberalisation must first occur 
in the bilateral realm through an increasing number of common aviation type 
agreements.  Currently it is the EC that is the driving force of change as it re-
negotiates all of its third-country bilaterals as mandated by the ECJ.  Key to any 
radical change will have to include the US and its willingness to liberalise beyond 
the bilateral framework.   
It can be expected that future bilateral negotiations will no longer be conducted on 
the basis of power and zero sum outcomes.  Any game that exists will remain in 
constant play; in reality the game to shift elements of the bilateral regime to the 
multilateral level has really only begun.  From the outset it is multi-faceted due to 
the range and number of sub-sector industries that are undergoing change.  This 
change is expressed through corporate restructuring by the airlines, which is being 
done primarily through outsourcing.  The result is an increasing number of non-
aviation corporations buying companies that were originally internal departments of 
the airlines.  Moreover, once sub-sector companies are formed and sold off by the 
airlines, the foreign ownership restrictions (a key element of the bilateral ASAs) no 
longer apply. Indeed, it is possible today to observe a growing dichotomy between 
the restrictive conditions of the bilateral agreements and the increasing economic 
freedom of the sub-sectors.  
This study has argued that those in favour of retaining the current economic 
regulatory world of bilateral ASAs do so for a number of reasons that represent 
protectionism regardless of how often we are told that only through the bilaterals is 
there any hope of further and orderly liberalisation.  Although beyond the scope of 
this study, further research is needed regarding the potential economic benefits of 
expanding the GATS to cover some of the sub-sector industries and more 
importantly, how this can be achieved. 
To accomplish this task, it would be critical to begin identifying which of the sub-
sectors can realistically be determined as not directly related to traffic rights.  Is it 
merely foreign ownership restrictions, or is it the ability to operate the business 
without possessing traffic rights?  For the sectors that might be covered under the 
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GATS, MFN exemptions should be prohibited and a time frame established to 
observe and analyse the effects of the GATS coverage.  Not only would this go a 
great distance to liberalise parts of the sector, but it would also change the dynamic 
of the bilateral negotiations over traffic rights.  The bilateral package to be 
negotiated would be smaller while at the same time the essence of the ASAs would 
remain intact for those wishing to retain levels of protectionism in politically 
sensitive areas of foreign ownership. 
It is through the multilateral negotiating forum that some clarity can be given to 
what is or is not directly related to the exercise of traffic rights.  This is important to 
keep in mind due to the political sensitivities surrounding the first and future 
Reviews, particularly because a number of delegates went on record to state that 
their governments did not consider the Review to be a negotiation and others 
argued that the CTS did not have the authority to expand coverage. 
Analysing this particular industry set in the context of the 2000 Review we can 
ascertain that sovereignty is not under imminent threat, despite the increasing 
economic interdependence that is institutionalised within the WTO.  Developing a 
solid body of rules in a widely accepted international legal regime that seeks to 
reduce and eventually remove mercantilist policies from the international economy 
of trade in goods and services will eventually incorporate much, if not all, of 
international air transport.  Whether this can or will benefit all participating states 
over the long term remains to be seen, although history and experience tells us 
that economic gains are produced through multilateral trade liberalisation.   
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Appendix 1 
Job No. 2451 
Council for Trade in Services 
19 April 2000 
ISSUES FOR POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION 
IN THE REVIEW OF AIR TRANSPORT 
Informal Note by the Secretariat 
On 14 April 2000, the Council for Trade in Services agreed that the Secretariat 
should circulate to Members a draft list of issues for consideration in the context of 
the review of air transport. The list is attached.19 April 2000 
 This informal note lists the matters which Members may wish to take up in 
their work on the review of the Air Transport Annex. 
 The list is largely based on the structure of document S/C/W/59, which the 
Secretariat is updating. For each of the items mentioned it indicates as a reference 
the relevant paragraphs of documents S/C/W/59 and S/C/W/129.  It also tries to 
take into account the various suggestions made to date. 
l. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECTOR 
Members could examine, on the basis of the documentation submitted by 
the Secretariat and by Members, the economic and regulatory developments 
(national, bilateral, regional or multilateral) that have affected trade in air transport 
services190 since the entry into force of the WTO.  The following list of services may 
be useful in organizing such discussions, even if they are not all examined 
individually. 
(a) Aircraft repair and maintenance - S/C/W/59, paragraphs 9 to 16; 
(b) Selling and marketing, including the new forms of selling and 
marketing such as electronic ticketing or more generally electronic 
commerce - S/C/W/59 paragraphs 31 to 36, and annex 2 on page 
54; S/C/W/129 paragraphs 19(a) and 20(b); 
(c) Computer reservation services - S/C/W/59, paragraphs 17 to 30; 
S/C/W/129, paragraph 5, 19C(a),19D(a),20(a) and annex 1 on page 
11; 
(d) Franchising S/C/W/59, paragraph 66; 
(e) Services auxiliary to all modes of transport when delivered in an air 
transport context- S/C/W/59, paragraphs 62 - 63; 
(f) Rental and leasing services - S/C/W/59, paragraph 65; S/C/W/129, 
paragraphs 6 - 7, 15(a), 19C(b), annex 2 on pages 12 - 13, and 
annex 6 on pages 25 - 27; 
(g) Catering services S/C/W/59, paragraph 67; 
                                          
190 This may include the trade effects or trade related aspects of major public policies affecting the 
sector such as competition, environmental and safety policies (S/C/W/59 paragraphs 85, 104 to 
106; 14 and 136). 
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(h) Refuelling services S/C/W/59, paragraph 68; 
(i) Ground handling services - S/C/W/59, paragraphs 134 to 136, annex 
2 on pages 53 - 54, and annex 4 on pages 56 – 57; S/C/W/129, 
paragraphs 10, 15(b) and 20(e); 
(j) Airport management services including charging systems - 
S/C/W/59, paragraphs 64, 126 to 134 and annex 4 on pages 56 - 57;  
S/C/W/129, paragraph 5; 
(k) Air traffic control services including charging systems - S/C/W/59, 
paragraphs 64 and 129; 
(l) General aviation services S/C/W/59, paragraph 61 and 69 - 70; and 
(m) Any other supporting services, notably in the sense of CPC 7469 
(cleaning and disinfecting services, fire fighting and fire protection 
services, hangar services) - S/C/W/59, paragraph 64. 
(n) Commercial air transport services: 
(i) routes (freedom by freedom) S/C/W/59, paragraph 74 to 82; 
(ii) capacity - S/C/W/59, paragraph 83 to 85; 
(iii) tariffs - S/C/W/59, paragraphs 86 to 91;  S/C/W/129, 
paragraph19(c); 
(iv) designation S/C/W/59, paragraph 73 to 82;  S/C/W/129, 
paragraph 19(c); 
(v) other standard elements of bilateral agreements in the ICAO 
sense191 - S/C/W/59, paragraphs 92 to 95 and annex 2 on 
pages 51 - 54; 
(vi) ownership and cooperation among airlines (including alliances 
and codeshare) S/C/W/59, paragraphs 102 to 106, annex 2 
on page 53; S/C/W/129, paragraphs 13, 15(a), 19(b), 19(c), 
19C(c) and 20(c); 
(vii) aspects specific to scheduled passenger services - S/C/W/59, 
paragraphs 96 to 107; 
(viii) aspects specific to non-scheduled passenger services - 
S/C/W/59, paragraphs 108 to 114;  S/C/W/129, paragraphs 
19(e), 19C(d); 
(ix) aspects specific to cargo services - S/C/W/59, paragraphs 115 
to 119; S/C/W/129, paragraphs 15 -18, 19(d) and (annex 4 
on pages 18 - 21; 
(x) slot allocation - S/C/W/59, paragraphs 120 to 125; 
S/C/W/129, paragraphs 8; and 
(xi) multimodal operations – S/C/W/129, paragraph 15(a). 
                                          
191 Dispute settlement procedures, exemptions from taxes and customs duties, right to establish 
offices or personnel in the territory of the other party; right of a designated company to sell 
transport services in the currency of the other party or a freely convertible currency; right of a 
designated company to provide its own ground services in the territory of the other party, or to 
choose an agent to do so; existence and conditions applicable to CRS services; right to convert or 
transfer funds; other elements. 
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ll. OPERATION OF THE ANNEX 
Members might then review the operation of the annex according to the 
sequence described below. 
A. OPERATION OF THE ANNEX FOR CRS, REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE AND 
SELLING AND MARKETING: 
 For each of those three explicitly covered services Members could examine 
the following questions: 
(a) Commercial and regulatory effects of GATS coverage for services providers 
in terms of commitments, MFN, and other disciplines of the Agreement: 
- repair and maintenance:  S/C/W/59, paragraph 41 to 45, table 1 on 
pages 37 - 40, table 3 on page 44, table 7 on page 50; 
- selling and marketing: S/C/W/59, paragraphs 46 to 50, table 4 on 
page 45 and table 7 on page 50, annex 2 on page 54; 
- CRS:  S/C/W/59, paragraphs 51 to 55, table 2 on pages 41 - 43, 
table 5 on page 46 and table 7 on page 50; 
(b) Definitional issues (possible need for revision, classification, possible 
overlaps): 
- repair and maintenance:  S/C/W/59, paragraph 38; 
- selling and marketing:  S/C/W/59, paragraphs 32 to 35, 40 and 
annex 2 on page 54; 
- CRS:  S/C/W/59, paragraphs 17 to 23 and 39; 
B. OPERATION OF THE ANNEX FOR SERVICES NOT DIRECTLY 
RELATED TO TRAFFIC RIGHTS  
(a) Identification and classification of services not directly related to traffic 
rights among the list above from (I.(d) to (m)) either on a case by case 
basis or through the establishment of general criteria S/C/W/59, paragraphs 
60 to 70 and annex 4 on pages 56 - 57; S/C/W/129, paragraph 12. 
(b) Commercial and regulatory effects of the ambiguity of the coverage by the 
annex for services providers in terms of commitments, MFN, and other 
disciplines of the agreement S/C/W/59, paragraph 56 to 59, 60 to 70, 134 
to 136, table 6 on page 48 - 49 and table 7 on page 50, annex 2 on page 53 
- 54. 
C. IDENTIFICATION OF THE POSSIBLE NEED FOR CLARIFIED AND/OR 
ADDITIONAL DISCIPLINES UNDER THE AGREEMENT FOR SERVICES 
COVERED UNDER A AND B ABOVE: 
D. COMMERCIAL AND REGULATORY EFFECTS OF THE EXCLUSION FROM THE 
AGREEMENT OF TRAFFIC RIGHTS AND SERVICES DIRECTLY RELATED TO 
TRAFFIC RIGHTS 
S/C/W/129, paragraphs 13, 19(c), 19D(b), 20(d).  
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Appendix 2 
ANNEX ON AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES192 
1. This Annex applies to measures affecting trade in air transport services, 
whether scheduled or non-scheduled, and ancillary services.  It is confirmed that 
any specific commitment or obligation assumed under this Agreement shall not 
reduce or affect a Member's obligations under bilateral or multilateral agreements 
that are in effect on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
2. The Agreement, including its dispute settlement procedures, shall not 
apply to measures affecting: 
(a) traffic rights, however granted;  or 
(b) services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights,  
 except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Annex. 
3. The Agreement shall apply to measures affecting: 
(a) aircraft repair and maintenance services; 
(b) the selling and marketing of air transport services; 
(c) computer reservation system (CRS) services. 
4. The dispute settlement procedures of the Agreement may be invoked 
only where obligations or specific commitments have been assumed by the 
concerned Members and where dispute settlement procedures in bilateral and other 
multilateral agreements or arrangements have been exhausted. 
5. The Council for Trade in Services shall review periodically, and at least 
every five years, developments in the air transport sector and the operation of this 
Annex with a view to considering the possible further application of the Agreement 
in this sector. 
6. Definitions: 
 (a) "Aircraft repair and maintenance services" mean such activities 
when undertaken on an aircraft or a part thereof while it is withdrawn from service 
and do not include so-called line maintenance. 
 (b) "Selling and marketing of air transport services" mean 
opportunities for the air carrier concerned to sell and market freely its air transport 
services including all aspects of marketing such as market research, advertising and 
distribution.  These activities do not include the pricing of air transport services nor 
the applicable conditions. 
 (c) "Computer reservation system (CRS) services" mean services 
provided by computerised systems that contain information about air carriers' 
schedules, availability, fares and fare rules, through which reservations can be 
made or tickets may be issued. 
 (d) "Traffic rights" mean the right for scheduled and non-scheduled 
services to operate and/or to carry passengers, cargo and mail for remuneration or 
hire from, to, within, or over the territory of a Member, including points to be 
served, routes to be operated, types of traffic to be carried, capacity to be 
provided, tariffs to be charged and their conditions, and criteria for designation of 
airlines, including such criteria as number, ownership, and control. 
                                          
192 GATS:  The General Agreement on Trade in Services and Related Instruments, April 1994, p 
27. 
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Appendix 3 
The Air Transport Review:  Written and Oral 
Submissions, Interventions, and Secretariat 
Background Papers193 
Council for Trade in Services:  Pre-Review Meetings 
23-23 November 1998 
14 April 2000 
26 May 2000 
Secretariat Papers 
S/C/W/129  (5 November 1998) 
Job No. 2451  (19 April 2000)  Classification List 
Written Submissions (formal and informal) 
Job No. 1059  (23 November 1998)  New Zealand 
Job No. 6512  (23 November 1998)  Australia 
S/C/W/113  (15 July 1999)   Chile/New Zealand/Singapore 
Job No. 753  (10 February 2000)  New Zealand 
Job No. 6786  (23 November 1998)  Poland (all transport) 
S/C/W/71  (24 November 1998)  US 
S/C/W/134  (10 February 2000)  Japan 
Job No. 1430  (8 March 2000)  Poland 
Job No. 3203  (19 May 2000)  Australia 
ICAO 
S/C/W/63   (23 October 1998) 
Job No. 6541  (24 November 1998) 
Job No. 679  (8 February 2000) 
Oral Interventions 
Brazil   Ecuador   Australia 
Norway  New Zealand   Japan 
Korea   EC    Hong Kong, China 
Mexico   Turkey    Hungary 
Chile   Switzerland   US 
India   Canada   Morocco 
Columbia  Dominican Republic  Poland 
Scheduled Topic Discussion 
Setting out the work programme and schedule for the Air Transport Review 
Minutes of Pre-Review Sessions 
S/C/M/31 (9 December 1998) “Report of the meeting held on 23 and 24 November 
1998”. 
S/C/M/38 (13 September 1999) “Report of the meeting held on 19 and 20 July 1999”. 
                                          
193 For a complete and official listing of all the documents used prior to and throughout the Air 
Transport Review see:  “Air Transport and the GATS:  Documentation for the First Air Transport 
Review under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 1995-2000 in Review”.  WTO 
Secretariat, 2006. 
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Dedicated First Session:  28-29 September, 2000 
Job No. 2451   (19 April 2000)  Sub-sector Classification List 
Secretariat Background Papers 
S/C/W163   (3 August 2000) 
S/C/W129   (15 October 1999) 
S/C/W59   (5 November 1998) 
Written Submissions by Members 
Job 1430  (8 March 2000)  Poland  
Informal Note   (1 August 2000)  Chile 
S/C/W/165  (15 September 2000)  New Zealand  
S/C/W/166  (15 September 2000)  Chile  
S/C/W/166/Corr.1 (6 November 2000)  Chile 
S/C/W/167  (18 September 2000)  Australia 
S/C/W/167/Corr.1 (28 November 2000)  Australia 
S/C/W/168  (26 September 2000)  EC  
Job No. 3203  (19 May 2000)  Australia (background for 
       S/C/W/167) 
ICAO 
Oral presentation 
Oral Interventions (over both days) 
Poland   Canada   Indonesia 
New Zealand  Senegal   Tunisia 
Chile   Jordan    Thailand 
Australia  Guatemala   Singapore 
EC   Brazil    Norway 
Egypt   Korea    ICAO 
Switzerland  Uruguay   Argentina 
US   Cuba    Mexico 
Japan   Hong Kong, China  ICAO 
Scheduled Topic Discussions 
MRO     Freight forwarding 
CRS     Rental and leasing 
Selling and Marketing   Catering 
Franchising 
Minutes of the First Session 
S/C/M/49, (1 December 2000), “Report of the first session of the review mandated 
under paragraph 5 of the air transport annex held on 28-29 September 2000”. 
S/C/M/49/Corr.1 (17 January 2001) “Report of the first session of the review mandated 
under paragraph 5 of the air transport annex held on 28-29 September 2000”, 
Corrigendum.194 
                                          
194 This was a text correction requested by Mexico.  Their intervention (paragraph 65) was falsely 
attributed to the United States. 
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Dedicated Second Session 4-5 December 2000 
Secretariat Papers 
S/C/W/163Add.1  (25 October 2000) 
S/C/W/163Add.2  (10 November 2000) 
ICAO/OECD Papers 
S/C/W/181   (27 November 2000)   OECD 
S/C/W/182   (30 November 2000)   ICAO 
Written Submissions 
S/C/W/179  (14 November 2000)   Australia  
S/C/W/185  (1 December 2000)   New Zealand 
S/C/W/186  (4 December 2000)   EC 
“Review of Air Transport Services under Paragraph 5 of the Annex on Air Transport 
Services (Date and number unknown)   New Zealand 
Informal paper  (13 November 2000)   Australia 
Oral Interventions (over both days) 
Australia  US     El Salvador 
ICAO   Brazil     Cuba 
Switzerland  Hong Kong, China   Japan 
EC   Dominican Republic   Uruguay 
New Zealand  Morocco    Columbia 
Turkey   Mexico     Egypt 
Canada  Chile 
Scheduled Topic Discussions 
Fuelling 
Ground handling 
Air Navigation 
General Aviation 
General Aspects of Commercial Aviation 
Minutes of the Second Session 
S/C/M/50 (5 March 2001) “Report of the second session of the review mandated under 
paragraph 5 of the air transport annex held on 4 December 2000”. 
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Dedicated Third Session:  9 October 2001 
Secretariat Papers 
S/C/W/163Add.3   (13 August 2001) 
S/C/W/163Add.4   (15 August 2001) 
S/C/W/163Add.5   (13 August 2001) 
S/C/W/163Add.6   (16 August 2001) 
S/C/W/200    (3 October 2001) 
S/C/W/200Add.1   (28 February 2002) 
ICAO Papers 
S/C/W/188    (11 January 2001) 
S/C/W/199    (2 October 2001) 
Written Submissions 
S/C/W/201   (4 October 2001)   Brazil 
S/C/W/201/Corr.1  (18 March 2002)   Brazil 
S/C/W/168    (26 September 2000)   EC 
S/C/W/41    (22 December 2000)   EC 
S/CSS/W/92    (26 June 2001)    New Zealand195 
S/C/W/198   (3 October 2001)   US 
S/C/W/198/Corr  (18 March 2002)   US 
S/CSS/W/59   (21 March 2001)   Norway196  
Oral Interventions (over both days) 
Brazil    New Zealand    Australia 
Brunei    Japan     Chile 
Venezuela   US     Canada 
EC    Cuba     Jordan 
Turkey    Argentina    Uruguay 
Dominican Republic  ICAO      
Scheduled Topic Discussions 
Freedoms of the air 
Agreements: bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral 
Ownership and control 
Alliances and code-sharing 
Slot allocation 
Non-scheduled services 
Cargo 
Multimodal 
Minutes of the Third Session and the Special Session 
S/CSS/M/12 (28 November 2001), “Report of the Meeting Held on 5, 8, 12 October 
2001”. 
S/C/M/57 (13 February 2002), “Report of the third session of the review mandated 
under paragraph 5 of the air transport annex held on 9 October 2001”. 
                                          
195 This paper was actually submitted in a Council for Trade in Services meeting and not an Air 
Transport Review meeting, although it was raised and discussed in the Review meetings. 
196 This paper was actually submitted in a Council for Trade in Services meeting and not an Air 
Transport Review meeting, although it was raised and discussed in the Review meetings. 
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Dedicated Fourth Session:  18 March 2002 
Secretariat Papers 
S/C/W/200/Add.1 
Written Submissions 
S/C/W/198/Corr.1  (12 March 2002)  Brazil (de-restricting 
        S/C/W/198)  
Job(02)/ 27   (12 March 2002 
Job(01)/153    (17 October 2001)  Chile 
S/C/W/206  (18 March 2002)  Australia, Chile, & New
     Zealand 
Scheduled Topic Discussions 
S/C/W/200/Add.1  (28 February 2002)  Part Two of Secretariat
     Executive Summary 
 Oral Interventions (over both days) 
Australia   European Communities United States 
New Zealand   Switzerland   Cuba 
Chile    Canada   Mexico 
Dominican Republic  Brazil    India 
Morocco   Japan    Uruguay 
Minutes of the Fourth Session 
S/C/M/62 (17 October 2002), “Report of the fourth session of the review mandated 
under paragraph 5 of the air transport annex held on 18 October 2002”. 
Non-dedicated Fifth Session: 2 October 2003 
Written Submissions 
S/C/W/206   (18 March 2002)  Australia, Chile, New 
        Zealand 
Oral Interventions 
ICAO    Canada   Indonesia 
Cuba    EC    New Zealand 
Australia   Dominican Republic  Switzerland 
Japan    Brazil    Turkey 
US    Mexico    Argentina 
Chile    Korea 
Norway   India 
Minutes of the Fifth Session 
S/W/M/68 (2, 9, 24 October 2003), “Report of the Meeting Held on 2, 9 and 24 
October 2003”. 
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Non-dedicated Sixth Session:  9 October 2003 
Written Submissions 
Job(03)/117 (June 2003)     ICAO 
Job(03)/193 (2 October 2003)    Australia/New Zealand 
Oral Presentations 
ICAO 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Oral Interventions  
ICAO    Chile    Brazil 
Cuba    Norway   Mexico68 
Australia   Canada   Korea 
Japan    EC    India 
New Zealand   Dominican Republic  Indonesia 
US    Switzerland 
Minutes of the Sixth Session 
S/C/M/68 (28 November 2003) “Report of the Meeting Held on 2, 9, and 24 October 
2003”. 
Non-dedicated Seventh Session:  23 October 2003 
Minutes of the Seventh Session 
S/C/M/68 (28 November 2003) “Report of the Meeting Held on 2, 9, and 24 October 
2003” 
Council for Trade in Services Special Session 
Meetings when air transport services excluded from the GATS are 
raised by Members in written and/or oral submissions during the 
period the Air Transport Review was open. 
S/CSS/W/59   (21 March 2001)  Norway 
TN/S/M/1   (5 June 2002)   Minutes (pp 32-36) 
S/CSS/M/12   (28 November 2001)  Minutes (pp 47-48)
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Appendix 4 
First Air Transport Review Session 28-29 September 2000 
Member 
States 
Should GATS 
Coverage be 
expanded?197 
Who has 
authority to 
amend the Annex 
Delegates noting 
Member’s 
authority198 
Is the Review a 
negotiation? 
Should 
expansion be 
discussed after 
the Review? 
Desire for 
clarification of 
the Annex199 
 Yes No N-O200 CTS GC Min MS Sec 
N-
C201 
Yes No N-C Yes No N-C Yes No N-C 
Poland  9              9   
New Zealand 9               9   
Chile 9               9   
Australia 9   9            9   
EC 9   9      9      9   
Egypt  9         9     9   
Switzerland 9   9            9   
US  9           9      
Japan  9     9    9  9202    9  
Canada 9            9203      
Senegal  9         9        
Jordan  9                 
Guatemala   9                
Cuba  9              9   
Brazil  9         9  9   9   
                                          
197 In the category of Member States saying that coverage should not be expanded include those who explicitly stated or implied that ICAO should be the primary 
multilateral forum for economic regulations for international air transport. 
198 There were requests for the Secretariat to provide points of clarification on the GATS and the Air Transport Annex, and requests for the secretariat to undertake 
more work.  Other members responded to remind others that it is a member driven body and therefore the secretariat should not undertake any work that might have 
interpretive elements. 
199 This is in the context of members asking the Secretariat for interpretations of the Annex wording of what is directly related to traffic rights. 
200 N-0 represents No Objection. 
201 N-C represents No Comment. 
202 Although Japan said they supported the US position on this issue, the US did not make the statement in the actual Session, indicating the position was agreed to in 
another location and time. 
203 Ibid. 
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Member States 
Should GATS 
Coverage be 
expanded? 
Who has 
authority to 
amend the 
Annex 
Delegates noting 
Members States’ 
authority 
Is the Review a 
negotiation? 
Should expansion 
be discussed after 
the Review 
concludes? 
Desire for 
clarification of 
the Annex 
 Yes No N-O CTS GC Min MS Sec N-C Yes No N-C Yes No N-C Yes No N-C 
Korea  9          9 9204      
Columbia 9   9               
Uruguay  9    9     9      9  
Hong Kong 
China 
9               9   
Indonesia  9                 
Tunisia  9                 
Thailand 9  9             9   
Singapore 9   9               
Norway 9                  
Argentina  9     9          9  
Mexico  9                 
El Salvador                9   
ICAO  9                 
                                          
204 This is implied in their intervention where they agreed with the position of the US and Japan.  Again it is noted that the US do not make this statement in the actual 
Review Session. 
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Appendix 5 
Second Air Transport Review Session 4-5 December 2000 
Member States 
Does the CTS have the authority 
to make recommendations to 
other WTO bodies?205 
Conclude the 
Review in 
this Session? 
Retain the 
status quo 
of the 
bilateral? 
 
Ministerial 
Council 
General 
Council 
  
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Australia      9   
Switzerland         
EC 9  9   9   
New Zealand 9  9   9   
Turkey         
Canada         
US  9  9  9   
Brazil  9  9  9   
Hong Kong China 9  9      
Dominican 
Republic 
  
 
     
Morocco  9  9   9  
Mexico  9  9  9   
Chile 9  9      
El Salvador 9  9   9   
Cuba         
Japan         
Uruguay  9  9   9  
Egypt         
Switzerland         
Note:  All the countries listed gave either oral or written submissions to the Session, however some 
only commented on specific sub-sectors.   
                                          
205 In addition to Members stating their opinions during the session, the secretariat was asked to give a 
legal opinion regarding the authority of the Council for Trade in Service (CTS) to make a 
recommendation to the General Council and/or the Ministerial Council.   
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Appendix 6 
Positions on whether sub-sectors are directly related to the 
exercise of traffic rights 
Member 
States 
Franchising 
Freight 
Forwarding 
Warehousing 
Rental and 
Leasing 
Catering 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Poland           
New Zealand          9 
Chile  9  9  9    9 
Australia           
EC  9  9  9  9  9 
Egypt           
Switzerland    9      9 
US 9      9206    
Japan           
Canada          9207 
Senegal           
Jordan 9          
Guatemala           
Cuba           
Korea 9          
Uruguay           
Hong Kong, 
China 
          
Indonesia           
Tunisia 9      9208    
Thailand           
Singapore           
Norway           
Argentina           
Mexico           
Columbia  9  9  9  9  9 
ICAO           
                                          
206 The US and Tunisia both referred specifically to ‘wet leasing’.  “A widespread method used by air 
carriers to obtain equipment or increase their fleet capacity is through leasing:  a leased aircraft is an 
aircraft used under a contractual leasing arrangement; a wet-leased aircraft includes a crew; a dry-
leased aircraft does not include crew; a damp-leased aircraft is a term used in some cases to refer to 
a wet-leased aircraft that includes a cockpit crew but not cabin attendants.  In this connection, the term 
lessor means the party from which the aircraft is leased and the term lessee is the party to which the 
aircraft is leased.”  (bold and italics are in the original) Manual on the Regulation of International Air 
Transport. ICAO Doc 9626 1st ed. 1996. p. 5.2.2. 
207 Although recorded as a comment by Canada in this first Session, it was submitted again in a later 
Session. 
208 Ibid. 
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Appendix 7 
Positions on whether sub-sectors are directly related to the 
exercise of traffic rights 
Member States Fuelling 
Ground 
handling 
Airport 
Services 
Air 
Navigation 
General 
Aviation 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Australia      9  9   
Switzerland  9209  9       
EC  9210  9  9 -211 - - 9212 
New Zealand  9  9  9    9 
Turkey    9       
Canada213  9 9   9 9    
US         9214  
Brazil   9        
Hong Kong, China   - -215       
Dominican 
Republic 
  - -216       
Morocco   9        
Mexico 9  9  9  9  9  
Chile  9  9       
El Salvador           
Cuba           
Japan           
Uruguay           
Columbia  9  9  9  9  9 
Egypt           
ICAO           
Secretariat  9         
 
                                          
209 Switzerland considers that ground-handling is not directly related to traffic rights and considers 
fuelling to be a part of ground-handling, therefore both are recorded in separate columns. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Dashes have been entered to represent a neutral position when comments were made on this sub-
sector that was so non-definitive that the actual position could not be determined.  
212 In this case, the EC suggested that only taxi services and fractional ownership, which are both 
considered elements of general aviation might be directly related to traffic rights. 
213 Canada specifically listed: catering, airport management services, cleaning and disinfecting aircraft as 
being not directly related to traffic rights. 
214 The US spoke specifically about air taxi services and that they are included in the US/Canada 
bilateral. 
215 Hong Kong, China was not against expanding coverage to ground-handling per say and stated their 
neutrality.  However, they also tended to side with the EC’s position. 
216 The Dominican Republic spoke on behalf of El Salvador and Honduras, taking the same position as 
Hong Kong, China.  See footnote 7. 
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Appendix 8 
Cases:  GDP per Capita Constant 2000 US$217 
Country Name 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Austria 20,649.80 20,953.31 21,343.16 21,658.81 22,482.70 23,037.23 23,765.65 23,884.44 24,108.51 24,217.02 
Belgium 19,264.13 19,679.56 19,872.09 20,509.74 20,878.72 21,498.83 22,268.39 22,333.60 22,389.76 22,544.44 
Denmark 25,914.22 26,510.44 27,002.53 27,687.49 28,281.00 28,928.02 29,630.32 29,985.07 30,203.86 30,261.90 
Finland 18,083.86 18,637.42 19,298.81 20,446.40 21,413.84 22,084.37 23,183.51 23,358.32 23,838.76 24,225.47 
France 19,555.90 19,819.67 19,975.42 20,292.20 20,914.12 21,504.37 22,216.57 22,568.11 22,722.52 22,722.93 
Germany 20,627.77 20,951.86 21,042.79 21,294.76 21,717.66 22,151.30 22,750.01 22,908.64 22,900.33 22,868.17 
Greece 8,783.53 8,899.65 9,045.73 9,315.63 9,577.44 9,861.24 10,267.94 10,637.02 11,006.49 11,448.74 
Ireland 15,116.27 16,463.05 17,645.37 19,408.41 20,835.69 22,877.49 24,848.36 26,035.26 27,374.06 27,932.03 
Italy 16,624.01 17,084.95 17,218.73 17,523.96 17,818.20 18,096.42 18,629.98 18,953.82 19,026.80 19,090.25 
Luxembourg 34,023.56 34,031.89 34,654.95 37,005.34 39,081.56 41,616.34 44,756.77 45,205.65 45,564.90 46,067.20 
Netherlands 19,467.86 19,956.00 20,487.00 21,150.73 21,942.73 22,665.01 23,282.77 23,389.44 23,293.78 22,973.43 
Portugal 8,452.17 8,788.67 9,074.88 9,402.46 9,794.31 10,121.62 10,405.31 10,516.02 10,485.03 10,283.82 
Spain 11,564.45 11,863.04 12,112.16 12,471.28 12,977.95 13,408.69 13,870.68 14,183.02 14,407.88 14,691.25 
Sweden 22,347.26 23,120.60 23,387.32 23,940.00 24,806.11 25,925.42 27,011.80 27,184.82 27,662.01 27,998.08 
United Kingdom 20,624.63 21,176.33 21,706.90 22,377.15 23,025.60 23,614.87 24,445.45 24,895.21 25,226.26 25,742.44 
EC 15 Ave 18,739.96 19,195.76 19,591.19 20,298.96 21,036.50 21,826.08 22,755.57 23,069.23 23,347.40 23,537.81 
New Zealand 16,132.78 16,556.05 16,870.97 16,892.72 16,815.36 17,541.62 17,902.25 18,380.67 18,905.21 19,243.35 
Brazil 3,285.25 3,376.20 3,420.80 3,487.32 3,446.09 3,430.24 3,537.52 3,535.99 3,559.82 3,510.23 
Canada 19,460.13 19,836.74 19,940.18 20,568.03 21,222.90 22,228.83 23,198.01 23,402.02 23,950.22 24,222.24 
Chile 3,942.41 4,295.10 4,546.84 4,814.95 4,936.62 4,816.44 4,964.40 5,040.21 5,089.31 5,195.58 
United States 29,550.48 29,941.64 30,703.73 31,716.04 32,671.27 33,748.21 34,599.47 34,401.26 34,788.76 35,566.15 
Australia 17,306.61 17,826.56 18,243.69 18,830.88 19,599.18 20,103.65 20,284.65 20,818.91 21,126.33 21,688.46 
Japan 34,767.20 35,304.23 36,417.24 36,995.37 36,485.64 36,437.28 37,408.91 37,491.37 37,282.96 38,222.07 
                                          
217 World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
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Appendix 9 
Great Circle Distances218 
Member 
State Code AKL AMS CDG FRA GRU JFK LAX LHR MAD MIA NRT ORD YUL YVR YYZ SCL SYD 
New 
Zealand AKL 0 11,269 11,516 11,304 7,485 8,828 6,504 11,404 12,175 8,050 5,472 8,184 8,931 7,043 8,616 6,011 1,345 
EC AMS 11,269 0 I I 6,059 3,643 5,578 I I 4,633 5,805 4,120 3,430 4,804 3,732 7,445 10,348 
EC CDG 11,516 I 0 I 5,829 3,635 5,670 I I 4,589 6,048 4,152 3,442 4,939 3,751 7,240 10,527 
EC FRA 11,304 I I 0 6,073 3,855 5,806 I I 4,832 5,836 4,343 3,648 5,025 3,952 7,506 10,249 
Brazil GRU 7,485 6,059 5,829 6,073 0 4,745 6,156 5,863 5,192 4,072 11,489 5,222 5,042 6,858 5,075 1,626 8,318 
US JFK 8,828 3,643 3,635 3,855 4,745 0 I 3,451 3,589 I 6,745 I 333 2,449 366 5,097 9,950 
US LAX 6,504 5,578 5,670 5,806 6,156 I 0 5,456 5,845 I 5,451 I 2,474 1,081 2,175 5,569 7,488 
EC LHR 11,404 I I I 5,863 3,451 5,456 0 I 4,425 5,974 3,953 3,249 4,723 3,556 7,227 10,573 
EC MAD 12,175 I I I 5,192 3,589 5,845 I 0 4,424 6,707 4,201 3,459 5,249 3,774 6,648 10,983 
US MIA 8,050 4,633 4,589 4,832 4,072 I I 4,425 4,424 0 7,436 I 1,404 2,801 1,233 4,118 9,336 
Japan NRT 5,472 5,805 6,048 5,836 11,489 6,745 5,451 5,974 6,707 7,436 0 6,274 6,449 4,674 6,415 10,666 4,486 
US ORD 8,184 4,120 4,152 4,343 5,222 I I 3,953 4,201 I 6,274 I 748 1,764 436 5,299 9,232 
Canada YUL 8,931 3,430 3,442 3,648 5,042 333 2,474 3,249 3,459 1,404 6,449 748 0 I I 5,430 9,954 
Canada YVR 7,043 4,804 4,939 5,025 6,858 2,449 1,081 4,723 5,249 2,801 4,674 1,764 I 0 I 6,533 7,757 
Canada YYZ 8,616 3,732 3,751 3,952 5,075 366 2,175 3,556 3,774 1,233 6,415 436 I I 0 5,332 9,663 
Chile SCL 6,011 7,445 7,240 7,506 1,626 5,097 5,569 7,227 6,648 4,118 10,666 5,299 5,430 6,533 5,332 0 7,060 
Australia SYD 1,345 10,348 10,527 10,249 8,318 9,950 7,488 10,573 10,983 9,336 4,486 9,232 9,954 7,757 9,663 7,060 0 
 
                                          
218 The distances used for this data table are absolute mileage (shortest distance) and not what is used for actual flight planning or flights.  Great Circle Mapper, 
http://gc.kis2.com. 
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Appendix 10 
Member State Air Services Agreement Types 
Bilateral and Plurilateral Agreements          
Country  AUS BRA CAN CHL NZL USA JPN GBR IRE FRA DEU 
Australia AUS 0  MBI None CAA MBl/CR7PR MBII MBII BII MBI MBII 
Brazil BRA  0 MBI  MBII  MBI     
Canada CAN MBI MBII 0 MBII MBI OS-N/A* MBI MBII MBII MBII MBII 
Chile CHL None  MBII 0 PL* PL*      
New Zealand NZL CAA MBII MBI PL* 0 PL* MBI MBII MBII MBI MBII 
United States USA MBI/CR7PR  
OS-
N/A* PL* PL* 0 MBII   OS* OS-PR* 
Japan JPN MBII MBI MBI None MBI MBII 0 MBI   MBI 
UK GBR MBII  MBII  MBII  MBI  0 CAA CAA CAA 
Ireland IRE BI  MBII  MBII   CAA 0 CAA CAA 
France FRA MBI  MBII  MBI OS*  CAA CAA 0 CAA 
Germany DEU MBII  MBII  MBII OS-PR* MBI CAA CAA CAA 0 
Spain ESP   MBII  MBII  MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Luxembourg LUX     MBII OS*  CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Portugal PRT   MBII   OS*  CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Greece GRC MBI  MBII    MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Italy ITA MBI  MBI  MBII OS-C&R MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Belgium BEL   MBII   OS-PR MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Austria AUT MBI  MBII  MBII OS MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Sweden SWE   MBII  MBII OS MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Netherlands NLD MBI  MBII   OS MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Denmark DNK   MBI  MBII OS MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Finland FIN   MBII   OS MBI CAA CAA CAA CAA 
It is assumed that most bilateral agreements have undergone some degree of change through exchanging diplomatic notes to accommodate 
technical and commercial changes over time. 
Classification:  Bermuda I, BI, Modified Bermuda I, MBI, Bermuda II, BII, Modified Bermuda II, MBII, Open Skies, OS; Plurilateral, PL; and 
Common Aviation Area, CAA 
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Member State Air Services Agreement Types cont’d 
Bilateral and Plurilateral Agreements          
Country  ESP LUX PRT GRC ITA BEL AUT SWE NLD DNK FIN 
Australia AUS    MBI MBI  MBI  MBI   
Brazil BRA            
Canada CAN MBII  MBII MBII MBI MBII MBII MBII MBII MBI MBII 
Chile CHL            
New 
Zealand NZL MBII MBII   MBII  MBII MBII  MBII  
United 
States USA  OS* OS*  OS-C&R OS-PR OS OS OS OS OS 
Japan JPN MBI   MBI  MBI MBI MBII MBI MBI MBI 
UK GBR CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Ireland IRE CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
France FRA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Germany DEU CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Spain ESP 0 CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Luxembourg LUX CAA 0 CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Portugal PRT CAA CAA 0 CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Greece GRC CAA CAA CAA 0 CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Italy ITA CAA CAA CAA CAA 0 CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Belgium BEL CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 0 CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Austria AUT CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 0 CAA CAA CAA CAA 
Sweden SWE CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 0 CAA CAA CAA 
Netherlands NLD CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 0 CAA CAA 
Denmark DNK CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 0 CAA 
Finland FIN CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA CAA 0 
In the cases where descriptions of the bilateral could not be located, the original signing date was used to classify it as MBI or MBII; OS*:  
Open Skies, Cargo 7th Freedom 
Australian Treaties Library, Civil Aviation.  http://.austrliin.edu.au/au/other/dat/subjects/Civil_Aviation.html. 
U.S. Department of State, Open Skies Partners, 22 November 2005.  http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2005/22281.htm. 
Japan, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, Civil Aviation Bureau, “Bilateral Agreements”, January 2005, 
http://www.milt.go.jp.koku/english/09_data/03_bilateral.html. 
Canadian Transportation Agency, “Report of Bilateral Air Relations Between Canada and Other Countries”, 2000, http:/www.cta-otc.gc.ca/air-
aerien/agreements/main_e.html#1. 
Ministry of Transport, New Zealand, “New Zealand's Air Services Agreements”, http://www.transport.govt.nz/publications/211201-07.php. 
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Appendix 11 
Cases:  Flag Carrier Revenue/Loss 
Country Airline 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Australia Qantas  133,800 187,200 197,800 206,900 263,800 324,300 223,200 224,800 201,200 461,600 
Brazil Varig 16,148 -7,432 96,396 -60 -22 -53 -98 -687,155 -1,014,127 -536,480 -29,831 
Canada Air Canada 93,138 38,372 109,196 307,536 -10,449 143,584 -55,406 -470,622 -509,448 -1,338,698 -674,292 
Chile LAN Airlines 6,336 25,368 38 64,115 30,990 48 48,386 10,842 30,808 83,555 163,552 
Japan Japan Airlines  -12,162 5,092 -81,514 -763,690 204,243 6,384 259,832 -279,471 152,890 -788,600 280,400 
 All Nippon Airways 42,633 31,940 34,542 -21,689 -51,195 -142,041 -261,893 -103,198 -139,205 84,906  
US United Airlines 40,136 340,794 533,744 931,911 802,635 1,203,761 51,624 -2,110,209 -3,325,781 -3,086,226
-
2,002,091 
 American Airlines 268,493 207,766 573,819 780,242 1,062,900 625,814 778,003 -1,317,176 -3,495,660 -1,318,491 -820,981 
 Delta Air Lines 
-
159,627 510,036 249,024 934,043 1,077,552 1,285,559 686,463 -1,107,053 -1,294,969 -895,593
-
3,362,180 
 Continental  -613,342 223,545 319,551 384,948 382,938 498,470 340,906 -95,142 -451,002 38,156 -362,965 
 Northwest 429,845 506,325 578,817 603,522 -241,269 287,839 269,943 -418,102 -766,429 478,109 -757,299 
 US Airways -716,183 32,990 183,232 1,052,159 559,073 273,469 -254,804 -1,989,407 -1,658,803 -1,452,056 -577,855 
US Ave.  -125,113 303,576 406,365 781,138 607,305 695,819 312,023 -1,172,848 -1,832,107 -1,039,350
-
1,313,895 
D Lufthansa 175,424 134,238 369,992 480,559 812,779 666,424 633,601 -568,026 679,526 -1,113,002 502,730 
NL KLM 270,490 342,088 135,164 1,099,896 268,789 344,979 69,684 -138,594 -409,627 27,988  
F Air France -229,136 
-
580,963 40,402 312,907 259,420 236,193 428,874 116,295 93,756 86,983 82,158 
UK British Airways 389,906 740,135 874,871 737,227 126,408 365,025 347,667 -160,853 -44,564 217,972 466,728 
UK Virgin Atlantic -13,282 40,408 54,676 103,589 141,813 57,550 49,729 -114,242 55,282 3,766 39,609 
 British Midland 5,037 4,362 5,105 19,612 11,992 19,890 11,726 10,772 -19,013 -8,541 -3,580 
EU Ave.  99,740 113,378 246,702 458,965 270,200 281,677 256,880 -142,441 59,227 -130,806 181,274 
New Zealand Air New Zealand  165,00 150,300 104 86,000 113,200 93,500 -758,000 -240,300 86,400 104,300 
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Appendix 12 
National Airport Cargo Volumes Freight Million Tons per Kilometre (FTKs) 
Country  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
New Zealand Country Total  580.3 745.0 928.4 826.2 855.6 817.1 763.0 687.5 800.5 
Australia Country Total 1,737.5 1,833.7 1,953.8 1,904.4 1,693.0 1,730.7 1,678.1 1,544.7 1,355.4 
Chile Country Total 775.4 806.2 1,071.2 1,246.2 1,139.4 1,312.0 1,277.3 1,098.0 1,130.2 
US Country Total 19,622.9 21,676.4 25,478.8 25,757.9 27,292.2 30,166.0 27,920.0 31,761.9 34,205.6 
Japan Country Total 6,538.0 6,801.3 7,504.6 7,514.1 8,225.6 8,672.0 7,614.1 8,183.4 7,985.4 
Brazil Country Total 1,581.9 1,644.8 1,789.9 1,642.8 1,462.9 1,534.5 1,467.4 1,539.7 1,478.4 
Canada Country Total 1,637.4 1,781.0 1,956.5 1,805.7 1,881.6 1,800.0 1,604.5 1,757.0 1,496.3 
EC Total Total  27,730.1 29,277.4 28,307.1 25,992.3 27,578.6 30,748.3 28,978.8 29,839.6 30,633.9 
EC Top 6 Ave. Average  4,219.6 4,444.1 4,227.2 3,871 4,113 4,525.3 4,300.8 4,486.9 4,608.8 
Germany Country Total  5,835.9 6,036.3 6,183.9 6,233.8 6,610.7 7,127.7 7,026.2 7,195.8 7,297.6 
NL Country Total  3,742.2 3,902.4 3,893.1 3,833.4 4,053.0 4,367.3 4,115.9 4,203.6 4,330.7 
Italy Country Total  1,469.6 1,459.1 1,443.3 1,475.9 1,614.6 1,748.4 1,521.0 1,393.8 1,358.8 
Belgium Country Total  594.6 590.9 677.6 473.0 535.4 1,017.5 852.8 655.4 604.6 
Denmark Country Total  133.5 172.2 202.6 201.1 199.0 198.9 184.2 185.1 171.0 
Austria Country Total  173.3 192.1 236.3 265.5 340.8 407.8 358.0 396.0 430.7 
France Country Total  4,577.7 4,842.6 5,132.0 4,773.6 4,968.4 5,224.3 4,825.2 5,030.2 5,067.3 
Sweden Country Total  192.0 249.6 293.6 294.2 291.0 289.3 263.8 266.8 252.9 
Ireland Country Total  107.0 102.1 122.1 129.6 138.0 167.6 158.8 116.1 121.8 
Spain Country Total  689.6 739.6 740.2 767.1 816.0 879.5 878.9 807.4 876.1 
Portugal Country Total  194.0 210.9 248.5 247.5 225.1 225.5 209.4 194.9 205.7 
Finland Country Total  211.5 236.8 294.0 276.0 251.9 280.7 171.1 215.6 255.7 
Greece Country Total  117.0 118.7 129.1 112.6 103.4 129.8 96.9 80.9 62.7 
UK Country Total  6,830.6 7,618.1 6,450.6 4,663.5 4,925.2 5,160.9 4,548.5 4,940.5 5,250.5 
Luxembourg Country Total  2,861.6 2,806.0 2,260.2 2,245.5 2,506.1 3,523.1 3,768.2 4,157.5 4,347.8 
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Cargo FTKS International and Domestic Loaded and Unloaded (1995-1999) 
Country Airport Code 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
EC    
Germany Country Total   5835.9 6036.3 6183.9 6233.8 6610.7
 Frankfurt/Main FRA 1,297,165 1,338,149 1,373,203 1,333,481 1,404,355
 Munich MUC 64,551 75,911 95,560 95,172 114,259
Luxembourg Country Total   2,862 2260.2 2245.5 2506.1
 Luxembourg LUX 286,159 280,529 339,448 381,617 447,422
Netherlands Country Total   3742.2 3902.4 3893.1 3833.4 4053
 Amsterdam Schiphol AMS 977,531 1,082,846 1,161,234 1,171,256 1,180,717
Italy Country Total   1469.6 1459.1 1443.3 1475.9 1614.6
 Rome Fiumicino FCO 256,982 259,285 243,130 209,735 144,479
 Milan Malpensa MXP 126,225 97,997 123,007 169,064 244,975
Belgium Country Total  594.6 590.9 677.6 473 535.4
 Brussels National BRU 426,564 450,711 518,440 585,592 661,985
Denmark Country Total   133.5 172.2 202.6 201.1 199
 Copenhagen CPH n/a n/a 387,669 374,141 389,318
Austria Country Total   173.3 192.1 236.3 265.5 340.8
 Vienna Intl VIE 92,570 94,558 106,982 108,214 118,581
France Country Total   4577.7 4842.6 5132 4773.6 4968.4
 Paris Charles D.G. CDG 824,269 866,112 950,669 940,273 1,228,123
 Paris Orly ORY 276,163 246,369 222,495 202,283 131,080
Sweden Country Total   192 249.6 293.6 294.2 291
 Stockholm Arlanda ARN 104,312 112,853 113,472 108,554 112,692
Ireland Country Total   107 102.1 122.1 129.6 138
 Dublin DUB 60,152 67,302 84,700 93,758 103,089
Spain Country Total   689.6 739.6 740.2 767.1 816
 Madrid Barajas MAD 230,122 242,555 265,801 266,350 294,398
Portugal Country Total   194 210.9 248.5 247.5 225.1
 Lisbon LIS 89,306 89,991 99,679 99,896 96,992
Finland Country Total   211.5 236.8 294 276 251.9
 Helsinki Vantaa HEL 77,971 83,526 84,749 83,308 77,376
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Greece Country Total   117 118.7 129.1 112.6 103.4
 Athens Athinai ATH n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
UK Country Total   6830.6 7618.1 6450.6 4663.5 4925.2
 London Heathrow LHR 1,042,762 1,052,543 1,169,474 1,209,187 1,265,845
 London Gatwick LGW 232,069 277,184 269,921 275,084 294,628
 London Stansted STN 93,032 107,186 130,503 180,725 179,708
 Manchester MAN 51,303 80,913 94,558 101,698 107,679
 East Midlands EMA 82,800 104,663 126,824 123,586 128,864
Australia Country Total   1737.5 1833.7 1953.8 1904.4 1693
 Sydney Kingsford Smith SYD n/a n/a 530,601 523,829 463,027
 Melbourne Tullamarine MEL n/a n/a n/a 376,595 363,565
 Cairns Int'l CNS 26,852 33,748 11,309 17,908 11,184
 Brisbane Int'l BNE 93,072 93,300 n/a n/a n/a
New Zealand Country Total   580.3 745 928.4 826.2 855.6
 Auckland Int'l AKL 180,363 175,873 174,199 169,085 170,245
 Christchurch Int'l CHC 29,704 30,790 n/a 35,598 38,538
 Wellington Int'l WLG n/a n/a n/a 40 30
Chile Country Total   775.4 806.2 1071.2 1246.2 1139.4
 Santiago SCL 168,544 195,141 n/a 259,593 257,507
US Country Total   19,622.90 21,676.40 25,478.80 25,757.90 27,292.20
 Memphis MEM 1,669,334 1,889,636 2,183,095 2,330,863 2,379,104
 Los Angles LAX 1,421,494 1,538,873 1,681,303 1,624,391 1,709,256
 Miami MIA 1,513,155 1,632,157 1,683,320 1,709,902 1,566,708
 New York JFK JFK 1,485,373 1,512,468 1,543,678 1,472,883 1,589,809
 Louisville SDF 1,335,584 1,353,412 1,331,101 1,382,461 1,431,001
 Chicago  ORD 996,133 996,134 1,165,321 1,205,128 1,316,666
 Newark EWR 869,286 885,147 969,215 974,701 983,786
 Atlanta ATL 544,956 572,264 628,230 677,468 653,596
 Dallas/Fort Worth DFW 594,440 594,516 628,565 593,492 608,923
 Dayton Int'l DAY 665,924 761,400 806,925 711,501 702,404
 San Francisco Int'l SFO 558,274 564,288 619,637 598,580 655,410
 Oakland Int'l OAK 513,267 583,719 641,277 660,632 631,069
 Indianapolis Int'l IND 292,204 393,528 443,260 508,149 633,117
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 Philadelphia Int'l PHL 417,850 430,952 415,374 443,142 482,513
 Honolulu HNL 328,729 348,967 413,497 351,834 390,872
 Boston Logan Int'l BOS 330,829 337,281 369,446 364,554 373,773
 Ontario Int'l ONT 336,148 377,347 396,275 394,365 427,250
 Denver Int'l DEN 256,280 261,299 294,224 293,318 306,259
 Seattle Tacoma Int'l SEA 309,679 285,977 281,147 294,141 300,501
 Minneapolist/St Paul MSP 241,741 239,533 251,534 239,887 248,857
 Detroit Int'l DTW 221,463 226,433 217,620 206,591 229,851
 Houston Intercont'l IAH 228,511 236,443 250,130 271,989 273,706
Japan Country Total   6,538 6,801.30 7504.6 7514.1 8225.6
 Fukuoka Int'l FUK 225,300 229,125 242,802 237,315 259,964
 Nagoya NGO 151,930 144,943 n/a 131,893 158,030
 Osaka Kansai Int'l KIX 464,060 558,329 711,328 735,235 831,526
 Osaka Osaka Int'l ITM 127,758 136,335 141,848 133,513 135,577
 Tokyo Narita Int'l NRT 1,619,091 1,574,381 1,688,688 1,598,531 1,797,544
 Tokyo Int'l Haneda HND 536,583 554,048 583,913 586,144 615,108
Brazil Country Total   1581.9 1644.8 1789.9 1642.8 1462.9
 Sao Paulo  GRU 371,231 380,932 360,247 313,901 356,910
 Rio De Janeiro GIG 131,390 136,062 142,907 128,569 103,975
Canada Country Total   1637.4 1781 1956.5 1805.7 1881.6
 Toronto L.B. Pearson Int'l YYZ n/a n/a 368,302 358,712 375,094
 Vancouver Int'l YVR 173,631 199,197 242,436 235,437 244,986
 Montreal Mirabel Int'l YMX n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
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Cargo FTKS International and Domestic Loaded and Unloaded (2000-2004) 
Country Airport Code 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EC    
Germany Country Total   7127.7 7026.2 7195.8 7297.6 n/a 
 Frankfurt/Main FRA 1,573,242 1,476,263 1,494,876 1,527,048 1,723,601 
 Munich MUC 124,859 123,385 144,398 140,585 170,828 
Luxembourg Country Total   3523.1 3768.2 4157.5 4347.8 n/a 
 Luxembourg LUX 499,907 509,034 549,491 656,638 712,503 
Netherlands Country Total   4367.3 4115.9 4203.6 4330.7 n/a 
 Amsterdam Schiphol AMS 1,222,595 1,183,208 1,239,900 1,306,155 1,421,023 
Italy Country Total   1748.4 1521 1393.8 1358.8 n/a 
 Rome Fiumicino FCO 153,314 134,097 130,755 127,685 132,019 
 Milan Malpensa MXP 290,979 277,591 280,420 306,625 347,065 
Belgium Country Total  1017.5 852.8 655.4 604.6 n/a 
 Brussels National BRU 676,364 559,998 509,673 581,338 622,671 
Denmark Country Total   198.9 184.2 185.1 171 n/a 
 Copenhagen CPH n/a 379,037 373,694 335,731 335,649 
Austria Country Total   407.8 358 396 430.7 n/a 
 Vienna Intl VIE 126,836 111,001 113,612 115,651 145,602 
France Country Total   5224.3 4825.2 5030.2 5067.3 n/a 
 Paris Charles D.G. CDG 1,410,484 1,361,000 1,399,000 1,496,800 1,637,600 
 Paris Orly ORY 107,347 100,000 111,000 92,500 102,609 
Sweden Country Total   289.3 263.8 266.8 252.9 n/a 
 Stockholm Arlanda ARN 120,535 112,775 123,200 104,978 75,610 
Ireland Country Total   167.6 158.8 116.1 121.8 n/a 
 Dublin DUB 109,391 130,317 108,385 n/a n/a 
Spain Country Total   879.5 878.9 807.4 876.1 n/a 
 Madrid Barajas MAD 311,021 295,944 295,711 307,026 341,177 
Portugal Country Total   225.5 209.4 194.9 205.7 n/a 
 Lisbon LIS 104,254 82,903 81,028 83,486 88,212 
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Finland Country Total   280.7 171.1 215.6 255.7 n/a 
 Helsinki Vantaa HEL 80,571 14,338 13,983 101,635 109,006 
Greece Country Total   129.8 96.9 80.9 62.7 n/a 
 Athens Athinai ATH n/a n/a 106,813 101,124 109,210 
UK Country Total   5160.9 4548.5 4940.5 5250.5 n/a 
 London Heathrow LHR 1,307,075 1,180,290 1,234,973 1,233,464 1,325,185 
 London Gatwick LGW 319,636 280,070 242,633 222,964 218,267 
 London Stansted STN 168,692 167,493 186,262 200,105 227,451 
 Manchester MAN 117,886 108,677 116,527 123,540 149,876 
 East Midlands EMA 179,135 195,348 219,871 n/a n/a 
Australia Country Total   1730.7 1678.1 1544.7 1355.4 n/a 
 Sydney Kingsford Smith SYD 533,658 509,760 n/a n/a n/a 
 Melbourne Tullamarine MEL n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Cairns Int'l CNS 11,717 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 Brisbane Int'l BNE n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
New Zealand Country Total   817.1 763 687.5 800.5 n/a 
 Auckland Int'l AKL 163,070 163,762 168,969 177,254 197,462 
 Christchurch Int'l CHC 35,988 32,635 30,941 29,886 30,347 
 Wellington Int'l WLG n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Chile Country Total   1312 1277.3 1098 1130.2 n/a 
 Santiago SCL 292,774 318,034 285,415 255,703 269,660 
US Country Total   30,166 27,920 31,761.90 34,205.60 n/a 
 Memphis MEM 2,452,649 2,601,028 3,375,625 3,378,423 3,548,983 
 Los Angles LAX 1,815,174 1,612,890 1,696,028 1,745,869 1,829,911 
 Miami MIA 1,557,782 1,568,250 1,584,891 1,593,688 1,734,381 
 New York JFK JFK 1,690,005 1,379,999 1,513,055 1,578,219 1,625,575 
 Louisville SDF 1,510,029 1,462,220 1,520,845 1,615,236 1,736,847 
 Chicago  ORD 1,293,357 1,144,453 1,085,142 1,360,093 1,367,003 
 Newark EWR 970,833 828,205 754,879 884,865 902,697 
 Atlanta ATL 655,983 589,712 640,697 687,159 766,733 
 Dallas/Fort Worth DFW 670,895 570,649 571,934 555,921 609,319 
 Dayton Int'l DAY 667,888 479,799 359,355 326,081 333,536 
 San Francisco Int'l SFO 692,745 516,184 501,201 483,413 489,759 
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US cont’d Oakland Int'l OAK 653,746 572,293 629,358 592,733 639,352 
 Indianapolis Int'l IND 761,139 791,448 868,434 871,403 924,029 
 Philadelphia Int'l PHL 493,621 472,946 517,855 502,579 548,448 
 Honolulu HNL 343,432 250,554 334,749 338,140 345,777 
 Boston Logan Int'l BOS 386,552 337,777 358,099 337,795 344,342 
 Ontario Int'l ONT 444,110 399,681 472,001 509,033 538,012 
 Denver Int'l DEN 306,694 255,593 289,572 276,677 281,629 
 Seattle Tacoma Int'l SEA 309,822 294,286 286,594 279,502 284,611 
 Minneapolis/St Paul MSP 255,785 232,739 262,965 278,830 288,904 
 Detroit Int'l DTW 218,627 180,229 199,838 196,155 211,923 
 Houston Intercont'l IAH 274,093 261,221 273,022 330,076 349,205 
 Country Total   8672 7614.1 8183.4 7985.4 n/a 
Japan Fukuoka Int'l FUK 271,430 247,828 246,221 240,114 260,550 
 Nagoya NGO 180,583 162,177 178,762 n/a n/a 
 Osaka Kansai Int'l KIX 966,764 837,918 776,292 765,634 860,194 
 Osaka Osaka Int'l ITM 147,783 137,273 131,349 146,600 159,658 
 Tokyo Narita Int'l NRT 1,885,692 1,630,918 1,950,081 2,102,453 2,322,170 
 Tokyo Int'l Haneda HND 656,708 609,460 592,834 613,589 651,419 
 Country Total   1534.5 1467.4 1539.7 1478.4 n/a 
Brazil Sao Paulo  GRU 348,245 351,961 374,595 395,892 411,927 
 Rio De Janeiro GIG 117,859 109,095 95,477 81,463 84,699 
 Country Total   1800 1604.5 1757 1496.3 n/a 
Canada Toronto L.B. Pearson Int'l YYZ 392,000 303,988 n/a n/a n/a 
 Vancouver Int'l YVR 229,235 208,293 214,479 196,007 215,768 
 Montreal Mirabel Int'l YMX n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Tokyo International (Haneda) is primarily a domestic freight airport.  The amount of international freight is significantly less than the domestic 
freight. 
Sources:  ACI Worldwide Airport Traffic Report 1996-2004; World Bank Development Report for the consolidated annual freight figures; and World 
Bank Development Indicators. 
 228 
Appendix 15 
Net Revenue (US$mil) Airport Management Services Corporations 
Country Company 1995 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 
US Houston Airport Systems    465.8 not incl'd  270 
Canada Vancouver Int'l Airport      n/a  213 
 Authority        
Australia/UK Macquarie Airports       1,212 
New Zealand Infratil     not incl'd  116 
Switzerland Unique 11.6 31.1 30  not incl'd  514 
EC:         
France Aeroports de Paris 69.3 89 71.1 1,201 1,215 1.5b 2,265 
France VINCI     160  582 
Italy Aero porti de Roma 34.4 63.2 52.6  467  693 
Italy SEA Aeroporti di Milano 31.4 35.1 39.8  475  769 
Spain Abertis       269.1 
Spain Aena 144.7 119.1 n/a  1,417  2,616 
Spain Ferrovial       764 
UK BAA 489.9 658.2 454.6 3.15b 2,716 3.0b 3,903 
UK Alterra Partners     n/a   
UK Wiggins     9.6   
UK Manchester Airports 28 70.1 35  372  689 
 Group        
UK Peel Airports       65.5 
UK TBI     267   
Denmark Copenhagen Airports 44.1 58 48.9  240  416 
Ireland Dublin Airport Authority*       580 
Ireland Aer Rianta  68.9 63.8  392   
Austria Flughafen Wien 25 57.4 n/a  287  521 
Germany Fraport** 30.9 59.1 51.6 1.5b 1,536 2b 2,542 
Germany Hochtief     n/a  N/A 
Netherlands Schiphol 90.9 150 126.6  633  1,131 
Sources:  WTO (S/C/W/163Add.1); Airline Business (2002), (2004); Air Transport Data Intelligence (2005). 
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